against Women and other international human rights instruments, and that its elimination is an
integral part of efforts towards the elimination of violence against women [emphasis added]”.
Such an understanding of the intention and objective behind the term sex goes beyond a mere
reasonable interpretation, especially since the word “gender” was not defined at the time in
any international human rights treaty leading up to CEDAW. Following the adoption of CEDAW,
the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court included the term “gender”; however it
was defined as referring to two sexes, male and female.
It can therefore be inferred that the
understanding of States that are parties of international treaties such as CEDAW, supported
by a
long history of stat
e practice
, is that the term
“woman” referred to a biological female.
While CEDAW did not define “gender”, the Committee in charge of monitoring the its
implementation (hereafter, the “CEDAW Committee”) has defined the term “gender” in its
general recommendations. These general recommendations are not binding, yet they are
recognized to constitute authoritative guidance to States Parties. In General Recommendation
No. 28, the CEDAW Committee defined “gender” as “socially constructed identities, attributes
and roles for women and men and society’s social and cultural meaning for these biological
differences resulting in hierarchical relationships between women and men [emphasis
added]”.
“This understanding of gender clarifies that the term ‘gender’ is not to be equated
with women”.
It is also clear that the CEDAW Committee did not equate a person who may
identify as a woman and a man with someone who is a woman or a man – the latter being
defined as either biologically male or female.
While not addressing or defining the terms “sex” or “gender”, many foundational human rights
treaties, and declarations, including CEDAW, enshrine a prohibition of discrimination based on
sex which can only be taken to mean as referring to biological sex
. In General
Recommendation No. 28, the CEDAW Committee reiterated that “the objective of the
Convention is the elimination of all forms of discrimination against women on the basis of sex”.
States have an obligation to guarantee non-discrimination in the enjoyment of human rights,
including based on sex (i.e. biological sex). Articles 2 and 3 of the ICCPR mandates States
Parties to take all steps necessary, including the prohibition of discrimination on the ground of
sex, putting an end to discriminatory actions, both in the public and the private sector which
impair the equal enjoyment of rights by women.
Based on the above analysis of relevant international law, it is clear that sex and gender are
two different concepts. However, international law does not permit any derogation to the
prohibition of discrimination against women based on sex. Where tension may arise between
Commission on Human Rights, Res 1994/45, preambular para. 13.
Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (opened for signature 17 July 1998, entered into force 1
July 2002) 2187 UNTS 90, art. 7(3).
Committee on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW Committee),
'General Recommendation No. 28 on the Core Obligations of States Parties under Article 2 of the
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women' (16 December 2010) UN
Doc CEDAW/C/GC/28, para. 5.
Chinkin et al, the UN Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women: A
Commentary, p. 17
Chinkin et al, the UN Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women: A
Commentary, p. 15
CEDAW Committee, General Recommendation No. 28, para. 4.
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (opened for signature 16 December 1966, entered