1
EUROPEAN
COMMISSION
Brussels, 8.11.2023
COM(2023) 690 final
COMMUNICATION FROM THE COMMISSION TO THE EUROPEAN
PARLIAMENT, THE COUNCIL, THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL
COMMITTEE AND THE COMMITTEE OF THE REGIONS
2023 Communication on EU Enlargement Policy
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2023 Communication on EU Enlargement Policy
I. INTRODUCTION
EU enlargement is a driving force for long-term stability, peace and prosperity across the
continent. EU membership is a geostrategic investment in a strong, stable and united Europe
based on common values. It is a powerful tool to promote democracy, the rule of law and
respect for fundamental rights. A credible, merit-based prospect of EU membership is the key
driver of transformation and thus enhances our collective security and socio-economic
prosperity. It is essential for fostering reconciliation and stability on the European continent.
The geopolitical significance of EU enlargement was further underlined in 2022, when
Ukraine, the Republic of Moldova
1
and Georgia applied to become EU members in the wake
of Russia’s unprovoked and unjustified war of aggression against Ukraine, with the European
Council
2
recognising the European perspective of Ukraine, Moldova and Georgia and
granting Ukraine and Moldova candidate status. The granting of candidate status to Bosnia
and Herzegovina in December 2022 was an important step in maintaining the momentum of
the enlargement process.
Today, the Western Balkans, Türkiye
3
, Ukraine, Moldova and Georgia have a historic
window of opportunity to strongly bind their future to the European Union. Accession is and
will remain a merit-based process fully dependent on the objective progress achieved by each
enlargement partner. Therefore, the enlargement countries will have to act with determination
to implement the necessary reforms and make tangible and irreversible progress, starting with
the fundamentals of the EU accession process. The rule of law, in particular the
independence and functioning of the judiciary and the fight against corruption, fundamental
rights, the economy, the functioning of democratic institutions and public administration
reform continue to be the cornerstones of the enlargement policy.
EU membership is a strategic choice. Partners must embrace and promote EU values firmly
and unequivocally. Alignment with the EU’s common foreign and security policy is a more
significant signal than ever of shared values and strategic orientation in the new geopolitical
context.
II. KEY DEVELOPMENTS
A united response to Russia’s war of aggression
The last 2 years were marked by Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine. The Office of
the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) recorded more than
27 000 civilian casualties in Ukraine, including 9 600 killed
4
, with the exact number of deaths
expected to be much higher. Humanitarian needs remain high: 17.6 million people in Ukraine,
49% of the country’s total population
5
, and 6.2 million in refugee-hosting countries
6
, continue
to need multi-sectoral humanitarian assistance. The war has also caused devastation and
destruction of production and property, disruption of trade, diminished investment, the
erosion of human capital, and immense damage to the environment.
1
Hereinafter ‘Moldova’.
2 EUCO 24/22.
3
In line with the request of the Republic of Türkiye regarding the use of the country's new official name in
English, this document uses the name “Türkiye” instead of “Turkey” in English. This administrative change is
limited to the nomenclature used in EU documents, does not have a retroactive effect, and entails no legal
consequences. This approach is without prejudice to the nomenclature used by Member States.
4
Figures as of end of August 2023.
5
United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, August 2023.
6
United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, September 2023
3
The EU’s response to Russia’s war of aggression was unprecedented, united, determined and
immediate. The 27 EU Member States and their partners around the world condemned the
unprovoked and unjustified war of aggression. They acted swiftly, isolating Russia
politically and economically, condemning the violations of international humanitarian law and
supporting steps to ensure full accountability for war crimes and other violations committed in
connection with Russia’s war of aggression. The EU has adopted so far 11 packages of far-
reaching sanctions against Russia and Belarus. Demonstrating its unwavering support for
Ukraine, the EU continues to provide broad humanitarian, financial, economic and
military support to the country. Through a ‘Team Europe’ approach, the EU, its Member
States and financial institutions have so far mobilised EUR 82.6 billion (September 2023;
incl. EUR 25 billion in military support), including funding made available to host refugees in
the EU. The Council extended until March 2025 the temporary protection for people having
fled the war against Ukraine, providing certainty for more than 4 million Ukrainians currently
living in the EU. In response to Russia’s blockage of the Ukrainian Black Sea Ports, since
May 2022, the EU, together with Ukraine and Moldova, has been implementing the EU-
Ukraine Solidarity Lanes, which connect Ukraine and Moldova to the European Union,
facilitating their trade with the EU and the rest of the world, including in critical products
such as grains. The Commission supports a range of efforts to monitor and record the
environmental damage. The EU will continue to support Ukraine as long as it takes.
The European Commission, together with Ukraine and G7 partners, set up in January 2023
the Multi-agency Donors’ Coordination Platform to coordinate support for Ukraine’s
immediate financing needs and future economic recovery and reconstruction.
In June 2023, the European Commission proposed a dedicated medium-term financing
instrument that will provide Ukraine with coherent, predictable and flexible support for the
period 2024-2027. The new Ukraine Facility
7
will support efforts to sustain macro-financial
stability and will promote recovery. The plan is for the Facility to be endowed
with EUR 50 billion in grants and loans for 2024-2027.
The EU also delivered two comprehensive support packages to Moldova
8
, particularly to
address the impact on the country from Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine. Moldova
has faced a major influx of refugees from Ukraine, soaring inflation, threats to its energy
supplies, violations of its airspace, and a multitude of hybrid hostile actions such as staged
protests, massive disinformation campaigns and cyberattacks.
Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine generates fear in the broader region, including in
Georgia. In this context, security and defence, countering hybrid and cybersecurity threats
continue to be among the priority areas for EU-Georgia cooperation. A total of EUR 62
million has been mobilised in support to the Georgian Defence Forces through the European
Peace Facility.
The European Commission put forward in December 2022 an Energy Support Package of
EUR 1 billion for the Western Balkans
9
. Addressing the immediate, short-term and medium-
term needs in the region, the substantial energy support package helped the Western Balkan
partners to begin decreasing their dependence on Russian fossil fuels, accelerate
decarbonisation and improve the region’s energy security. The EU stepped up its support in
cybersecurity, also in light of several cyberattacks in the Western Balkan countries. The
7
2023/0200 (COD)
8
The European Union will grant the Republic of Moldova another EUR 250 million; Support Package for the
Republic of Moldova.
9
https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/AC_23_3196
4
European Commission co-hosted a High-Level Cybersecurity Conference in June 2023 in
Brussels.
Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine has impacted the enlargement countries, in
particular Ukraine as the victim of the aggression, and EU Member States, with major
economic and social challenges. Confronted with growing foreign instability, strategic
competition and security threats, the EU has assumed more international responsibility and
has taken further decisive steps towards reducing dependencies and building a more robust
economic base. These objectives are relevant for all enlargement countries.
EU enlargement gaining new momentum
The enlargement agenda gained new momentum in June 2022, when the European
Council endorsed the Commission’s recommendations, recognising the European
perspective of Ukraine, Moldova and Georgia and granting Ukraine and Moldova
candidate country status. This followed the applications for EU membership submitted by
the three countries in spring 2022, and the Opinions
10
presented by the European Commission
in June same year. The European perspective has reinforced the countries’ determination to
carry out the necessary reforms required by the EU accession process, in particular the
steps/priorities mentioned in the Commission Opinions. The Commission as of now reports
on the fulfilment of these steps/priorities as part of its regular enlargement package, in which
Ukraine, Moldova and Georgia are included as of this year.
In the Western Balkans, the first Intergovernmental Conference with Albania and with
North Macedonia on accession negotiations took place in July 2022, followed by the
analytical examination of the EU acquis (screening) process, which is due to be finalised in
December 2023. In December 2022, the European Council granted Bosnia and Herzegovina
EU candidate status on the understanding that the country implements the steps specified in
the Commission’s October 2022 communication on enlargement policy
11
. In December 2022,
Kosovo
∗
applied for EU membership. The EU agreed in spring 2023 on visa liberalisation for
Kosovo, applicable from 1 January 2024.
Engagement at high level with the enlargement countries continued. During the November
2022 Western Balkan Summit of the Berlin Process, the Commission announced a
substantial Energy Support Package of EUR 1 billion in EU grants to help the Western
Balkans address the immediate consequences of the energy crisis and build resilience in the
short and medium term. The EU-Western Balkans Summit took place in December 2022 in
Tirana. The fact that the summit was organised for the first time in the region was a clear sign
of the EU’s full and unequivocal commitment to the European Union membership perspective
of the Western Balkans. The EU welcomed the breakthrough in the negotiations for three new
Common Regional Market agreements facilitating freedom of movement and employment
across the region. A roadmap for lowering roaming costs between the EU and the Western
Balkans was adopted in the margins of the summit.
On 6 October 2023, at the informal meeting of heads of state or government in Granada,
EU leaders reconfirmed enlargement as a geo-strategic investment in peace, security, stability
and prosperity
12
. They highlighted that aspiring members need to step up their reform efforts,
notably in the area of rule of law, in line with the merit-based nature of the accession process
and with the assistance of the EU. In parallel, the Union needs to lay the necessary internal
10
COM(2022) 405 final, COM(2022) 406 final, COM(2022) 407 final.
11
COM(2022) 528 final.
∗
This designation is without prejudice to positions on status, and is in line with UNSCR 1244/1999 and the ICJ
Opinion on the Kosovo Declaration of Independence.
12
https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2023/10/06/granada-declaration/
5
groundwork and reforms for further enlargement, to complete the European Union. As a
concrete expression of EU support for the enlargement partners, it is crucial to mobilise the
corresponding funding, including in the context of the mid-term revision of the current multi-
annual financial framework
13
.
The Berlin Process Summit on 16 October 2023, held for the first time in the region – in
Tirana, saw progress in the Common Regional Market, with the signature of the Agreement
on recognition for professional qualifications for midwives, vets, nurses and pharmacists and
a number of joint statements related to regional cooperation. It was also an opportunity to
discuss the EU Growth Plan for Western Balkans with the leaders of the region and to
inaugurate the representation office of the College of Europe in Tirana including launching of
the enrolment of students for academic year 2024/25.
Accession negotiations with Türkiye are at a standstill since 2018, in line with the decision of
the Council. Türkiye remains a key partner for the European Union and a candidate country,
and highlights the EU accession as its strategic goal. Nevertheless, Türkiye has continued to
move away from the EU, mainly on account of continuing backsliding in the areas of
fundamental rights and rule of law, including the independence of the judiciary, and the lack
of reforms in some sectoral issues.
The 2016 EU-Turkey Statement remained the key framework for cooperation on migration
and continued to yield results, despite continued challenges over its implementation. Türkiye
continues to host 3.6 million refugees. Türkiye also continued to play a key role in addressing
migration along the Eastern Mediterranean route. The Commission expects Türkiye to uphold
its commitments under the EU-Turkey statement, in line with the European Council
conclusions of October 2021, including prevention of irregular migration from land and sea
routes, and resuming returns.
In line with the European Council conclusions of 2021
14
on a positive agenda with Türkiye,
the Commission engaged in high-level dialogue with the Turkish authorities on agriculture
and rural development, on climate change, as well as on research and innovation, and
launched the newly established Turkey Investment Platform. The next EU-Türkiye high-level
dialogue on migration and security is scheduled to take place on 23 November 2023. The EU
has a strategic interest in a stable and secure environment in the Eastern Mediterranean and in
the development of a cooperative and mutually beneficial relationship with Türkiye. The
European Council in June 2023 invited the High Representative and the Commission to
submit a report to the European Council on the state of play of EU-Türkiye relations
15
,
building on the instruments and options identified by the European Council, and with a view
to proceeding in a strategic and forward-looking manner.
Since the start of Russia’s aggression against Ukraine, the EU relations with Ukraine have
attained an unprecedented level. The 24
th
EU-Ukraine Summit and a meeting between the
College of Commissioners and the Government of Ukraine took place in Kyiv in February
2023. The first ever EU–Ukraine informal foreign ministers meeting in Kyiv gathered
Ukraine, the EU and the 27 Member States on 2 October 2023. The EU reiterated its
unwavering support and commitment to Ukraine’s independence, sovereignty and territorial
integrity within its internationally recognised borders and to the country’s EU path.
On 1 June 2023, Moldova hosted the second meeting of the European Political Community,
bringing together 45 European leaders to discuss joint efforts for peace and security, as well
as energy resilience and connectivity and mobility in Europe.
13
COM(2023) 336
14
EUCO 7/21.
15
EUCO 7/23.
6
Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine has further underlined the need for unity and
solidarity among the EU and its closest partners and thus the importance of common foreign
and security policy (CFSP) alignment in the enlargement process. Continued full alignment
by Albania, Montenegro and North Macedonia remained a strong signal of their strategic
choice of EU accession. Ukraine’s overall cooperation and alignment with the EU’s CFSP
increased. The significant increase in the CFSP alignment rates of Moldova and Bosnia and
Herzegovina, and Kosovo’s continued unilateral alignment, were also important
confirmations of their strategic direction towards the EU, although the implementation of
sanctions remains a challenge in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Serbia maintained its alignment
pattern over the reporting period and is expected, as a matter of priority, to fulfil its
commitment and progressively align with the EU CFSP, including on EU restrictive
measures, in line with its negotiating framework, and to avoid actions and statements that go
against EU positions on foreign policy. Georgia’s alignment with CFSP remains low and the
country is expected to reverse this trend. Türkiye made no progress on CFSP alignment
during the reporting period, maintaining a very low rate. Türkiye continued to refrain from
aligning with the EU restrictive measures against Russia. Its rhetoric in support to terrorist
group Hamas following its attacks against Israel on 7 October 2023 is in complete
disagreement with the EU approach. At the same time, Türkiye, together with the UN,
facilitated the export of Ukrainian grain via the Black Sea through the Black Sea Grain
Initiative, until Russia’s unilateral suspension of the mechanism. Partners continued their
valued contributions to common security and defence policy missions and operations.
The Western Balkans, Türkiye, Ukraine, Moldova and Georgia continued to align with the
EU, when voting on the majority of relevant UN General Assembly resolutions related to
Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine. As a non-permanent member of the UN Security
Council, Albania continued to be actively engaged in promoting and defending international
law, the UN Charter and the rules-based international order.
Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Moldova and Ukraine joined the Union Civil Protection
Mechanism. They achieved significant progress in civil protection by increasing their
administrative and operational capacity to demonstrate EU solidarity. The participating states
of the Union Civil Protection Mechanism have the same rights and obligations as the EU
Member States under the mechanism.
The Commission encourages all enlargement countries to be more ambitious and strengthen
their coordinated action on the green transition, especially by prioritising the mainstreaming
of the European Green Deal in all policy areas. The countries who are party to the Energy
Community Treaty are encouraged to implement commitments under the Energy
Community’s Decarbonisation Roadmap and prepare for the Emissions Trading System in
line with the Energy Community recommendation.
III. THE ENLARGEMENT COUNTRIES ON THEIR WAY TO THE EU
Montenegro has all chapters open for negotiations, three of which are provisionally closed.
The next milestone is meeting the interim benchmarks for the rule of law chapters. Serbia has
22 out of 35 negotiating chapters open, 2 of which are provisionally closed. The path towards
opening further clusters will depend on progress by the country, in particular on the pace of
rule of law reforms and normalisation of relations with Kosovo.
In line with the revised methodology
16
, in this Communication’s conclusions and
recommendations, the Commission assesses the overall balance in the accession
negotiations with Montenegro and with Serbia and proposes the way ahead for each country.
16
COM(2020) 57 final.
7
The next intergovernmental conferences could take place following publication of the present
annual package of reports.
Following the first Intergovernmental Conference with Albania and with North Macedonia
on 19 July 2022, the Commission launched the screening process immediately. All sessions
on cluster 1 (fundamentals), cluster 2 (internal market), cluster 3 (competitiveness and
inclusive growth) and cluster 4 (Green Agenda and sustainable connectivity) have taken
place. Explanatory and bilateral sessions for the remaining two clusters are ongoing or
scheduled until December 2023. The screening reports for the fundamentals cluster were
presented to the Council in July 2023. The authorities have consistently stated their political
commitment to the strategic goal of EU integration and their ambition to move forward in the
accession negotiations based on continuing reform progress.
After the October 2022 general elections in Bosnia and Herzegovina, a new state-level
Council of Ministers took office in late January, and a new government of the Federation
entity took office in early May 2023. Following the granting of candidate status in December
2022, the new ruling coalition declared advancing on the EU path as a top priority of its
coalition agreement and expressed commitment to addressing the 14 key priorities from the
Commission’s Opinion on Bosnia and Herzegovina’s application for membership of the EU,
Bosnia and Herzegovina’s Council of Ministers adopted several strategies (on terrorism,
organised crime, money laundering and migration) and draft laws. Parliament adopted a
number of laws related to the 14 key priorities and the steps specified in the Commission
recommendation for candidate status. The Constitutional Court quashed several legal and
political acts adopted by the Republika Srpska entity as being in breach of the constitutional
and legal order. The reintroduction of criminal penalties for defamation in the Republika
Srpska entity in July 2023 severely impacts the environment for civil society and represents a
major step backwards in the protection of fundamental rights. A draft law targeting civil
society groups as ‘foreign agents’ was adopted in the first reading by the entity assembly; if
fully adopted, would mark another regrettable and undeniable major step backwards. In June
2023, the Republika Srpska entity adopted two laws on the non-implementation of the
Constitutional Court’s rulings and the High Representative’s decisions, thereby breaching the
constitutional and legal order of the country.
The Council of the EU and the European Parliament adopted the decision on visa
liberalisation for Kosovo in spring 2023. In December 2022, Kosovo applied for EU
membership. The situation in the north of Kosovo during the reporting period was
characterised by several crises of varying intensity on a number of issues, with a violent
attack against Kosovo Police on 24 September 2023 constituting the gravest escalation in
recent years. Other crises were triggered by issues over licence plates, which led to the
collective resignation of Kosovo Serbs from Kosovo institutions in November 2022.
Kosovo and Serbia reached an Agreement on the Path to Normalisation and its
Implementation Annex in February and March 2023 respectively. Both Kosovo and Serbia are
yet to start implementation of their respective obligations stemming from the Agreement,
which are binding for the Parties and part of their European paths.
The EU and Türkiye continued engagement in line with the European Council conclusions of
2021. Türkiye is a candidate country and a key partner for the EU in essential areas of joint
interest such as trade, migration, counterterrorism, public health, climate, energy, transport
and regional issues. Accession negotiations remain at a standstill, as Türkiye has not reversed
the negative trend of moving away from the European Union, with serious backsliding in a
number of key areas. On energy, Türkiye continues to be an important and reliable transit
country for the EU. The EU immediately responded in solidarity to the February 2023
earthquakes that struck south-eastern Türkiye with rescue teams and in-kind support via the
Union Civil Protection Mechanism, and contributed to mobilising an overall pledge of
8
EUR 6 billion by the international community. Both sides are successfully cooperating to
implement the EUR 1 billion of assistance pledged by the EU. The Customs Union between
the EU and Türkiye continued to benefit both sides. Full respect of EU restrictive measures
should be ensured, in particular taking into consideration the free circulation of products
within the EU-Turkey Customs Union.
The Commission’s Opinion on Ukraine’s application for membership of the EU identified 7
steps for Ukraine to proceed on its EU accession path. The European Council granted
candidate status to Ukraine and invited the Commission to report on the implementation of
the 7 steps as an integral part of this package.
The Commission’s Opinion on Moldova’s application for membership of the EU identified 9
steps for Moldova to proceed on its EU accession path. The European Council granted
candidate status to Moldova and invited the Commission to report on the implementation of
the 9 steps as an integral part of this package.
The Commission’s Opinion on Georgia’s application for membership of the EU identified 12
priorities for Georgia to proceed on its EU accession path. The European Council expressed
readiness to grant the status of candidate country to Georgia once these priorities have been
addressed. The European Council invited the Commission to report on the implementation of
these priorities as an integral part of this package.
IV. FUNDAMENTALS OF THE EU ACCESSION PROCESS
The rule of law, fundamental rights, the functioning of democratic institutions, public
administration reform and the economic criteria form the core of what is known as the
‘fundamentals’ of the EU accession process. Quality of institutions and governance is the
basis for enhancing competitiveness, prosperity and societal well-being, and underpin the
ability to comply with the EU acquis across the board. Credible and irreversible reforms on
the fundamentals are crucial for enlargement countries to secure progress on their respective
EU accession paths. Over the past year, advancement on the reform agendas linked to the
fundamentals was noted particularly in Ukraine and Moldova in response to the
recommendations in the respective Commission’s Opinions.
The entrenchment of the rule of law requires an independent, impartial, accountable and
professional judicial system, which operates efficiently, and with adequate resources, free
from undue external interference and where decisions are executed effectively and in a timely
manner. Progress was achieved in some cases, with judicial reforms advancing, for instance in
Albania, Moldova, Serbia and Ukraine. However, in most enlargement countries judicial
bodies remain exposed to many challenges and vulnerabilities. Attempts by politicians in
several countries to publicly expose and pressure magistrates, particularly on sensitive cases,
remained a worrying practice. Institutional arrangements that negatively affect the
independence of judges and prosecutors remained in place, ultimately affecting the balance
and separation of powers. As a result, the judiciary’s credibility overall remained rather low,
including a common public perception of impunity. In several countries, justice reforms
revealed limited implementing capacity even where there is political will. Effectiveness of
investigative and judicial authorities, resulting in a credible track record of results, is essential
for further progress in the EU accession process.
The fight against corruption remains a priority for governments in the enlargement
countries. Corruption, including high-level corruption, continues to be widespread across
enlargement countries, and entanglement of public and private interests remains an issue of
concern. Some efforts were made to strengthen the fight against corruption. Mainstreaming of
anti-corruption measures across the most vulnerable sectors remains an important priority,
while law enforcement and judicial bodies require greater empowerment and independence.
Elements of state capture persist, with threats to democratic stability, high-level corruption
9
and undue influence by oligarchs being observed, alongside attempts by organised criminal
networks to infiltrate the economic and political systems, administrations, and media. These
challenges need to be urgently addressed through systemic and comprehensive approaches. A
key indicator of success will be a credible track record of proactive investigations,
prosecutions and final convictions related to corruption, organised crime and money
laundering. To be credible, all actors in the rule of law chain should produce solid results and
a track record of proactive investigations, prosecutions and final convictions related to
corruption, organised crime and money laundering.
Stable and consolidated democratic institutions and processes are a central pillar of the EU
accession process. The Commission has begun implementing a strengthened and streamlined
engagement with enlargement countries on the general framework for democracy, whether
this concerns the electoral process, the functioning of Parliament (including its oversight role
in government performance and policymaking and the still-excessive reliance on accelerated
procedures in many cases) or the role of civil society.
Most countries continued to be affected by marked political polarisation, lack of cross-party
cooperation, and shrinking space for civil society. Lack of effective cross-party dialogue
resulted in prolonged political impasse and the stagnation of reforms. In some cases,
parliamentary debates were marked by tensions, offensive language and occasional violent
incidents.
In a number of enlargement countries there was some progress on fundamental rights, with
greater understanding of the importance of these rights and freedoms being guaranteed. At the
same time, some negative trends continued, with gender-based violence remaining prevalent,
while freedom of media continued to be hindered by political and economic interests, which
weakens control over public authorities, opens space for foreign interference and undermines
communication about the EU. In some countries, positive initiatives are being put in place on
the rights of the child and persons with disabilities. In practice, however, the protection of
fundamental rights is negatively affected by insufficient implementation of laws and policies
and the ineffectiveness of redress mechanisms across the board. Challenges remain in
ensuring effective protection from all forms of hatred and discrimination, including that which
is directed towards minorities.
On justice, freedom and security, law enforcement and judicial cooperation between the EU
and enlargement countries continued to evolve positively, while challenges remain. The
Western Balkans continue to function as a hub for criminal activities and groups active in the
EU, being an important transit point for victims of trafficking in human beings, migrant
smuggling and illicit commodities, in particular for drugs entering the EU. Criminals and
criminal networks originating from the Western Balkans also have a significant impact on
serious and organised crime in other parts of the world. Türkiye remains the key transit
country for heroin trafficked to the EU. Organised crime groups from Moldova and Georgia
are active in migrant smuggling, organised property crime, trafficking in human beings,
cyber-dependent crime, non-cash payment fraud, excise fraud, and other types of crimes such
as document fraud. Ukraine is geographically at the crossroads of smuggling illegal goods to
the EU, and is also a source, and destination country for trafficking in human beings. Despite
the war-related challenges including stretched institutional capacities due to significant losses
of resources to fight organised crime, relevant Ukrainian institutions demonstrated remarkable
resilience and operational capabilities.
Ratification and correct implementation of international conventions in the field of judicial
cooperation in civil matters, in particular those developed by the Hague Conference on
Private International Law, is of the utmost importance in the perspective of future accession
of these countries to the EU.
10
Cooperation on counterterrorism and prevention of radicalisation is relevant for all
enlargement countries. Terrorism and violent extremism continued to pose a challenge and a
security threat. Hybrid threats, including disinformation, foreign information manipulation
and interference (FIMI) and cyberattacks, in particular against critical infrastructure, remain a
political and security challenge for the enlargement countries. After a steep increase last year
following Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine, these threats continue to pose a
considerable risk to both the EU and enlargement countries. The Joint Action Plan on
Counterterrorism for the Western Balkans has been the main framework for cooperation in
this matter since 2018.
Alongside an overall increase in irregular migratory flows, changing patterns in the Western
Balkan routes demand constant vigilance in particular as regards the illegal activity of
networks involved in migrant smuggling and trafficking in human beings. There is progress
on migration management capacities in the Western Balkans region. An EU Action Plan on
the Western Balkans was presented by the Commission in December 2022 to address
increasing flows of irregular arrivals to the EU via the Western Balkan route. The
implementation of this Action Plan has brought first results with a decrease of migratory
pressure on the Western Balkans route in 2023 thanks in particular to an increased political,
financial and operational engagement between the EU and the Western Balkan partners on
migration and an improved alignment with EU visa policy. Visa policy alignment with the EU
remains crucial for the good functioning of the visa-free regime of these partners with the EU.
Further efforts should continue to progress on all the strands of the Action Plan.
To help addressing the ongoing challenges along the Eastern Mediterranean route, the
Commission presented an EU Action Plan on the Eastern Mediterranean route in October
2023. It outlines operational measures to prevent irregular departures, combat smuggling,
provide legal pathways, improve border management, support return and readmission
cooperation, and sufficient reception capacity.
Russia’s war against Ukraine has led to a rise in the number of Ukrainian refugees. Moldova,
which hosts the highest number of Ukrainian refugees per capita among enlargement
countries, but also countries like Montenegro, Serbia, Albania and North Macedonia have
played a crucial role in hosting these refugees.
The quality of public administration and of the regulatory framework is crucial for the EU’s
long-term competitiveness
17
. Overall, enlargement countries remain at best moderately
prepared in terms of quality of their public administration. During the reporting period,
reform progress was very limited overall. Most recommendations from earlier years still
apply. A typical pattern is that a formal legal and institutional basis for a professional
administration is at least partially in place, but not systematically applied.
Since the start of Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine in February 2022, the majority
of the 10 enlargement economies have faced major economic and social challenges. In
Ukraine, GDP dropped by 29.1% in 2022, as the whole country was profoundly impacted by
Russia’s war of aggression resulting in significant pressure on macroeconomic stability. The
Western Balkan region’s GDP growth slowed to 3.2% in 2022, down from 7.7% rebound
from the COVID-19 impact in 2021, but the severity of the slowdown varied across
economies, with real GDP growth decelerating to 6.1% in Montenegro, 4.8% in Albania, 4%
in Bosnia and Herzegovina, 3.5% in Kosovo, 2.3% in Serbia and 2.1% in North Macedonia.
In Türkiye, GDP growth slowed to 5.6%. In Moldova, GDP contracted sharply by 5.9%,
while in Georgia GDP continued to grow at double-digit levels of 10.1%. Country-to-country
differences in the economic growth were mainly driven by direct and indirect consequences of
17
COM(2023) 168 final.
11
the war against Ukraine, including its impact on trade links, energy, food prices and refugee
flows. The economic outlook for the 10 economies remains surrounded by high uncertainty
about the war’s potential further consequences on growth, employment and social cohesion.
It is increasingly important that all 10 enlargement economies accelerate structural reforms
to enable a sustainable recovery in the medium term and advance their progress towards
meeting the economic criteria for EU membership. This involves ensuring the functioning of
market economies and demonstrating the capacity to cope with competitive pressure and
market forces within the EU.
A more detailed overview of the situation regarding the fundamentals of the EU accession
process across the enlargement countries can be found in annex 1.
V. ECONOMIC CONVERGENCE NEEDS TO BE ACCELERATED IN THE WESTERN BALKANS
In 2023, after 6 consecutive quarters of slowing growth, economic output in the Western
Balkan region expanded faster in the first quarter of 2023 than in the previous 3 months. The
region’s GDP growth accelerated marginally to 1.7% year on year from 1.6% in the preceding
quarter, as most countries except Albania and Bosnia and Herzegovina recorded a pick-up in
the rate of output growth. Growth was generally driven by net exports and recovering
investment. Private consumption showed a mixed performance, as it decelerated in most
countries and even turned negative in some cases, but continued to increase at a robust pace in
Montenegro.
Even before the COVID-19 pandemic, the economies of the Western Balkans faced major
challenges preventing them from taking full advantage of their economic potential. The
countries were lagging behind in reforming their economic structures and improving
competitiveness, and faced high unemployment rates (in particular among young people),
large skills mismatches, a persistent informal economy, unfriendly business environments and
low levels of innovation.
The investment climate in the Western Balkans is characterised by a weak rule of law, the
lack of adequate enforcement of State aid control, an entrenched grey economy, poor access
to finance, and low levels of regional integration and connectivity. State interference in the
economy persists, exacerbating the risk of corruption through weak public financial
management and frequent changes in the regulatory environment and taxes. There is a strong
need to upgrade infrastructure; investments should be channelled through single project
pipelines and be consistent with the priorities agreed with the EU.
Economic convergence is at the heart of EU membership benefits. For the Western Balkans,
convergence is low, at between 30 and 50% of the EU average (in terms of purchasing power
parity), and is not progressing fast enough. The experience of the fifth round of EU
enlargement demonstrates the positive impact that membership of the EU single market
combined with structural funds has on economic convergence.
12
Source: Eurostat, World Bank
Source: Eurostat, World Bank
To further accelerate reforms and deliver more in terms of socio-economic convergence of
the Western Balkans with the European Union, and to help the countries meet the
0
20
40
60
80
100
120
2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022
GDP per capita in PPS (EU27 = 100), 2011-2022
European Union - 27 countries (from 2020) Bosnia and Herzegovina
Montenegro North Macedonia
Albania Serbia
Kosovo
0 20 40 60 80 100 120
GDP per capita in PPS (EU27 = 100) in 2022
Kosovo Serbia
Albania North Macedonia
Montenegro Bosnia and Herzegovina
European Union - 27 countries (from 2020)
13
requirements of EU membership, the European Commission is proposing a new Growth Plan
for the Western Balkans
18
, which would bring forward some of the advantages and further
reform incentives of EU membership before accession.
VI. REGIONAL COOPERATION AND GOOD NEIGHBOURLY RELATIONS
In the Western Balkans, good neighbourly relations and regional cooperation are essential
elements of the stabilisation & association and enlargement processes.
After the successful introduction of Roam Like at Home within the six Western Balkan
economies as of 1 July 2021, further preparatory steps were taken towards lowering roaming
charges between the Western Balkans and the EU. A roadmap for lowering roaming costs
between the EU and the Western Balkans was adopted on the margins of the Tirana EU-
Western Balkans Summit in December 2022. The first phased reduction in charges started in
October 2023. The ultimate ambition of the process is to lower roaming prices with the EU to
a level close to domestic prices by 2027. On 31 May 2023, the EU and Moldova telecom
operators agreed to voluntarily lower roaming tariffs from January 2024, bringing Moldova
closer to the Roam Like at Home area.
There has been substantial technical work across the full range of areas covered by the
Common Regional Market initiative. This work, under the auspices of the Regional
Cooperation Council, the Central European Free Trade Agreement (CEFTA) and the
Western Balkans 6 Chamber Investment Forum, aims to enable freedom of movement for
people, professionals and the provision of electronic services, to facilitate employment and
trade and to ease customs procedures within the region. In November 2022, at the Berlin
Process Summit, leaders of the WB6 approved a number of ‘mobility agreements’ covering
travel within the region on the basis of ID cards, recognition of higher education
qualifications and recognition of professional qualifications. Once implemented, these
agreements will offer the right to ‘travel, study and work’ across the region. Additional green
and blue lanes have been established between Italy, and Montenegro and Albania
respectively, and between Croatia, and Montenegro and Bosnia and Herzegovina respectively,
with the active support of the Transport Community and CEFTA. More generally, the
Transport Community has played an important role supporting the Western Balkans in the
enlargement process through the implementation of the relevant EU transport acquis, and will
do likewise for Ukraine, Moldova and Georgia, following their closer association to the
Transport Community. However, disagreements on status issues between Serbia and Kosovo
continued to prevent the formal adoption of an increasing number of economically important
draft decisions technically agreed in the CEFTA framework. The region needs to show
political leadership to complete this work and to adopt legally binding agreements or
decisions among all Western Balkan partners for the benefit of their populations and
businesses. This requires joint focus on establishing the Common Regional Market, building
on EU rules and standards, and avoiding unilateral steps jeopardising this work.
The comprehensive normalisation of relations between Kosovo and Serbia through the
EU-facilitated Dialogue remains central to their European future and for the stability of the
whole region.
Existing bilateral agreements, including the Prespa agreement between Greece and North
Macedonia and the Treaty of Friendship, Good Neighbourliness and Cooperation between
Bulgaria and North Macedonia, need to be implemented in good faith by all parties.
In the Western Balkans, overcoming the legacy of the past and addressing disputes arising
from the conflicts of the 1990s remain key. Important outstanding bilateral issues still have to
18
COM (2023) 691
14
be solved, including border issues and delivering justice to war crimes’ victims, identifying
remaining missing persons, and establishing an accurate record of past atrocities at regional
level. There is no place in the EU for inflammatory rhetoric or the glorification of war
criminals, from any side.
Relations between Türkiye and Greece deteriorated until early 2023, however, the solidarity
shown by the Greek people and government after the February 2023 earthquakes prompted a
marked improvement in relations. High-level exchanges followed, including meetings at head
of state level.
During the reporting period, Türkiye did not engage in any unauthorised drilling activities in
the Eastern Mediterranean.
Pursuing dialogue in good faith and abstaining from unilateral actions which run counter to
the EU interests and violate international law and the sovereign rights of EU Member States is
an essential requirement to ensure stable and secure environment in the Eastern
Mediterranean and the development of a cooperative and mutually beneficial relationship
between the EU and Türkiye. Türkiye is expected to unequivocally commit to good
neighbourly relations, international agreements and to the peaceful settlement of disputes in
accordance with the United Nations Charter, having recourse, if necessary, to the International
Court of Justice.
The EU remains committed to defending its interests and those of its Member States as well
as to upholding regional stability.
It is of paramount importance that Türkiye commits and actively contributes to the
negotiations for a fair, comprehensive and viable settlement of the Cyprus issue within the
UN framework, on the basis of a bicommunal, bizonal federation with political equality, and
in accordance with the relevant UN Security Council resolutions, as well as in line with the
EU acquis and the principles on which the EU is founded. No unilateral action should be
taken that could raise tensions on the island and undermine a return to talks. Türkiye must
immediately reverse all actions and steps taken since October 2020 with regard to Varosha
that run contrary to relevant UN Security Council resolutions. Türkiye urgently needs to fulfil
its obligation of fully implementing the Additional Protocol to the EU-Turkey Association
Agreement and make progress towards normalising relations with the Republic of Cyprus.
Türkiye continued to advocate for a two-state solution, contrary to UN Security Council
Resolutions.
Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine has had an impact on relations with its bilateral
partners and neighbouring countries. The Ukrainian authorities have sought to maintain and
further strengthen cooperation and diplomatic ties with European countries.
Ukraine’s relations with the Western Balkan countries have improved overall, with diverging
views with Serbia and Bosnia and Herzegovina’s Republika Srpska entity over their relations
with Russia. Relations with Georgia have experienced some strain, notably due to non-
alignment by Georgia with the sanctions against Russia. Türkiye continues to be a strategic
partner for Ukraine, with important bilateral economic and people-to-people ties, evidenced
by a bilateral visa-free regime and a free trade agreement signed in February 2022. Türkiye
has also been a prominent participant in Ukraine’s International Crimea Platform.
Following Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine, Moldova stepped up cooperation with
Ukraine and Romania on humanitarian support for Ukrainian refugees, energy security,
transport and connectivity. Since the beginning of Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine,
the European Commission has provided more than EUR 48 million in humanitarian assistance
to Moldova to support both the Ukrainian refugees living in the country, and the Moldovan
families hosting them.
15
Bilateral cooperation with Ukraine continued to improve during the reporting period.
Moldova has shown solidarity with Ukraine since the start of Russia’s war, voted in favour of
relevant UN General Assembly resolutions, and aligned itself with a number of political
statements in international organisations that condemn the military aggression. The country
hosted and supported a large number of refugees, heavily relying on international
humanitarian donors, and actively supported the development of new trade routes under the
‘Solidarity Lanes’ initiative. In the aftermath of the Kakhovka dam destruction, Moldova
offered bilateral assistance to Ukraine to deal with the humanitarian consequences of the
disaster.
Georgia has had diplomatic relations with all its neighbours except the Russian Federation
since the war in 2008. Both sides participate in the Geneva International Discussion, co-
chaired by the EU, UN and the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe.
Georgia has a strategic partnership with Türkiye. Georgia continues to support Ukraine’s
territorial integrity and sovereignty, including through co-sponsorship of UN resolutions in
support of Ukraine, however it has not aligned with EU restrictive measures against Russia.
The resumption of flights between Russia and Georgia and the health conditions in prison of
former Georgian President Saakashvili, a Ukrainian citizen, have led to additional diplomatic
tensions.
Ukraine, Moldova and Georgia also continue to participate actively in the Eastern
Partnership.
Territorial cooperation enables the enlargement countries to work together and with
neighbouring EU Member States in key social and economic sectors. More specifically,
cross-border cooperation programmes create opportunities for dialogue and cooperation at
local government level, with the involvement of communities, the private sector and civil
society organisations. The EU Strategy for the Adriatic and Ionian Region and the EU
Strategy for the Danube Region have continued contributing to cooperation between Member
States and candidate countries, by fostering administrative capacity on different EU policies,
including cohesion policy; and offering a platform for cooperation.
VII. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
I.
1. In a rapidly changing geopolitical environment, the EU has demonstrated it is ready to
rise to the occasion by strengthening its stance on the world stage. In line with the aim of
the Union to promote peace, its values and the well-being of its peoples, EU enlargement
continues to be a powerful tool to promote democracy, the rule of law and respect for
fundamental rights. A credible, merit-based accession perspective is the key driver of
transformation and thus enhances our collective security and socio-economic prosperity. It
is essential for fostering reconciliation and stability on the European continent.
Responding to the call of history, we must now work on accelerating EU enlargement
and completing the Union.
2. The EU’s enlargement policy has already gained new momentum. A firm prospect of
EU membership for the Western Balkans, Ukraine, Moldova and Georgia is in the EU’s
very own political, security and economic interest and essential in the current geopolitical
context.
16
In the Granada declaration
19
, EU leaders recall that “Enlargement is a driver for
improving the economic and social conditions of European citizens, reducing disparities
between countries, and must foster the values on which the Union is founded.” They also
note that both the EU and future Member States need to be ready for a further enlarged
Union. For this, the Union needs to lay the necessary internal groundwork and reforms. At
the same time, it is essential that aspiring members step up their reform efforts, notably in
the area of rule of law, in line with the merit-based nature of the accession process and
with the assistance of the EU.
3. Significant developments have taken place on the EU enlargement agenda in the past
year.
The European Council recognised the European perspective of Ukraine, Moldova and
Georgia. EU leaders decided to grant the status of candidate country to Ukraine and the
Republic of Moldova, and to grant the status of candidate country to Georgia once the
priorities specified in the Commission’s Opinion on Georgia’s membership application
have been addressed.
In the Western Balkans, the first Intergovernmental Conferences with Albania and with
North Macedonia on accession negotiations took place in July 2022, followed by the
analytical review of the EU acquis (screening) process. In December 2022, the European
Council granted Bosnia and Herzegovina EU candidate status on the understanding that
the country implements the steps specified in the Commission’s October 2022
communication on enlargement policy. In December 2022, Kosovo applied for EU
membership. The EU agreed in spring 2023 on visa liberalisation for Kosovo, which will
enter into force from 1 January 2024.
4. All enlargement countries now have a historic window of opportunity to strongly bind
their future to the European Union. The Commission is ready to accelerate their respective
accession processes and to make sure that the next enlargement is a catalyst for
progress. Accession is and will remain a merit-based process fully dependent on the
objective progress achieved by each country. The rule of law, the economy, the
functioning of democratic institutions, and public administration reform continue to be the
cornerstones of the enlargement policy. The countries will have to act with stronger
determination to implement the necessary reforms and make tangible and irreversible
progress on the fundamentals in order to make full use of the new momentum.
5. Furthermore, economic growth in many of the countries is too slow and hence the
convergence with the EU is not happening fast enough. Targeted structural reforms are
needed in particular to unlock the growth potential of the Western Balkan region.
Improving the rule of law and the business environment are key for attracting the level of
investment as well as enhancing trade integration that are needed to boost growth and to
bring the region closer to the EU. The Commission therefore proposes in parallel a new
Growth Plan for the Western Balkans
20
. The plan consists of four pillars that will be
mutually reinforcing, (i) increasing integration with the EU’s Single Market which needs
to go hand in hand with (ii) opening the markets to all Western Balkan neighbours and
building a Common Regional Market. (iii) In order to deepen current reforms, investment
priorities and reforms will be articulated in Reform Agendas per country, building on the
Economic Reform Programmes. (iv) Delivering on these reforms will unlock increased
financial assistance.
19
Granada declaration
20
COM (2023) 691; COM (2023) 692
17
Bilateral issues, notably in the Western Balkans, are holding back not only regional
economic integration but also slow down the respective EU paths of the countries.
Unresolved issues generate a risk of instability and even escalation, as evidenced by the
violent attack against Kosovo police of 24 September in Banjska, in the north of Kosovo.
It is therefore essential that open issues are addressed, and mutually acceptable solutions
found by the parties concerned. In this context, both Kosovo and Serbia are urged to
engage more constructively in the EU-facilitated dialogue implementation of the
Agreement on the path to normalisation and its Implementation Annex as well as other
agreements reached in the EU-facilitated dialogue without further delay or preconditions.
This includes the establishment of the Association/Community of Serb Majority
Municipalities. Normalisation of relations is an essential condition on the European path
of both Parties. Both risk losing important opportunities in the absence of progress.
6. Türkiye remains a key partner for the European Union in essential areas of joint interest.
The EU has a strategic interest in a stable and secure environment in the Eastern
Mediterranean and in the development of a cooperative and mutually beneficial
partnership with Türkiye.
In December 2022, the Council reiterated that Türkiye continues to move further away
from the European Union, and that Türkiye’s accession negotiations have effectively
come to a standstill and no further chapters can currently be considered for opening or
closing. The underlying facts leading to this assessment still hold. The European Council
in June 2023 invited the High Representative and the Commission to submit a report to
the European Council on the state of play of EU-Türkiye relations, building on the
instruments and options identified by the European Council, and with a view to
proceeding in a strategic and forward-looking manner. This report will be submitted in
November 2023. The Commission and the High Representative will update the European
Council on the state of play on the aforementioned steps by the end of 2024.
II.
7. In Montenegro, the political commitment of the authorities to the country’s EU accession
process is the key priority for the country and is generally reflected in policy decisions.
This includes a continued 100 % alignment rate with the EU’s common foreign and
security policy, including sanctions. Montenegro has contributed to the management of
the mixed migration flows towards the EU by cooperating to implement the EU Action
Plan on the Western Balkans. However, in the last two years political instability, tensions,
the weak functioning of democratic and judicial institutions and the absence of a fully-
fledged government have stalled decision-making processes and reform implementation,
leading to a marked slowdown of negotiations. The Commission assessment is that, in line
with the negotiating framework, an overall balance is currently ensured between progress
under the rule of law chapters, on the one hand, and progress in the accession negotiations
across chapters, on the other.
The priority for further overall progress in the accession negotiations - and before moving
towards the provisional closure of other chapters or clusters - remains the fulfilment of
the rule of law interim benchmarks set under chapters 23 and 24. To reach this
milestone, Montenegro needs to intensify its efforts to address the outstanding issues,
including in the critical areas of freedom of expression and media freedom, the fight
against corruption and organised crime, and accelerate and deepen reforms on the
18
independence, professionalism and accountability of the judiciary including judicial
appointments. The constitution of the new parliament and the new government took place
at the end of October 2023. The new government needs to focus on delivering key
pending EU-related reforms, and a properly functioning Parliament is key. Work must
focus on building up broad political consensus on key reforms and on strengthening the
focus on core deliverables to advance the EU integration agenda in practice.
8. In Serbia, the pace of reforms picked up after the formation of the new government in late
October 2022, although political developments following the two tragic mass shootings in
May 2023 generated a temporary slowdown. In the area of rule of law, Serbia made steps
to strengthen the independence and accountability of the judiciary with the timely
adoption of the legislation giving practical effect to the constitutional amendments of
2022. Serbia also prepared and adopted new media legislation whose implementation can
significantly improve the regulatory environment. It improved its alignment with EU visa
policy and repealed the Law on special public procurement procedures for linear
infrastructure projects. Further work and long-lasting political commitment are needed to
adopt and implement the necessary reforms in the area of rule of law. The legal
framework that will allow gas sector unbundling was put in place, however delays are
now significant. Serbia has concluded a Free Trade Agreement with China, raising serious
questions. Serbia needs to improve, as a matter of priority, its alignment with EU common
foreign and security policy, including restrictive measures and statements on Russia, and
must refrain from actions and statements that go against EU positions on foreign policy
and other strategic matters. The Commission’s assessment is that, in line with the
negotiating framework, much more progress could have been achieved in the accession
negotiations. Constant attention is needed to preserve the overall balance between
progress under the rule of law chapters and normalisation of relations with Kosovo, on the
one hand, and progress in the accession negotiations across chapters, on the other.
Normalisation of relations is an essential condition on the European path of both Serbia
and Kosovo and both risks losing important opportunities in the absence of progress.
The Commission’s assessment remains that Serbia has technically fulfilled the
benchmarks to open cluster 3 (Competitiveness and inclusive growth).
Serbia’s progress on the rule of law and the normalisation of relations with Kosovo will
continue to determine the overall pace of the accession negotiations. In the coming year,
Serbia is expected to demonstrate unequivocally its determination to advance the
accession process by accelerating its work on the implementation of EU-accession related
reforms across the board. In the area of rule of law, Serbia is expected to address
shortcomings, in particular in the key areas of the judiciary, fight against corruption and
organised crime, media freedom, and the domestic handling of war crimes. It also needs to
make credible efforts to shut down disinformation and foreign interference and
information manipulation, decrease the dependence of its energy sector on Russia,
enhance cooperation with the EU in the area of migration and take responsibility for
proactive and objective communication on the EU. Serbia has contributed to the
management of the mixed migration flows towards the EU by cooperating to implement
the EU Action Plan on the Western Balkans.
Serbia has remained engaged in the EU-facilitated Dialogue on normalisation of relations
with Kosovo, but it needs to demonstrate more serious commitment, invest more efforts
and make compromises to take the process of normalisation of relations with Kosovo
forward. Serbia needs to uphold its Dialogue commitments and commit to the full
implementation of all past Dialogue agreements and the Agreement on the Path to
Normalisation and its Implementation Annex. The country is expected to engage more
19
constructively to enable negotiations on the comprehensive legally binding normalisation
Agreement. Serbia is also expected to fully cooperate in investigations into the violent
attack against Kosovo Police of 24 September 2023 and the attacks on KFOR on 29 May.
The perpetrators of the attack need to be apprehended and swiftly brought to justice and
Serbia must fully cooperate and take all the necessary steps in this regard.
9. In North Macedonia, the authorities have consistently stated that EU accession remains
their strategic goal. As a negotiating country, North Macedonia needs to deliver on the
implementation of EU related reforms, including in the areas of the fundamentals cluster
notably the judiciary, the fight against corruption and organised crime, public
administration reform, including management of public finances, and public procurement.
Some changes to the criminal code, affecting a large number of high-level corruption
cases, have raised serious concerns. Strengthening trust in the justice system and
addressing corruption unabatedly, including through a solid track record in the
investigation, prosecution and final conviction of high-level corruption cases is of key
importance. The country has continued to fully align with all EU common foreign and
security policy decisions following Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine. North
Macedonia has contributed to the management of the mixed migration flows towards the
EU by cooperating to implement the EU Action Plan on the Western Balkans.
North Macedonia has committed to launch and achieve as a matter of priority the relevant
constitutional changes with a view to including in the Constitution citizens who live
within the borders of the state and who are part of other people. The country provides a
good example of multi-ethnic society. Following the first Intergovernmental Conference
on EU accession negotiations process with North Macedonia in July 2022, the analytical
examination of the EU acquis (the screening) has progressed smoothly. North Macedonia
has engaged actively and shown a high level of commitment during the screening process.
The screening report on ‘Cluster 1 – the Fundamentals’ was presented to the Council in
July 2023.
In light of the Council Conclusions of July 2022, the Commission is looking forward to
swift and decisive follow-up to the screening report on ‘Cluster 1- the Fundamentals’,
including as regards the country’s roadmaps in line with the Negotiating Framework, with
a view to opening the first Cluster by the end of this year.
10. In Albania, the authorities have consistently stated that the strategic goal of EU accession
is the country’s key priority. Albania has continued to make progress in reforms under the
fundamentals cluster, including with the continued implementation of the comprehensive
justice reform. Further concrete results were achieved by the Specialised Structure against
Corruption and Organised Crime (SPAK). Good cooperation continued with EU
Members States and EU agencies on the fight against organised crime. Albania has
contributed to the management of the mixed migration flows towards the EU by
cooperating to implement the EU Action Plan on the Western Balkans.
As non-permanent member, Albania has been actively engaged in the UN Security
Council including as a co-penholder of resolutions condemning Russia’s war of
aggression against Ukraine. Full alignment with EU common and foreign security policy
by Albania has been a strong signal of its strategic choice of EU accession and its role as a
reliable partner.
Following the first Intergovernmental Conference on EU accession negotiations process
with Albania in July 2022, the analytical examination of the EU acquis (the screening) has
20
progressed smoothly. Albania has engaged actively and shown a high level of
commitment during the screening process. The screening report on ‘Cluster 1 – the
Fundamentals’ was presented to the Council in July 2023.
In light of the Council Conclusions of July 2022, the Commission is looking forward to
swift and decisive follow-up to the screening report on ‘Cluster 1- the Fundamentals’,
including as regards the country’s roadmaps in line with the Negotiating Framework, with
a view to opening the first Cluster by the end of this year.
11. The Commission welcomes the reforms efforts undertaken by Bosnia and Herzegovina
since the meeting of the European Council of December 2022 granting candidate status to
the country. The Commission also welcomes the swift entry into office of a new Council
of Ministers in January 2023. The public commitment of political parties to the strategic
goal of European integration has brought positive results.
Steps and commitments were made towards the fulfilment of the key priorities and to
address the steps specified in the Commission recommendation for candidate status The
Council of Ministers adopted strategies to counter organised crime, made an updated risk
assessment and an accompanying action plan on anti-money laundering and combating the
financing of terrorism, adopted strategies and action plans on migration and on terrorism,
and appointed a supervisory body for the implementation of the national war crimes
processing strategy. Bosnia and Herzegovina has contributed to the management of the
mixed migration flows towards the EU by cooperating to implement the EU Action Plan
on the Western Balkans. The contact point with Europol started operations in June 2023.
The country adopted laws, notably on integrity in the judiciary through amendments of the
High Judicial and Prosecutorial Council; torture prevention (designating the Ombudsman
as national preventive mechanism); foreigners; freedom of access to information and
adopted the Gender Action Plan. Alignment with the EU common foreign and security
policy has significantly improved during the reporting period, but more remains to be
done regarding implementation of restrictive measures.
The public commitment of the coalition parties to the strategic goal of European
integration has brought positive results, since the granting of candidate status. At the same
time, there have been negative developments in the Republika Srpska entity. The entity
called for constitutional judges to resign and adopted a law decreeing that Constitutional
Court decisions would not be implemented, in breach of the constitutional and legal order
of the country. The entity also reintroduced criminal penalties for defamation, restricting
freedom of expression and media freedom. A draft law targeting civil society groups as
‘foreign agents’ is also pending adoption in the entity; if adopted, it would mark another
major step backwards on fundamental rights. Secessionist actions undermining the unity,
sovereignty, territorial integrity, constitutional order and international personality of the
country undermine progress in EU accession.
A number of Constitutional Court decisions have yet to be fully enforced, notably on state
property. Both entities’ assemblies should swiftly appoint judges to ensure the full
composition of the Constitutional Court. The country needs to urgently finalise the
pending constitutional and electoral reforms. Reforms are still needed to bring the
Constitution into line with the European Convention on Human Rights, complying with
the Sejdić-Finci case law.
Overall, further efforts are required for Bosnia and Herzegovina to fulfil the 14 key
priorities set out in the Commission Opinion on its EU membership application and the
steps specified in the Commission recommendation for candidate status. The state of play
of the implementation of the fourteen key priorities is specified in the country report. The
21
Commission recommends the opening of EU accession negotiations with Bosnia and
Herzegovina, once the necessary degree of compliance with the membership criteria is
achieved.
The Commission will report to the Council on progress at the latest in March 2024.
12. Following Kosovo’s application for EU membership in December 2022, its government
continued to push ahead with its EU reform agenda. Kosovo made progress on addressing
long-standing EU recommendations for electoral reform, which led to the adoption of two
important election laws. Kosovo needs to intensify its efforts to strengthen the rule of law
and public administration and to build energy resilience. Kosovo has contributed to the
management of the mixed migration flows towards the EU by cooperating to implement
the EU Action Plan on the Western Balkans. Visa liberalisation for Kosovo citizens is
scheduled to enter into force on 1 January 2024. The situation in the north of Kosovo has
been affected by several crises of varying intensity. Kosovo Serbs collectively resigned
from Kosovo institutions in November 2022. Following their withdrawal, local by-
elections were organised in the four municipalities in the north of Kosovo in April 2023.
The very low turnout, in particular among Kosovo Serb community, showed that these
elections do not offer a long-term political solution. It remains imperative to restore a
situation where Kosovo Serbs participate actively in local governance, policing and
judiciary in the north of Kosovo. Early local elections need to be held as soon as possible
in all four municipalities, organised in a fully inclusive manner, and with the
unconditional participation of Kosovo Serbs. Kosovo has to engage in de-escalation in the
north of Kosovo by decreasing the permanent presence of Kosovo special police forces,
ease expropriation of land and eviction orders in the North.
Kosovo has remained engaged in the EU-facilitated Dialogue on normalisation of
relations with Serbia, but it needs to demonstrate more serious commitment, invest more
efforts and make compromises to take the process of normalisation of relations with
Serbia forward. Kosovo needs to uphold its Dialogue commitments and commit to the full
implementation of all past Dialogue agreements and the Agreement on the Path to
Normalisation and its Implementation Annex. Kosovo is expected to engage more
constructively to enable negotiations on the comprehensive legally binding normalisation
Agreement. Normalisation of relations is an essential condition on the European path of
both Serbia and Kosovo and both risks losing important opportunities in the absence of
progress.
13. Türkiye is a candidate country and a key partner for the EU. Its accession negotiations
remain at a standstill since June 2018 in line with the decisions of the European Council
as Türkiye continued to move away from the EU. Dialogue on rule of law and
fundamental rights remain an integral part of the EU-Türkiye relationship. The refusal to
implement certain rulings of the European Court of Human Rights remains a matter of
concern. Türkiye is a significant regional actor in the area of foreign policy, which
constitutes an important element in the context of the EU-Türkiye relationship, even if
differing views on certain foreign policy issues persist. It maintained a very low alignment
rate of 10% with the EU common foreign and security policy. Türkiye condemned
Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine, and engaged politically and diplomatically,
including by facilitating direct talks, working on de-escalation and cease-fire, facilitating
the export of Ukrainian grain, the exchange of prisoners and providing crucial and strong
military assistance to Ukraine. Nevertheless, Türkiye continued to refrain from aligning
22
with the EU’s restrictive measures against Russia. Its rhetoric in support to the terrorist
group Hamas following its attacks against Israel on 7 October 2023 is in complete
disagreement with the EU approach.
The country is expected to actively support the negotiations on a fair, comprehensive and
viable settlement of the Cyprus issue within the UN framework, in accordance with the
relevant UN Security Council resolutions and in line with the principles on which the EU
is founded. It is important that Türkiye reaffirms its commitment to the UN-led settlement
talks on Cyprus in line with the relevant UNSC resolutions, including their external
aspects. It is also urgent that Türkiye fulfils its obligation to ensure full and non-
discriminatory implementation of the Additional Protocol to the EU-Turkey Association
Agreement.
Cooperation with Türkiye in areas of joint interest continued in essential areas such as
counter-terrorism, economy, energy, food security, migration and transport. The EU has a
strategic interest in a stable and secure environment in the Eastern Mediterranean and in
the development of a cooperative and mutually beneficial relationship with Türkiye. The
Commission and the High Representative will submit a report to the European Council in
November 2023, in which they will set out further options to develop this relationship.
14. The Commission welcomes the significant reform efforts undertaken by Ukraine since
the European Council of June 2022, despite Russia’s war of aggression. The Commission
considers that Ukraine has made important progress on the seven steps set out in its
Opinion of June 2022 and has taken additional measures to complement and sustain these
achievements.
Ukraine has established a transparent and merit-based pre-selection system for the judges
of the Constitutional Court and has completed an integrity-focused reform of the judicial
governance bodies. Ukraine should continue implementing the adopted laws to select and
appoint judges in ordinary courts and at the Constitutional Court. Ukraine has
strengthened the fight against corruption by continuously building a credible track-record
of corruption investigations and convictions and ensuring transparent appointments of the
heads of the key anti-corruption agencies. It has taken additional systemic measures to
ensure sustainability of its anti-corruption efforts, including by restoring the electronic
asset declaration system, albeit with certain shortcomings, and implementing the state
anti-corruption programme.
Ukraine has strengthened its anti-money laundering framework, including the alignment
of its legislation, notably the definition of politically exposed persons, with the FATF
standards, and has adopted a comprehensive strategic plan and action plan for the reform
of the law enforcement sector. Ukraine has also stepped-up systemic measures against
oligarchs in such areas as competition and political party funding while postponing the
application of the anti-oligarch law. Ukraine has aligned its media law with EU law. It has
continued to strengthen the protection of national minorities, in particular through
amending the laws on minorities and on education, while further reforms as indicated by
the Venice Commission are still to be implemented. These reform processes have to be
inclusive by fully involving the representatives of the national minorities throughout all
the necessary steps.
While the introduction of martial law has led to the derogation of certain fundamental
rights, the measures taken are temporary and overall proportionate to the situation in the
country.
23
In light of the results achieved since June 2022 under the political criteria, within the
framework of the seven steps and beyond, the Commission considers that Ukraine
sufficiently fulfils the criteria related to the stability of institutions guaranteeing
democracy, the rule of law, human rights and respect for and protection of minorities, set
by the Copenhagen European Council in 1993, provided it continues its reform efforts and
addresses the remaining requirements under the seven steps. On this basis, the
Commission recommends that the Council opens accession negotiations with Ukraine.
Furthermore, the Commission recommends that the Council adopts the negotiating
framework once Ukraine has:
- enacted a law proposed by the government increasing the staffing cap for the
National Anti-Corruption Bureau of Ukraine;
- removed from the law on corruption prevention the provisions restricting the NACP's
powers to continued verification of assets that have already undergone the verification
process and limiting NACP's powers to verify property acquired by declarants before
joining the public service, without prejudice to the rules applying to national security
during wartime;
- enacted a law regulating lobbying in line with European standards, as part of the
anti-oligarch action plan;
- enacted a law addressing the remaining Venice Commission recommendations from
June 2023 and October 2023 linked to the Law on national minorities, also addressing
the Venice Commission recommendations linked to the laws on State language, media
and education.
Ukraine has to continue to fight against corruption by building a further track record of
corruption investigations and convictions.
The Commission will continuously monitor the progress and compliance in all areas
related to the opening of negotiations and report to the Council by March 2024. The
Commission stands ready to start preparatory work, in particular the analytical
examination of the acquis (screening) and the preparation of the negotiating framework.
15. The Commission welcomes the significant reform efforts undertaken by Moldova since
the European Council of June 2022, despite the severe impact in Moldova of Russia’s war
of aggression against Ukraine. The Commission considers that Moldova has made
important progress on the nine steps set out in its Opinion of June 2022 and has taken
additional measures to complement and sustain these achievements.
Moldova has put in place an ambitious vetting process for judiciary and prosecution
bodies which is the foundation of its comprehensive justice reform. It has reformed its
Supreme Court of Justice and ensured functioning of the Supreme Council of Magistrates
with vetted members. The institutional and legislative anti-corruption framework have
been reformed. The country adopted new legislation on asset recovery, fighting financial
crime and money laundering. Investigation against oligarchs were progressing well, with
court convictions in absentia allowed to bring to justice oligarchs involved in the fraud
case - with substantial asset seizures - which drained Moldova’s public resources.
The number of investigated cases related to corruption and organised crime has increased.
The number of instances of seized assets of politically exposed persons has also increased.
Moldova has put in place a systemic approach to de-oligarchisation with an ambitious
action plan. The new electoral, criminal, media and competition legislation strengthens the
country’s capacity to fight undue vested interests. Moldova has actively increased
24
international cooperation with EU Member States and EU agencies through the EU
Support Hub for Internal Security and Border Management.
The country adopted strategies for the reform of its public administration, strengthened
public financial management and set interinstitutional processes indispensable for
handling the reforms. In spite of challenging economic conditions, it increased salaries to
retain and attract public service workers. Moldova regulated its public investment
framework, further digitalised its public services and progressed in the voluntary
amalgamation of local governments.
Moldova has been addressing ODIHR and Venice Commission recommendations and
involving civil society in decision-making processes including through a platform for
dialogue and civic participation in the Parliament. It has also strengthened the protection
of human rights including by fully transposing the Istanbul convention into national
legislation.
In the light of the results achieved since June 2022 under the political criteria, within the
framework of the nine steps and beyond, the Commission considers that Moldova
sufficiently fulfils the criteria related to the stability of institutions guaranteeing
democracy, the rule of law, human rights and respect for and protection of minorities, set
by the Copenhagen European Council in 1993, provided it continues its reform efforts and
addresses the remaining requirements under the nine steps. On this basis, the Commission
recommends that the Council opens accession negotiations with Moldova. Furthermore,
the Commission recommends that the Council adopts the negotiating framework once
Moldova has:
- continued making significant progress in appointing vetted Supreme Court
Justices members of judicial and prosecutorial self-governance bodies, and in
nominating a new Prosecutor General in a merit-based and transparent process;
- assigned adequate resources and structures to the Anticorruption Prosecutor’s
office of Moldova;
- undertaken further steps on deoligarchisation, including through relevant
regulations such as on cash payments and on financial flows.
Moldova has to continue to fight against corruption by building a further track record of
corruption investigations and convictions.
The Commission will continuously monitor the progress and compliance in all areas
related to the opening of negotiations and report to the Council by March 2024. The
Commission stands ready to start preparatory work, in particular the analytical
examination of the acquis (screening) and the preparation of the negotiating framework.
16. The Commission welcomes the reform efforts undertaken by Georgia in line with the
country’s constitution which envisages its integration into the EU as a priority for the
country. An overwhelming majority of Georgian citizens supports the country’s EU
accession process. Political depolarisation and more positive engagement by the ruling
party with opposition parties and civil society are needed to build consensus on matters of
national interest.
Georgia needs to step up its actions to counter disinformation and foreign information
manipulation and interference against the EU’s values and to improve its alignment rate
with the EU common foreign and security policy.
In relation to the twelve priorities specified in the European Commission Opinion of June
2022, Georgia has adopted legislative acts and policy actions on gender equality and on
25
fighting violence against women, on taking into account European Court of Human Rights
judgments in Court deliberations and on organised crime. It has appointed a new Public
Defender.
Certain procedural steps have been taken in Parliament to increase scrutiny by the
opposition. Building a strong cross-party political consensus would contribute to
addressing polarisation and accelerate Georgia’s European path. Amendments to
legislation and to parliamentary rules of procedure were adopted, in relation to the
functioning and accountability of state institutions and the electoral framework. Judicial
reform has included steps on accessibility to court decisions, reasoning for judicial
appointments, disciplinary measures for judges and the selection of Supreme Court
nominees but a holistic reform of the High Council of Justice is still needed. Georgia has
shared this legislation and several other core legal acts on the Election Code, Anti-
Corruption Bureau, Special Investigation Services, Personal Data Protection Service as
well as its action plan for de-oligarchisation with the Venice Commission for opinion. In
addition, it is important to establish a system of extraordinary integrity checks, with the
involvement of international experts, for all leading positions in the judiciary, and to
establish a system of effective assets declarations.
An action plan for de-oligarchisation, following a systemic approach, was adopted and the
“personalised” approach withdrawn. An Anti-corruption Bureau was set up. Georgia
increased international cooperation in the fight against organised crime. On media
pluralism, an opposition media director was released from prison following a Presidential
pardon, and Parliament adopted amendments to the Law on Broadcasting to align with EU
legislation. A strategy on the protection of human rights was adopted and an action plan
elaborated. A memorandum of cooperation between Parliament and some civil society
representatives was concluded to frame CSO involvement in policy-making processes.
In the light of the results achieved since June 2022, within the framework of the twelve
priorities and beyond, the Commission recommends that the Council grants Georgia the
status of a candidate country on the understanding that the following steps are taken:
- Fight disinformation and foreign information manipulation and interference against
the EU and its values.
- Improve Georgia’s alignment with the EU common foreign and security policy.
- Further address the issue of political polarisation, including through more inclusive
legislative work with opposition parties in Parliament, notably on legislation related to
Georgia’s European integration.
- Ensure a free, fair and competitive electoral process, notably in 2024, and fully
address OSCE/ODIHR recommendations. Finalise electoral reforms, including
ensuring adequate representation of the electorate, well in advance of election day.
- Further improve the implementation of parliamentary oversight notably of the security
services. Ensure institutional independence and impartiality of key institutions,
notably the Election Administration, the National Bank, and the Communications
Commission.
- Complete and implement a holistic and effective judicial reform, including a
comprehensive reform of the High Council of Justice and the Prosecutor’s Office,
fully implementing Venice Commission recommendations and following a transparent
and inclusive process.
- Further address the effectiveness and ensure the institutional independence and
impartiality of the Anti-Corruption Bureau, the Special Investigative Service and the
Personal Data Protection Service. Address Venice Commission recommendations
26
related to these bodies, in an inclusive process. Establish a strong track record in
investigating -corruption and organised crime cases.
- Improve the current action plan to implement a multi-sectorial, systemic approach to
deoligarchisation, in line with Venice Commission recommendations and following a
transparent and inclusive process involving opposition parties and civil society.
- Improve the protection of human rights including by implementing an ambitious
human rights strategy and ensuring freedom of assembly and expression. Launch
impartial, effective and timely investigations in cases of threats against safety of
vulnerable groups, media professionals and civil society activists, and bring organisers
and perpetrators of violence to justice. Consult and engage with civil society, allowing
for their meaningful involvement in legislative and policymaking processes and ensure
they can operate freely.
VIII. ANNEXES
1. The fundamentals of the accession process.
2. Key achievements of the Economic and Investment Plan for the Western
Balkans.
3. Key achievements of the Economic and Investment Plan – overview for Ukraine,
Moldova, and Georgia.
4. Third-party indicators related to the status of democracy, good governance and
the rule of law in candidate countries and potential candidates.
5. Statistical data.
27
EUROPEAN
COMMISSION
Brussels, 8.11.2023
COM(2023) 690 final
ANNEXES 1 to 5
ANNEXES
to the
COMMUNICATION FROM THE COMMISSION TO THE EUROPEAN
PARLIAMENT, THE COUNCIL, THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL
COMMITTEE AND THE COMMITTEE OF THE REGIONS
2023 Communication on EU Enlargement policy
{SWD(2023) 690 final} - {SWD(2023) 691 final} - {SWD(2023) 692 final} -
{SWD(2023) 693 final} - {SWD(2023) 694 final} - {SWD(2023)
695
final} -
{SWD(2023) 696 final} - {SWD(2023) 697 final} - {SWD(2023) 698 final} -
{SWD(2023) 699 final}
28
Annex 1. The fundamentals of the accession process
The rule of law, fundamental rights, the functioning of democratic institutions and
public administration reform – and the economic criteria form the core of what is known
as the ‘fundamentals’ of the EU accession process. Quality of institutions and governance
is the basis for enhancing competitiveness, prosperity and societal well-being, and underpin
the ability to comply with the acquis across the board. Credible and irreversible reforms on
the fundamentals are therefore crucial for enlargement countries to secure progress on their
respective EU accession paths.
In a number of enlargement countries some progress was noted on justice reform, on
fundamental rights, and in the functioning of the public administration, including public
financial management. A steady intensification of work on the respective reform agendas was
noted particularly in Moldova and Ukraine. Overall, progress towards fulfilling the economic
accession criteria remained too slow to substantially narrow the economic gap with the EU.
There are good examples in the enlargement countries of reform agendas being driven
forward to transform institutions and societies in the light of the opportunity of EU accession.
However, many obstacles remain. Although not uniform across countries, there is generally a
negative and worrisome pattern of diffused political and institutional resistance to change, in
particular to strengthening the fight against corruption. A constant commitment to prevent
corruption and maintaining a culture of integrity remains an important priority, including
through mainstreaming of anti-corruption measures across the most vulnerable sectors. Law
enforcement and judicial bodies require greater empowerment and the independence
necessary to guarantee a meaningful and impartial fight against corruption. Worryingly,
elements of state capture persist, with threats to democratic stability, high-level corruption
and undue influence by oligarchs still being observed, alongside attempts by organised
criminal networks to interfere with the countries’ economies, political systems,
administrations and media environments. All these challenges need to be urgently addressed
through systemic and comprehensive approaches.
A key indicator that these tendencies are addressed will be a credible track record of
proactive investigations, prosecutions and final convictions related to corruption, organised
crime and money laundering. It is essential for the enlargement countries to demonstrate the
effectiveness of their investigative agencies, prosecution services and criminal courts. To be
credible, all actors in the rule of law chain should produce solid results through targeted
financial investigations, resulting in systematic confiscation of the proceeds of crime.
On fundamental rights, there is some progress in some of the enlargement countries towards
greater understanding of the importance of these rights and freedoms being guaranteed. At
the same time, some negative trends of recent years have continued, with gender-based
violence remaining prevalent, while freedom of the media continued to be hindered by
political and economic interests, which weakens control over public authorities, opens space
for foreign interference and undermines communication about the EU. In some countries,
some positive initiatives are being put in place on the rights of the child and the rights of
persons with disabilities. In practice, however, the protection of fundamental rights is
negatively affected by insufficient implementation of laws and policies and the
ineffectiveness of redress mechanisms across the board. Challenges remain in ensuring
effective protection from all forms of hatred and discrimination, including that which is
directed towards minorities.
29
Functioning of democratic institutions
Stable and consolidated democratic processes are a central pillar of the EU accession process.
The Commission has begun implementing strengthened and streamlined engagement with the
enlargement countries on the general framework for democracy, whether this concerns the
electoral process, the functioning of Parliament (including its oversight role in government
performance and policymaking and the still-excessive reliance on accelerated procedures in
many cases), or the role of civil society. Most countries continued to be affected by marked
political polarisation, lack of cross-party cooperation, and a shrinking space for civil society.
Several elections took place in the reporting period in enlargement countries including in
Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo, Moldova, Montenegro, and Türkiye. In most
countries, reforms are still pending to address outstanding recommendations from the Office
for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights at the Organization for Security and
Cooperation in Europe (OSCE/ODIHR). The Group of States Against Corruption (GRECO)
standards related to political party financing are also yet to be addressed in North Macedonia
and Bosnia and Herzegovina.
As regards parliamentary work, polarisation remained often a visible feature. Lack of
effective cross-party dialogue resulted in prolonged political impasse and stagnation of
reforms. This was observed for instance in Montenegro, Albania, North Macedonia and
Georgia. In some cases, plenary debates were marked by tensions, offensive language and
occasional violent incidents, as was the case in Georgia and Kosovo. In Ukraine, despite the
extraordinary circumstances, Parliament has demonstrated resilience and strong political will,
particularly in areas vital for Ukraine’s integration with the EU. Legislative tasks were
carried out systematically, ensuring an uninterrupted democratic decision-making process.
Judiciary and fundamental rights
The entrenchment of the rule of law requires stable, well-functioning institutions. This
requires an independent, impartial, accountable and high-quality judicial system, which
operates efficiently and with adequate resources, free from undue external interference, and
whose decisions are executed effectively and in a timely manner. Progress was achieved in
some cases, with judicial reforms advancing, for instance, in Albania, Moldova, Serbia and
Ukraine. However, in most enlargement countries, judicial bodies remain exposed to many
challenges and vulnerabilities. Attempts by politicians to publicly influence or attack
magistrates, particularly when they deal with sensitive cases, remained a dangerous recurrent
practice in several countries. Institutional arrangements that negatively affect the
independence of judges and prosecutors remained in place, ultimately affecting the balance
and separation of state powers. As a result, the judiciary’s credibility remained overall rather
low, with the public generally noting the impunity of perpetrators. In several countries,
justice reforms reveal limited implementing capacity even where there is political will.
Effectiveness of investigative and judicial authorities, resulting in a credible track record of
results, is essential for further accession progress. Georgia’s legal framework on the
functioning of the judiciary requires further reforms and avoiding negative steps. Serious
backsliding continued in Türkiye and the structural deficiencies, notably related to the
independence of the judiciary and the lack of checks and balance in the Presidential system,
remained in place.
The fight against corruption remains a priority for governments in the enlargement
countries. Corruption, including high-level corruption, continues to be widespread, and
entanglement of public and private interests remains an issue of concern. In some cases,
corruptive practices and influence exercised by oligarchs can trigger risks of state capture.
30
Progress in preventing and fighting corruption effectively is slow and requires a sustained
systemic approach and dedicated action in key sectors vulnerable to corruption. There is a
need to initiate or continue to mainstream anti-corruption measures in key sectors, to
undertake targeted risk assessments to feed policymaking, and to roll out effective reform
plans. Stronger political will and clear reform efforts are still needed to improve transparency
and a culture of integrity and to develop further a convincing track record of investigations,
prosecution and final convictions, including at high level. Anti-corruption strategies and
action plans are in place and need to be updated and implemented in a systematic and
structured manner, including through appropriate budgetary resources and dedicated
monitoring to ensure their effective implementation. Public procurement, political party
financing, public finance management, energy, transport, health, water, infrastructure, natural
resources and education remain areas particularly prone to corruption and require more robust
and ambitious measures. As regards repression, the generally low track record triggers
concerns about the effectiveness of investigations and the judicial follow-up.
Throughout the enlargement countries, fundamental rights are generally enshrined and
protected by law, but challenges remain in ensuring their effective implementation. The
legislative and policy frameworks are gradually being completed as a result of countries’
accession to European human rights instruments and alignment with the EU acquis. This is
notably the case on data protection reforms. However, implementation continues to be slow,
and systemic gaps remain in the funding of policies adopted to strengthen human rights
protection, leaving many sectors dependent on donors. Based on the experience of Albania,
North Macedonia and Serbia, the accession as observer of other candidate countries to the
European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights will contribute to the development of a
comprehensive monitoring and data collection system ensuring a more effective
implementation of human rights legislation, policies, and strategies.
In much of the region, the Ombudsperson institutions and other independent and regulatory
bodies such as equality bodies play a key role in monitoring the States’ actions to respect,
protect and fulfil human rights, as per their international obligations. However, their
effective independence, resources and capacities remain insufficient, as does the follow-up on
their recommendations. Governments in the region need to consistently address all the
recommendations of international and regional human rights monitoring bodies, including on
prison conditions and the prevention of torture and ill-treatment. This is notably the case in
countries such as North Macedonia, Moldova and Serbia, where recommendations of the
European Committee for the Prevention of Torture have not been systematically addressed.
Civil society continues to supplement or even replace government action in providing
services to persons in vulnerable situations, for instance by running shelters for victims of
sexual and gender-based violence or trafficking in human beings in Albania and Serbia. In
the Western Balkans, the concerns and recommendations in the previous years’ reports
remain largely valid and need to be addressed as a matter of urgency. In Türkiye, the human
rights situation continued to deteriorate and remains a serious concern, including as regards
non-implementation of certain judgements of the European Court of Human Rights, notably
in the Kavala case.
Freedom of expression, media freedom and pluralism are key pillars of a democratic society
and must be upheld. There was limited to no progress, or backsliding, on addressing past
recommendations in the Western Balkan region. In several countries, the media landscape is
marked by deep political polarisation. Pluralism, independence and the development of
quality professional journalism are undermined by media concentration and political
influence over the media in a number of countries. Poor labour conditions persist for
journalists, which can lead to self-censorship. Cases of threats, intimidation and violence
31
against journalists and derogatory remarks by public officials continue to cause serious
concern throughout the region. Efforts are being made in some countries to tackle this
phenomenon, but all countries need to ensure systematic judicial follow-up on all cases.
Insufficient protection of journalists and ineffective follow-up on cases can have a chilling
effect on the exercise of media freedom.
In general, public broadcasters’ independence is undermined by insufficient funding and
political influence. The independence of media regulators needs to be guaranteed, including
through merit-based appointments in management structures. Where this is not the case, such
as in Serbia, regulators must act impartially and exercise their mandates to the full. The
effective functioning of independent self-regulatory bodies also needs to be further supported.
All countries need to increase transparency on media funding. Efforts to fight Russian
disinformation have led to the suspension of broadcasting licences in Moldova and blocking
of web resources in Ukraine. In Türkiye, serious backsliding on freedom of expression
continued. Journalists, human rights defenders, lawyers, writers, opposition politicians,
students and social media users continued to systematically face criminal charges and
convictions.
In most countries, the authorities have been working towards putting in place the legal and
institutional framework to implement commitments in the field of gender equality and in
combating gender-based violence, particularly to transpose the provisions of the Istanbul
Convention. The Convention has been ratified by all enlargement partners except Kosovo,
due to status issues, and Türkiye, whose withdrawal was confirmed as final by its Council of
State. However, more efforts are needed to make gender equality a reality and to ensure the
sustainability of policies. Gender-based violence remains present in much of the region. All
countries need to strengthen assistance to victims of all forms of violence. A trend of
increased use of derogatory terms or hate speech targeting women politicians, journalists and
human rights defenders in public discourse is a concern, notably in Türkiye, Montenegro,
Serbia and North Macedonia. There are also instances of hate speech and violence against
lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, intersex and queer (LGBTIQ) persons, whose
fundamental rights in several countries are often challenged.
Laws and policies on non-discrimination, combating hate crime and hate speech are
generally in place, but remaining gaps and shortcomings in legislation, including in relation
to protected grounds need to be addressed. Equality bodies and other institutions tasked with
promoting equal treatment and implementing and monitoring non-discrimination policies
need to be provided with sufficient means to fulfil their mandate including assistance to
victims, conducting surveys, and publishing reports and recommendations needs to be
ensured.
While mechanisms for strengthening the rights of the child are generally in place,
interinstitutional coordination needs to be substantially improved throughout the region,
notably in Kosovo and North Macedonia, to ensure effectiveness of child protection systems,
in line with the best interests of the child. Ensuring effective access to education for children
in Ukraine and for displaced Ukrainian children remains challenging. Child-friendly justice
systems need to be further developed and alternatives to detention made available and used
more systematically, with detention used only as a very last resort and for the shortest
appropriate period of time. Violence against children and early marriages remain serious
concerns. Reliable and comparable data disaggregated by age and sex is in most cases
missing and is essential for addressing violence against children. Continued
institutionalisation of children without parental care and of children and persons with
disabilities is a concern in many countries, particularly Georgia, Moldova, Ukraine and
32
Bosnia and Herzegovina. Only North Macedonia has achieved full deinstitutionalisation of
children from large-scale institutions. While efforts are being made to strengthen the
mechanisms to enforce the rights of persons with disabilities, much higher levels of
investment will be needed to ensure full compliance with the UN Convention on the Rights
of Persons with Disabilities, notably as regards transition to community-based care,
independent living, accessibility and inclusion.
The rights of persons belonging to minorities remain unevenly protected throughout the
region. Legal frameworks and implementing mechanisms still need to be completed in
Albania, Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine, while recommendations of the Advisory Committee
of the Framework Convention on National Minorities need to be addressed by Serbia and
North Macedonia. The Roma remain the most deprived community and are frequently
victims of discrimination, hate-motivated incidents, as well as social and economic exclusion.
Justice, freedom and security
The Western Balkans and Türkiye continue to be hotspots of criminal activities and organised
crime groups active in the EU, serving as an important transit point for migrant smuggling,
victims of trafficking in human beings and illicit commodities entering the EU via different
variations of the Balkan route. Criminals and criminal networks from the region also have a
significant impact on serious and organised crime in other parts of the world, including in
Latin and South America where they play an important role in the global cocaine trade, the
transit for heroin trafficked to the EU, and facilitate the entry of victims of trafficking in
human beings, irregular migrants and illicit commodities into EU countries. The criminal
infrastructure developed for trafficking heroin and synthetic drugs is used for cocaine
trafficking across the Balkan routes in both directions as well as to Black Sea ports.
Organised crime groups from Moldova and Georgia are active in migrant smuggling,
organised property crime, trafficking in human beings, cyber-dependent crime, non-cash
payment fraud, excise fraud, firearms trafficking and other related crimes such as document
fraud. Many of these groups are poly-criminal, meaning that they traffic more than one illicit
commodity. Ukraine is located at the crossroads of smuggling illegal goods to the EU and is
also a source, transit and destination country for trafficking in human being. Despite the war-
related challenges including stretched institutional capacities due to significant losses of
personal equipment and reduced financing to fight organised crime, relevant Ukrainian
institutions demonstrated remarkable resilience and operational capabilities.
Since February 2022, Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine had a significant impact on
the regional crime situation, including on cooperation between powerful regional criminal
groups, which largely came to an end. Nevertheless, new circumstances emerged and
criminal groups in the region are taking advantage of them.
Law enforcement cooperation (including at operational level) between the EU and the
enlargement countries continued to evolve positively. All Western Balkan countries have
ratified operational agreements with Europol (except Kosovo, with which a working
arrangement is in place) and have access to Europol’s secure platform for the exchange of
information (SIENA). Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo, Montenegro, North
Macedonia and Serbia have posted liaison officers at Europol in The Hague. Cooperation
between Europol and Türkiye is based on a strategic agreement on cooperation, which
excludes the possibility of sharing personal data but facilitates cooperation in a range of
areas. A Turkish Liaison Officer is posted at Europol and Türkiye is also connected to
SIENA. Ukraine, Moldova and Georgia also concluded operational cooperation agreements
with Europol, are connected to SIENA and opened liaison bureaus at Europol. The level of
33
participation by enlargement countries in EMPACT, the Member States-led European Multi-
disciplinary Platform Against Criminal Threats, overall continued to intensify, while
remaining uneven. In addition, there is also an increasing trend for operational actions to be
led or co-led by enlargement countries, which is a very welcomed development. All Western
Balkan countries, along with Moldova and Ukraine, participated in a number of Joint Action
Days, with immediate results in terms of arrests of criminals and corrupt officials, seizures
and the launch of new investigations.
Trafficking of drugs continues to be a lucrative criminal market in enlargement countries.
While the longer-term trend in seizures of cannabis in the Western Balkans is downward,
seizure of cocaine (especially in seaports) is on the rise, while heroin seizure remained
largely stable. With the exception of Albania, all Western Balkan countries have or had until
recently a national strategy on drugs, in some cases accompanied by an action plan.
Information about (the quality of) the plans’ implementation is not available as no evaluation
is performed in the vast majority of cases. Türkiye’s national strategy and action plan expire
this year. Moldova and Georgia adopted both new strategies and action plans on drugs, while
Ukraine has no dedicated strategy or action plan on drugs. Serious efforts are required in the
region regarding the establishment of National Drug Observatories (NDO) and National
Early Warning Systems (NEWS) on new psychoactive substances (NPS). Only Serbia has an
established and operational NDO while a NDO is crucial for the coordination of the drug
information system and is a prerequisite for being associated to EU Reitox network
(European information network on drugs and drug addiction). With the exception of Serbia,
no other formal and/or operational NEWS on NPS has been established in the region,
something that should be urgently addressed. The European Monitoring Centre for Drugs and
Drugs Addiction is providing long-term support or works on the basis of working
arrangement or bilateral agreements with the enlargement countries.
The roadmap for a comprehensive small arms and light weapons control in the Western
Balkans by 2024 continues to be implemented. In May 2023, a political agreement was
reached on continuing the roadmap beyond 2024 with the support of the South Eastern and
Eastern Europe Clearinghouse for the Control of Small Arms and Light Weapons (SEESAC).
Given the high and increasing numbers of small arms and light weapons following Russia's
full-scale invasion, the EU has already put in place several preventive measures, jointly with
Ukraine, to counter the risk of arms trafficking and Ukraine should continue its engagement
with the international law enforcement community to address these risks. This includes
support provided by Europol and the European Border and Coast Guard Agency (Frontex),
Ukraine’s participation in EMPACT on firearms, and the work of the European Union
Advisory Mission in Ukraine.
Progress continued, albeit unevenly, on addressing trafficking in human beings in
enlargement countries. Continuous efforts are required to align and effectively implement the
relevant EU acquis, including prevention measures, early identification, protection of and
assistance to victims, effective investigations of trafficking cases, prosecutions and
convictions of perpetrators.
While advancing unevenly, the enlargement countries’ respective track records on
proactive investigations, prosecution and final convictions of organised crime and
corruption cases, particularly at high levels, remain overall insufficient and require sustained
efforts. Money laundering should be increasingly investigated and prosecuted as a stand-
alone offence. The use of financial investigations should be stepped up and used more
systematically to dismantle organised crime groups and seize and confiscate the proceeds of
crime. Recent cases have once again shed light on the risks of infiltration of organised crime
34
groups at all levels of the criminal justice chain. Efforts in some countries to strengthen their
operational capacities and root out corruption within their judicial bodies need to be
translated into concrete results. Building and consolidating a credible track record is essential
in order to have a deterrent effect on criminal activities and restore citizens’ trust in the law
enforcement agencies and in the judiciary. In Ukraine, Moldova and Georgia, the fight
against the specific phenomenon of ‘thieves in law’ should continue.
Albania needs to further strengthen its efforts to combat trafficking in human beings, money
laundering, high-level corruption and to counter cybercrime (including by criminalising
online child sexual abuse). While confiscation of assets has significantly increased, it is still
very limited compared to the amounts of seizures (which, however, have declined). The
country still lacks an asset recovery office. There was also a significant decrease in the
quantity of drugs seized. The Specialised Anti-Corruption and Organised Crime Structures
(SPAK) achieved further results and should continue to develop their track record of
investigations and high-level convictions. The persisting lack of progress on the fight against
organised crime in Bosnia and Herzegovina raises serious concerns. Kosovo made limited
progress on its overall track record on fighting organised crime and should step up its efforts
on proactive investigations, convictions and confiscations of criminal assets, which remain
very low. In North Macedonia, there are serious concerns about undue external influence over
the work of the Judicial Council and the judiciary. Some changes to the criminal code,
adopted through an expedited parliamentary procedure, are affecting, halting or even
terminating a large number of high-level corruption cases. The authorities also need to
enhance their efforts to fight against money laundering and financial crime. Montenegro
showed encouraging developments in the fight against organised crime, arresting top-level
members of organised crime groups and high-ranking officials in law enforcement agencies.
This underlines the importance of consistently and vociferously combating the infiltration of
organised crime in the police and the judiciary. However, the lack of convictions in the areas
of tobacco smuggling, money laundering, trafficking in human beings and cybercrime, as
well as the very low level of asset confiscations, is concerning. Although the number of
convictions for financial crimes increased in 2022, these were exclusively based on plea
bargains. Serbia’s track record on organised crime provides a mixed picture, with an increase
in the number of investigations and indictments (including for people smuggling), but a
decrease in first-instance and final convictions, and a very low level of confiscations. While
Türkiye increased its participation in joint operations with EU Member States and
neighbouring countries, it needs to improve the fight against money laundering and financial
crime, including the use of confiscation of criminal assets. Moldova carried out a number of
financial investigations, performed some assets seizures (and to a lesser extent, confiscations)
and has an initial track record of final convictions, which should be consolidated. In Georgia,
there was a significant increase in the number of final convictions of ‘thieves in law’ and
convictions were pronounced in cases of money laundering. Ukraine has started to develop an
initial track record, but further efforts are required on combating serious forms of organised
crime, money laundering and other financial crimes.
While cooperation on counterterrorism and prevention of radicalisation is relevant for all
enlargement countries, it remains a particular priority for the EU’s cooperation with the
Western Balkans. Terrorism and violent extremism in all their forms and irrespective of their
origin continue to pose a challenge and a security threat. Arrests of violent extremists and
foiled attacks were reported. The EU-Western Balkan Justice and Home Affairs Ministerial
Forum held in November 2022 reiterated the importance of intensifying the measures
undertaken to identify and counter the evolving threats stemming from Russia’s war of
aggression against Ukraine. The joint action plan on counterterrorism for the Western
35
Balkans remains the main framework for cooperation with the region, combining political
commitment with support and regular monitoring. There is progress across the region, with
Albania and North Macedonia having implemented most of the actions. In addition, updated
implementing arrangements focusing on the objectives still pending were signed at
ministerial level by two countries in December 2022. The remaining Western Balkan
countries submitted new reports a fifth set of on the implementation of the action plan in the
first quarter of 2023. Montenegro also registered significant progress and an update of the
bilateral arrangement is being discussed with the European Commission. In general, more
efforts are required on the prevention of all forms of radicalisation, including in prisons, on
following up on the early conditional release of violent extremist offenders from prison, and
on effectively addressing terrorist and extremist content online. As reported in the 2023
Terrorist and trends report from Europol, recruitment continues to take place both online and
through gatherings in informal religious buildings, as well as in correctional facilities. The
revision of national strategies and action plans is ongoing in Serbia and Albania, and is
already finalised in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo, North Macedonia and Montenegro.
The threat of terrorism remains low in Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine, and their anti-
terrorism legislation is broadly in line with international standards. Their strategic security
frameworks recognise terrorism as a threat and specialised services are in place. Operational
cooperation with European agencies on fighting terrorism is well-established.
Alignment with and effective implementation of legislation on countering terrorism
financing and on anti-money laundering remains uneven. Progress on legislation,
strategies and implementation is reported for North Macedonia, while legislation in Bosnia
and Herzegovina is still pending approval in Parliament and track record needs to be
established on investigations, prosecutions and final court rulings. Albania, which is under
FATF scrutiny, has addressed all action plan items in the last 6 months. FATF decided in
June 2023 to propose an on-site visit, which led to Albania’s removal from the ‘grey list’ in
October 2023. However, FATF will continue to monitor to check whether any Albanian
voluntary tax compliance programme (including potential criminal amnesties), should there
be any, is in line with FATF principles and best practices. Türkiye's legal framework should
be aligned with the items of its FATF Action Plan in order to be removed from the FATF
‘grey list’. Ukraine, Moldova and Georgia have legislation in place that criminalises the
financing of terrorism, but some areas still need to be aligned with Moneyval
recommendations and relevant EU legislation.
The six Western Balkan partners are increasingly aware of the importance of a robust
framework to deal with critical infrastructure protection. Kosovo, Montenegro and Serbia
have developed appropriate legislation in this area, while in Bosnia and Herzegovina such
legislation exists only partially.
Most Western Balkans partners have repatriated foreign terrorist fighters and family
members from north-east Syria. Bosnia and Herzegovina has expressed its willingness to
repatriate all foreign terrorist fighters. While legal provisions are in place for their
prosecution upon their return, effective prosecution took place unevenly throughout the
region. Bosnia and Herzegovina prosecuted 7 returned foreign terrorist fighters, while the 6
accompanying women received conditional sentences. Albania is investigating 9 cases of
nationals who are still in north-east Syria, with no indictment or prosecution of the 37 women
and children repatriated so far. Montenegro has prosecuted one national who returned from
the 2014 Russian invasion of Ukraine. These verdicts are characterised by lenient sentences,
which is a matter of concern. With regard to departures to participate in the Russian war
against Ukraine, with the exception of Albania, that reported that one of its nationals had
travelled to fight in Ukraine, none of the other Western Balkan countries reported that their
36
citizens travelled to foreign battlefields in recent times. However, open sources did report
about departures from the region to Ukraine.
Due to the persistent threats from various terrorist groups, Türkiye continued to prioritise the
fight against the PKK and the dismantling of the Gülen movement. The PKK remains on the
EU’s list of people, groups and entities involved in acts of terrorism. Türkiye has also
continued its active counterterrorism cooperation with the international community as a
member of the Global Coalition to Defeat ISIS, the Global Counterterrorism Forum, and the
Committee of Experts on Terrorism of the Council of Europe. Active as a co-chair of the
Defeat ISIS Coalition’s foreign terrorist fighters working group, Türkiye also provided access
to its airspace and facilities for coalition counterterrorism operations in Iraq and Syria. At the
same time, Türkiye’s authorities should ensure that the country’s anti-terrorism law and its
application is in line with the rule of law principle and respects fundamental rights and
freedoms. Türkiye should bring its anti-terrorism legislation in line with EU standards, and
comply with the opinion of the Venice Commission on the law on preventing financing of
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.
Hybrid threats
Hybrid threats
, including disinformation, foreign information manipulation and interference
(FIMI) and cyberattacks, particularly against critical infrastructure, remain a political and
security challenge for the enlargement countries. After a steep increase last year following
Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine, these threats continue to pose a considerable risk
to both the EU and enlargement countries. In response to the recent granting of candidate
status to Ukraine and Moldova and the European perspective of Georgia, various actors, in
particular Russia-sponsored, continue to challenge the EU’s credibility and undermine public
trust in democratic institutions. These actors have continued to engage in information
manipulation and interference directly or through proxies, often synchronising their action
with deliberate disruptions in different sectors and exploiting vulnerabilities.
Disinformation and FIMI
have
increased significantly
since last year. As the Russian full-
scale invasion in Ukraine developed, so did the spreading of different Kremlin narratives in
the enlargement countries, with varying results. These are particularly effective in Serbia,
where part of the local media and some mainstream political forces disseminate pro-Russian
narratives, including throughout the Western Balkan region. Despite considerable efforts,
resilience towards these threats remains weak due to low media literacy, low trust in
institutions, limited independent and professional journalism and a low level of media
freedom. Similarly, following the decision to recognise a European perspective to Ukraine,
Moldova and Georgia as well as grant to grant candidate status to Moldova and Ukraine,
these three countries have been the target of a new wave of FIMI campaigns, mainly aiming
to discredit aspirations to join the EU and blame the West for the current situation in the
region. In Georgia, a specific strand of disinformation attempted to imply that the West seeks
to open a ‘second front’ against Russia from Georgia. More active debunking by the
authorities would be opportune.
Cybersecurity
and cyber resilience
remain
a key priority
in all enlargement countries. A
few countries reported cyberattacks over the course of the year, with large-scale impact on
public administration and public services. Progress on alignment with the EU acquis in
cybersecurity was seen in Albania, North Macedonia, Montenegro, Ukraine and Moldova. A
high-level cybersecurity conference – Towards a resilient cyberspace in the Western Balkans
took place in June 2023 in Brussels. A second EU-Ukraine cybersecurity dialogue took place
in physical format in September 2022.
37
Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo, Moldova, Montenegro and Türkiye held
elections
in the reporting period. In the upcoming period, elections will be organised in North
Macedonia, Ukraine, Moldova and Georgia. Further measures are required to prevent and
address any attempts of interference by third states and non-state actors.
Foreign direct investment
also intensified in all countries with the exception of Ukraine.
Robust frameworks to control foreign direct investment, in line with the EU FDI Screening
Regulation, are still lacking in the majority of the enlargement countries, apart from
Moldova, which has a system in place.
Migration
The Russian war of aggression against Ukraine has led to a rise in Ukrainian refugees, and
countries like Moldova in particular, as well as Montenegro, Serbia, Albania, and North
Macedonia have played a crucial role as host countries.
Irregular migration remains a significant challenge for both the Western Balkans and
Türkiye, in particular the fight against migrant smuggling and trafficking in human beings.
According to the European Border and Coast Guard Agency (Frontex), in 2022 the total
number of irregular border crossings at the external borders of the EU from the Western
Balkans was around 144 100. This was an increase of 134% compared to 2021 (61 600).
However, from the beginning of the year up to 31 July 2023, the overall number of irregular
arrivals from the Western Balkans to the EU decreased, compared with the same period in
2022. In the first 7 months of 2023, around 52 200 irregular border crossings were detected
on the Western Balkan route, 26% less than in the same period in the previous year. In 2022
and in the first 7 months of 2023, the main nationalities of arrivals were from Syria,
Afghanistan and Türkiye.
The main factors influencing the high number of people arriving by air from Türkiye and
Serbia are: (i) visa-free regimes; (ii) the short time needed to cross the region, i.e. 8 days on
average in 2022 compared with 53 in 2021 according to the International Organization for
Migration (IOM); (iii) the relatively low prices offered by smuggling networks to cross the
region; and (iv) the greater difficulty in entering the EU through other routes (e.g. the
Western Mediterranean).
The European Commission’s policy objective is to support the Western Balkan countries
facing migratory pressure in the region as potential future EU Member States. In line with the
EU Action Plan on the Western Balkans, this support is comprehensively targeting enhancing
border management, asylum procedure and reception capacity, combating migrant
smuggling, increasing readmission cooperation and returns of irregular migrants with no
rights to stay to their countries of origin, and enhancing asylum and protection systems and
reception capacities, as well as achieving visa policy alignment. According to Frontex, in
2022 the EU Member States returned 5 962 third-country nationals to the Western Balkans,
22% more compared with 2021. Albania was the main country of destination for these
returns, followed by Serbia and North Macedonia. Moreover, up to 8 June 2023, according to
the IOM, there were approximately 3 657 migrants and refugees in the region’s reception
centres and an estimated 700 outside reception facilities. In comparison, total reception
capacity stood at approximately 12 172 places. The Western Balkans participate in the
regional Anti-Smuggling Operational Partnership, launched in November 2022 to support
law enforcement and judicial cooperation against criminal smuggling networks and to
increase border management capacities.
Until September 2023, 22 421 irregular migrants arrived from Türkiye into the EU (including
Greece, Italy and Bulgaria), compared to 22 821 arrivals during the same period in 2022.
38
Arrivals to Greece increased by 123%, while the sea route to Italy saw a substantial decrease
(down by 55%). The number of arrivals in Cyprus via the Green Line fell significantly by
42%.
The 2016 EU-Turkey Statement remained the key framework for cooperation on migration
and continued to yield results, despite continued challenges over the implementation of the
Statement. Türkiye also continued to play a key role in addressing migration along the
Eastern Mediterranean route. Türkiye sustained its enormous efforts to host 3.6 million
refugees from Syria and other countries, and the EU maintained its substantial support. The
EU Facility for Refugees in Turkey had mobilised EUR 6 billion, with EUR 5.1 billion
disbursed as of September 2023. After a bridge funding of EUR 535 million in 2020, the
Commission continued the implementation of the EUR 3 billion package requested by the
Council.
Visa liberalisation continues to be a powerful tool to facilitate people-to-people contacts and
support reforms in the Western Balkans as well as in Ukraine, Moldova and Georgia in the
areas of justice, security and fundamental freedoms. As corroborated by the 2023 report
under the visa suspension mechanism
21
, Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Montenegro,
North Macedonia
22
, Serbia, Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine need to ensure further visa policy
alignment with the EU lists of visa-required third countries, in particular those third countries
which present irregular migration or security risks to the EU. Visa policy alignment with the
EU remains crucial for the good functioning of these partners’ visa-free regimes with the EU.
No progress was made by Türkiye with regard to completing the still open Visa
Liberalisation Roadmap benchmarks during the reporting period.
Public administration reform
The quality of the public administration and of the regulatory framework are crucial for the
EU’s long-term competitiveness
23
. For many years, the European Commission has
systematically guided and supported prospective EU Member States on how to build stable
and well-performing public administrations based on the five principles of good policy
making, management of the civil service, effective state organisation and clear accountability
lines, seamless and citizen-oriented service provision and sound public financial
management. While enlargement countries actively engage in the support, most continue to
lack the necessary political commitment and leadership to tackle the more sensitive reforms
that would affect a predominantly clientelist culture and build more stable and professional
structures and systems. For now, most reforms are more cosmetic than substantive. If
countries do not start changing the predominant administrative culture, their public
administrations will continue to struggle to attract and retain the talent to coordinate and
deliver the policies, services and investments needed to build long-term prosperity and
societal well-being.
Overall, enlargement countries remain at best moderately prepared in terms of quality of
their public administration. During the reporting period, reform progress was very limited
overall. Most recommendations from previous year(s) still apply. A typical pattern is that a
formal legal and institutional basis for a professional administration is at least partially in
place, but not systematically applied. Most countries have public administration reform
21
COM(2023) 730 final
22
North Macedonia achieved a nearly total alignment of its visa policy with EU lists; only one country
(Türkiye) whose citizens require a visa to enter the EU has a visa-free agreement with North Macedonia.
23
COM(2023) 168 final, COM(2023) 667 final
39
strategies (except Türkiye) or are updating them. However, their implementation is uneven
and often does not result in sustainable reforms or have a lasting impact on building a better
public administration.
For Ukraine, there are elements of progress but challenges remain also due to the war
circumstances. Georgia and Moldova made some progress in strengthening their public
administrations following the adoption of a public administration reform and related action
plans.
Good policy coordination and development remain the foundation of public administration
reforms. Enlargement countries need to systematically inform policy and legislation with data
and evidence, design legislation and policies in an inclusive consultative manner and assess
their potential impact. Good planning and due process of the policy agenda would build trust,
resilience and a more predictable regulatory environment for the public and businesses.
On human resources and civil service management, most countries still struggle with
developing and systematically implementing a transparent, coherent and fair salary system as
well as a merit-based recruitment, promotion and dismissal system. These reforms are needed
to attract and retain motivated and qualified staff and create a professional and well-
performing civil service. However, managing such reforms tends to be very sensitive.
Understanding different stakeholder interests and concerns and brokering broad support is
critical to achieve progress.
Effective state organisation and accountability are still hampered by a lack of progress on
streamlining state structures and setting clear lines of accountability between ministries and
subordinated bodies (in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Albania, Kosovo, North Macedonia, Serbia
and Moldova). The capacity of administrative courts and the quality of decisions is
insufficient to ensure individuals’ rights to administrative justice (in Serbia, North
Macedonia, Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Moldova). The quality of oversight
bodies varies, and recommendations are not systematically followed up, thereby limiting
effective checks and balances and opportunities for systemic improvement. Improving multi-
level governance requires better cooperation and coordination between national, regional and
local authorities, ensuring quality of service at all levels and matching administrative
responsibilities with resources and capacity. Given the importance of ensuring both an
appropriate balance between central, regional and local government, and a coherent
application of rules, procedures and standards across all levels of public administration, more
efforts are needed in all countries.
Providing digital administrative services continues to be the most advanced area of the
public administration reform agenda, especially in Albania, Serbia and Ukraine. While other
countries still need to catch up with them, all countries need to continue to ensure that public
services are equally accessible for people with insufficient digital means or skills. There is
also room to further streamline administrative processes and reduce the regulatory burden on
the public and businesses.
A lack of effectiveness and integrity of the public financial management system erodes
trust and affects both public revenue generation and expenditure management in most
enlargement countries. Budgetary transparency and public expenditure effectiveness are
critical issues, especially in times of increasing fiscal constraints. Public procurement
systems still have too many loopholes to ensure efficient allocation of taxpayers’ money. A
culture of managerial accountability and internal and external audits would ensure the
sustainability of a country’s finances, but this is not yet the norm. The quality of asset and
investment management needs to improve much more to enable enlargement countries to
40
close the infrastructure gap with EU Member States and reap the benefits of future EU
membership, including funding for investments.
Civil society
A free and empowered civil society is a key component of any democratic system. Across the
enlargement countries, there is an active and vibrant civil society that monitors governmental
action and contributes to policymaking. Civil society organisations also continue to be
providers of services, particularly assistance to people in vulnerable situations and taking part
in the humanitarian response to the Russian war of aggression against Ukraine.
Freedom of association and assembly is enshrined in legal frameworks and generally
enjoyed. However, reforms are still needed to fully apply international standards, and
implementation needs to be much more consistent. Civil society faces continuous pressure,
and its space to operate freely has continued to diminish, with restrictions on its activities and
those of human rights defenders. Use of strategic lawsuits against public participation
(SLAPP), including by public officials, are on an alarming rise in Serbia and Bosnia and
Herzegovina, and are also seen in other countries, such as Albania. Similarly, it is essential
that security measures are not misused, e.g. instrumentalised to target political opponents or
critics through anti-terrorism legislation in Türkiye, free access to information in
Montenegro, and as yet unrepealed excessive control and reporting rules on preventing
money laundering in Kosovo. The most worrying developments, however, are linked to the
development of ‘foreign agent laws’ leading to the stigmatisation and repression of civil
society organisations. These have been put forward in the Republika Srpska entity of Bosnia
and Herzegovina and in Georgia (but subsequently withdrawn in Georgia due to international
and local pressure).
Significant progress needs to be made – for instance in Georgia, Serbia, Montenegro, Bosnia
and Herzegovina and Kosovo – to improve the availability and transparency of public
funding, which should be distributed on the basis of objective criteria. While the legal
framework on philanthropy and donations was improved in Moldova, laws on volunteering
are still pending in Albania and Montenegro. Processes for registering civil society
organisations need to be improved, including in Albania, North Macedonia and Montenegro.
Despite the existence of policies for strengthening the enabling environment for civil society
or for governmental cooperation with civil society in Albania, Kosovo, North Macedonia or
Ukraine, their implementation is insufficient and often depends on donor funding. In
policymaking, most countries recognise the valuable contribution of civil society. There are
also mechanisms for open public consultations, but how they are applied needs to be
improved. There are continued weaknesses in the institutionalised mechanisms for
cooperation between civil society and government. It is essential that governments ensure the
conditions for meaningful and inclusive participation of civil society organisations in
policymaking.
Economy
Following Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, the 10 enlargement
economies faced major economic and social challenges. In Ukraine, GDP dropped by 29.1%
in 2022 as the whole country was profoundly affected by Russia’s war of aggression resulting
in significant pressure on macroeconomic stability. The Western Balkan region’s GDP
growth slowed to 3.2% in 2022, down from a 7.7% rebound from the COVID-19-induced
recession in 2021. However, the severity of the slowdown varied across economies, with real
GDP growth falling to 6.1% in Montenegro, 5.6% in Türkiye, 4.8% in Albania, 4% in Bosnia
and Herzegovina, 3.5% in Kosovo, 2.3% in Serbia, and 2.1% in North Macedonia. In
41
Moldova, GDP contracted sharply by 5.9%, and in Georgia, GDP continued to grow at
double-digit levels (10.1%). Differences in the economic growth in countries were mainly
driven by direct and indirect consequences of Russia’s war in Ukraine, including its impact
on trade links, energy, food prices and migration. The economic outlook for the 10
economies remains surrounded by high uncertainty about the war’s further impact on growth,
employment and social cohesion.
During 2022, countries adopted fiscal measures to mitigate the economic impact of the war
and of rising energy and food prices. As energy prices have come down substantially from
their peak, measures should now be gradually phased out, while ensuring that fiscal
consolidation is maintained and social protection is well-targeted to those who need it.
Inflation in the Western Balkans, Moldova and Georgia started to slow from its peak in
autumn 2022 following a substantial acceleration. In Türkiye, inflation also decelerated in the
first half of 2023, after global price pressures coupled with an unorthodox monetary policy
triggered a large depreciation in the lira and drove inflation up to a two-decade high (over
85% in October 2022). In Ukraine, disruptions in supply chains, higher production costs and
money printing by the National Bank to finance the war led to a strong rise in inflation,
reaching a 26.6% peak at end-2022 before starting to ease.
Labour markets in the Western Balkans and Türkiye continue to be characterised by overall
low activity (especially among women and young people),high unemployment, and brain
drain of skilled workers. Structural mismatches in skills persist, driven by underinvestment in
human capital and weak education systems. This requires more active labour market policies,
strengthened bipartite and tripartite social dialogue and investments in upskilling and
reskilling. In this context, Western Balkan partners committed in 2021 to set up Youth
Guarantee schemes following the EU model. As of mid-2023, most of them had established
inter-ministerial expert groups to develop implementation plans. Three had already adopted
their plans, and some were already starting to pilot the scheme in 2023. The labour markets in
Moldova and Georgia performed relatively well in 2022, benefiting from the arrival of
qualified refugees fleeing Russia’s war against Ukraine and mobilisation in Russia, though
structural weaknesses persist. However, high levels of informal employment remain a key
issue across all partner countries. In Ukraine, refugee flows and internal displacement,
together with the tremendous capital destruction, dramatically affected the labour market,
which was already characterised by relatively low activity rate and brain drain. Enormous
efforts will be required to rebuild a functioning labour market and address the skills shortage
once the war ends. Strengthening of social dialogue, including capacity building for social
partners, will be crucial in that respect.
It is increasingly important that all 10 enlargement economies accelerate structural reforms
to enable a sustainable recovery in the medium term and make progress in meeting the two
economic criteria for EU membership: ensuring functioning market economies and
demonstrating the capacity to cope with competitive pressure and market forces in the EU.
In terms of functioning market economies, none of the Western Balkan countries can
currently be considered to have a fully functioning market economy, and the levels of
compliance vary despite progress in some countries. While Bosnia and Herzegovina remains
at an early stage of preparation with no progress over the last year, most of the other partners
made some or good progress in building functioning market economies and reached a
moderate or good level of preparation. Türkiye’s market economy is well advanced, but
serious concerns persist over its functioning as it backslid on key elements, such as the
conduct of monetary policy and the institutional and regulatory environment. Steps have been
taken since the election to address some of these concerns. Moldova and Ukraine are at an
42
early stage / some level of preparation, while Georgia is moderately prepared. In terms of
their capacity to cope with competitive pressure and market forces, only Türkiye has a good
level of preparation. Serbia, Montenegro and North Macedonia are moderately prepared,
Albania and Georgia have some level of preparation, Bosnia and Herzegovina and Moldova
are at an early stage / have some level of preparation, while Kosovo and Ukraine are at an
early stage.
The level of implementation of the jointly agreed policy guidance continued to deteriorate
across the Western Balkans and Türkiye, falling from 50.8% in 2020 to 42.9% in 2021 and to
40.8% in 2022. Implementing the policy guidance is key for the countries to further align
their economies with the EU’s and prepare for their future participation in the European
Union’s framework for the coordination and surveillance of economic and social policies.
There is a need to enhance fiscal sustainability, promote human capital development, and
build resilience to future shocks. Efforts should continue in advancing the digital and green
transitions, improving the business environment and deepening regional economic integration
based on EU standards to attract investment and boost economic growth.
43
Annex 2. Implementation of the Economic and Investment Plan for the Western
Balkans
Implementation of the Economic and Investment Plan (EIP) for the Western Balkans
24
,
adopted on 6 October 2020, is well under way. The plan aims at closer integration and
bridging the socio-economic gap between the region and the EU, assisting its green and
digital transitions and bringing the Western Balkans closer to the EU single market. The plan
is implemented through a package of EUR 9 billion of EU grants and the Western Balkans
Guarantee Facility, which is expected to attract up to EUR 20 billion in investments.
The impact of these investments on the region’s economy is expected to be amplified by
tangible advances in the implementation of the Common Regional Market and the Economic
Reform Programmes, as well as continued progress in the areas of the rule of law, public
finance management and public administration reform.
To date, the EU has approved or committed funding of EUR 4.29 billion in grants and is
expected to leverage more than EUR 10.76 billion in investment from other sources. This
includes funding for 54 flagship projects under the Western Balkans Investment Framework
(WBIF), bilateral and multi-country actions under the Instrument for Pre-accession
Assistance (IPA) and IPARD (IPA for Rural Development) funding in support of agriculture
measures. In addition, the EU has approved the provisioning of 21 guarantees under the
European Fund for Sustainable Development (EFSD+), which will leverage significant
investment through banks and international financing institutions.
Investing in transport connectivity focuses on developing the necessary infrastructure for
road, rail and waterway transport in line with the trans-European transport networks
priorities. It also focuses on upgrading and greening existing infrastructure to contribute to
smart mobility solutions in line with the Green Agenda.
Key flagship projects approved under the WBIF as part of the EIP focus on: (i) the Corridor
X Serbia-Bulgaria railway; (ii) the Peace Highway, connecting Kosovo and Serbia; (iii) the
Corridor Vc motorway in Bosnia and Herzegovina, connecting the country with the Adriatic,
Hungary and Croatia; (iv) the Blue Highway in Albania; (v) the Corridor VIII motorway in
North Macedonia; and (vi) other motorway and railway interconnectors and bypasses in the
region.
These projects complement connectivity investments adopted in previous years, several of
which have been completed in the past months. These include the Corridor Vc Tarcin
motorway section and the Ivan Tunnel in Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Corridor IV Bar-
Vrbnica railway section in Montenegro.
In coordination with the Transport Community Treaty Permanent Secretariat, the region also
continues to work on reform measures through implementation of five sectoral action plans
(rail, road, road safety, transport facilitation, and waterborne transport and multimodality)
and the sustainable and smart mobility strategy for the Western Balkans. The 5-year rolling
work plan endorsed by the six partners serves as an additional planning tool for the reforms
and infrastructure that the region has to prioritise in the coming years.
The implementation of these action plans and the modernisation of existing infrastructure is
supported through the safe and sustainable transport programme of EUR 80 million adopted
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COM(2020) 641 final.
44
by the WBIF Operational Board in June 2023. This funds smart and sustainable mobility
solutions through decarbonisation and digitalisation.
Following the successful introduction of ‘green lanes’ in the region during the COVID-19
pandemic, similar green and blue lanes (on maritime crossings) are also being created
between the Western Balkans and EU countries as part of the transport facilitation measures.
They are currently piloted with Greece, Italy and Croatia, and lanes on the Serbia-Hungary
border are under negotiation.
Lastly, as part of the proposal for revision of the Trans-European Transport Network (TEN-
T) Regulation, a Western Balkans corridor has been established and included in the
comprehensive network and partly in the core network. This demonstrates the EU’s
commitment to connectivity in the region, which is seen as an integral part of the EU’s
transport network.
In terms of financial assistance for sustainable transport under the EIP, EUR 1.74 billion has
so far been approved under the WBIF and committed under bilateral and multi-country IPA
programmes. This is expected to leverage an additional EUR 5.7 billion from other sources.
Clean energy transition and connectivity flagship projects focus on investment in
renewable energy sources, the energy efficiency ‘renovation wave’ and facilitating the
transition from coal. Energy security and diversification of supply are also supported.
In October 2022, the Commission announced a EUR 1 billion Energy Support Package for
the region. Half the amount is targeted support to vulnerable social groups and businesses,
and the other half is for accelerating the energy transition, especially through investments in
energy efficiency measures, diversification of supply and renewables generation. Most of the
direct support was disbursed in early 2023, while prioritising and adopting the investments is
happening in the course of 2023.
The WBIF Operational Board has so far adopted 18 EIP investment projects focusing on the
construction of solar/photovoltaic power plants (e.g. in Albania, Kosovo and North
Macedonia), windfarms (e.g. in Serbia), rehabilitation of hydropower plants (e.g. in Albania,
Bosnia and Herzegovina, North Macedonia and Serbia), electricity transmission network (e.g.
the Trans-Balkan electricity corridor) and energy efficiency. The EU is also supporting and
provisioning investments in gas interconnectors to ensure a better diversification of energy
sources.
To promote renewable energy and energy efficiency and support progress in renovating
public and private buildings, the Commission replenished the regional energy efficiency
programme with EUR 100 million through a contribution agreement signed in December
2022. Financing of EUR 45 million for a dedicated guarantee facility for projects related
mainly to energy efficiency and renewables received a positive opinion from the WBIF
Operational Board in April 2022 and is currently being negotiated.
In December 2022, the Western Balkans adopted 2030 energy and climate targets under the
Energy Community Treaty. On this basis, they are currently developing their respective
national energy and climate plans setting out the steps to achieve these targets. The
Commission and the Energy Community are also engaged with the Western Balkans on
developing a regional Emissions Trading System as part of their accession process.
The transition from coal in the region, most of which is heavily reliant on fossil fuels, will be
a major socio-economic challenge. The Commission has therefore been supporting the
cooperation platform for coal regions in transition in the Western Balkans and Ukraine,
45
mirroring a similar EU initiative. A whole series of bilateral exchanges with EU regions
already took place, while others are being planned.
In terms of financial assistance under the EIP for clean energy, EUR 617 million has so far
been adopted under the WBIF and committed under bilateral and multi-country IPA
programmes. This is expected to leverage an additional EUR 1.3 billion from other sources.
Furthermore, the WBIF Operational Board issued a positive opinion on the provisioning of
six open access guarantees related that are expected to generate significant investments in
energy infrastructure, efficiency and transition. The contracts are currently under negotiation.
The EIP priorities on transport and energy complement the efforts in the field of the
environment and climate change. Together, they contribute to implementing the Green
Agenda for the Western Balkans, adopted with the EIP and endorsed by the Western Balkan
leaders through the Sofia Declaration in November 2020. The five-pillar agenda relies on
regulatory reforms and investments in the region to align it with the ambitions of the
European Green Deal, particularly in the areas of energy transition, pollution prevention, the
circular economy, biodiversity protection and sustainable food production. The
implementation of the agenda is promoted by the EIP flagship projects related to sustainable
transport, energy transition and waste and wastewater management.
The region is implementing a detailed action plan for the agenda, endorsed by the leaders at
the Brdo summit in October 2021. While the Regional Cooperation Council maintains a key
role in the coordination of regional initiatives under the Green Agenda, the Commission
concluded a EUR 11 million EU4Green programme with the Austrian Environment Agency
to help each partner work on their own strategies and reforms.
In addition to the energy and transport projects mentioned earlier, EU-supported investment
in favour of the Green Agenda focus on waste and wastewater management, the circular
economy, environmental protection and sustainable agriculture. Under flagship 7, the WBIF
Operational Board and the Commission have so far approved financing for seven water and
wastewater management investment projects in all six partner countries (including in the
capitals Podgorica, Skopje, Belgrade and Sarajevo) and three programmes supporting waste
management (in Albania, North Macedonia and Serbia). There is also a series of bilateral
programmes on biodiversity and the environmental protection of specific areas (e.g. Lake
Prespa). There is also a regional programme to fight pollution in cities by supporting the
Covenant of Mayors for Climate and Energy, which helps cities develop plans and implement
pilot projects in this area.
The agri-food green transition is largely implemented through IPARD. EUR 152 million has
been committed under the EIP so far to support the modernisation of sustainable food
production.
In terms of financial assistance for environmental protection and climate change under the
EIP, EUR 633 million has so far been adopted under the WBIF and committed under bilateral
and multi-country IPA and IPARD programmes. This is expected to leverage an additional
EUR 685 million from other sources.
Furthermore, the WBIF Operational Board has issued a positive opinion on the provisioning
of four open access guarantees related to the green transition, targeting the sustainable
transition of cities, carbon sinks and green bonds. The contracts are being prepared with a
view to signature in 2023.
The EIP also supports the region in its digital transformation through technical assistance
and investment. It focuses on the regulatory reforms conducive to the development of a
46
digital services market and on promoting investment in innovative digital solutions and
digital infrastructure. Two projects have been approved under the WBIF so far, related to
broadband in Serbia and ICT laboratories in Albania.
In terms of legal framework reform, the Commission maintains annual regulatory dialogue on
digital policy with the region and supports the regular high-level Western Balkans digital
summits. At the dialogue on 30 June 2023, Albania, Montenegro, North Macedonia and
Serbia signed Association Agreements to the Digital Europe Programme (DIGITAL).
Participation in DIGITAL will allow the countries to take part in the network of European
Digital Innovation Hubs supporting companies and the public sector in the green and digital
transitions. The six countries signed up to the Declaration for the Future of Internet in 2022,
which sets out the vision and principles for a trusted internet. The region is also fully
associated with the work of the Body of European Regulators for Electronic
Communications.
The Commission, together with the Regional Cooperation Council, was instrumental in
securing the regional roaming agreement. which introduced a Roam Like at Home scheme in
the region on 1 July 2021. The first voluntary reduction of data roaming charges by the
leading EU and Western Balkan operators came into force on 1 October 2023. The operators
also agreed on a glide path for further reductions in the coming years with a view to bringing
the prices close to a Roam Like at Home scheme by 2028.
In parallel, the EU is promoting the development of new digital solutions for various aspects
the Western Balkans’ economies, including transport, energy, logistics, government and
commerce. A major initiative promoting such solutions is the annual Balkathon, which
awards innovative digital transition projects.
A regional programme, EU4Digital, is in preparation. It has a budget of EUR 15 million, and
it is planned to be implemented in 3 years. The programme aims to complement the ongoing
work of the Common Regional Market – Regional Digital Area, which builds on the
objectives of the Digital Agenda for the Western Balkans.
Cybersecurity remains an important element of the EIP. A cybersecurity-needs assessment
for the region was completed, and a series of technical assistance events are being held
through the Technical Assistance and Information Exchange (TAIEX) instrument, building
preparedness for cyber incidents.
In terms of financial assistance for the digital transition under the EIP, more than
EUR 50 million has so far been adopted under the WBIF and committed under bilateral and
multi-country IPA programmes. This is expected to leverage an additional EUR 240 million
from other sources.
Furthermore, the WBIF Operational Board has approved provisioning of one open access
guarantee in this field: the Digital Transformation Platform.
Supporting the private sector focuses on targeted funding through dedicated guarantee
facilities for small and medium-sized businesses (SMEs) to start up, innovate and become
competitive. Similar support is also provided to rural agro-businesses through the IPARD.
The right conditions for the development and growth of the private sector must be created, in
particular for micro-, small and medium-sized businesses (MSMEs). This is at the centre of
the economic policy dialogue held with the Western Balkan partners annually through the
Economic Reform Programmes (ERP) exercise and the resulting economic policy
recommendations, aligned with the priorities of the EIP.
47
Private sector support, especially geared towards fostering innovation and strengthening the
dual green and digital transitions, is currently delivered through six dedicated private sector
blending schemes: SMEs Go Green, Climate Programme, Green Finance for Inclusion,
Sustainable Access to Finance for Entrepreneurship, Go Digital and Green for Growth,
promoting green lending.
The Commission also supports the WB6 Chambers Investment Forum to promote the
economic interests of the Western Balkans and beyond. It finances, in particular, the regional
supplier development programme, which aims to help create links/opportunities for domestic
suppliers.
Lastly, the Commission launched a number of initiatives under the Western Balkans
Guarantee as part of the broader EFSD+. This includes provisioning 10 guarantee schemes to
provide general growth financing for SMEs and an agricultural risk-sharing facility as well as
promoting inclusive growth and the dual transitions. These are currently under contracting.
In terms of financial assistance for private sector development under the EIP,
EUR 341 million has so far been approved under the WBIF and committed under bilateral
and multi-country IPA programmes. This is expected to leverage an additional
EUR 2.1 billion from other sources.
The sixth priority area supported by the EIP is developing human capital and innovation,
including young people, education and embracing innovation. In July 2021, the ministers of
the region endorsed a declaration committing their countries to the principles of the European
Pillar of Social Rights and implementing the Youth Guarantee flagship of the EIP. The EU-
Western Balkans Summit in October 2021 saw the launch of a comprehensive agenda on
innovation, research, education, culture, youth and sport (the Innovation Agenda).
The Youth Guarantee is an activation scheme to ensure that young people in the Western
Balkans receive a quality offer of employment, continued education, apprenticeship and
training within a certain time after becoming unemployed or leaving formal education. The
scheme requires reforms and capacity building in education and vocational training,
employment, labour services and social protection. All Western Balkan partners, except
Bosnia and Herzegovina (where work is under way), have adopted national Youth Guarantee
implementation plans and set up coordination mechanisms, and some are already piloting
them.
Since late 2022, the EU’s peer-to-peer technical assistance facility, SOCIEUX+, has been
available to the Western Balkans. It specialises in employment, labour and social protection
and provides short-term assistance to partner countries’ national and local institutions
working in the eligible sectors. There are currently 26 actions ongoing in the Western
Balkans, mainly related to social protection and to labour and employment.
The Western Balkans Agenda on Innovation, Research, Education, Culture, Youth and Sport
continues to set the Western Balkans on a solid path towards closer cooperation in those
policy areas. Numerous cooperation efforts between EU Member States and Western Balkan
partners have strengthened key areas such as support to the modernisation of higher
education systems, industry cooperation and smart manufacturing, strengthening of
innovation eco-systems, training of medical personnel, digitalisation and cyber-security.
The Innovation Agenda’s key implementation instrument is the Horizon Europe programme,
to which all six Western Balkan partners are now associated. The region has also access to
the RTD Policy Support Facility and have increased their engagement and participation in
EU research initiatives such as COST and EUREKA. North Macedonia and Serbia are
associated with Erasmus+, while other four partners benefit from support of the international
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dimension of Erasmus+ programme. Since 2023, the Erasmus+ European Universities
initiative is open to the participation of all higher education institutions from the Western
Balkans as full partners. European Universities are transnational alliances of higher education
institutions developing long-term structural and strategic cooperation, creating the
universities of the future and promoting European values and identity. The Western Balkan
partners are also fully associated with EU initiatives in the area of culture, including the
Creative Europe programme and the New European Bauhaus initiative. This initiative
promotes innovation, sustainability, inclusion and aesthetics in infrastructure and other
projects and is particularly related to implementation of the Green Agenda.
EU assistance in this field also includes close cooperation with the Western Balkans on
health. The region continues to be associated with the work of the EU Health Security
Committee and the European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control and has access to
joint procurement of medical supplies. The EU is financing a health crisis resilience project
in the Western Balkans and an investment project to expand the University Children’s
Hospital in Belgrade.
In terms of financial assistance for human capital development under the EIP,
EUR 368 million has so far been approved under the WBIF and committed under bilateral
and multi-country IPA programmes. This is expected to leverage an additional
EUR 477 million from other sources.
The EIP’s six priorities are underpinned – and their impact amplified – by the region’s
commitment (and the EU’s support) to create a Common Regional Market in the Western
Balkans based on the four freedoms of movement. A major breakthrough in late 2022 was the
conclusion of three agreements on the freedom of movement of people in the region. Their
successful implementation will facilitate travel and the recognition of higher education
qualifications and certain professional qualifications. The EU is supporting the development
of the Common Market through the Regional Cooperation Council and CEFTA.
Lastly, the success of the Economic and Investment Plan is conditional upon all partners
implementing best practices in the rule of law, public finance and investment management
and fostering a professional and efficient public administration.
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Annex 3. Implementation of the Economic and Investment Plan (EIP) – overview for
Ukraine, Moldova, and Georgia
In 2021, the EU and its five Eastern partners launched an Economic and Investment Plan
for the Eastern Partnership
25
(EIP). Its aim is to support economic recovery after 2 years of
a socially and economically damaging health crisis. The plan also aims to bring about the
green and digital transformations required to build innovative, environmentally sustainable,
socially inclusive and resilient economies.
Since the start of Russia’s unprovoked war of aggression against Ukraine, the EIP has gained
a whole new socio-economic significance and political relevance. It has become an integral
part of the EU’s response to the impact of the war against Ukraine by providing the liquidity
and mobilising the investments needed to help the economy of Ukraine – and of Moldova –
stay afloat. The EIP is also part of the EU’s support to integrating these two countries – as
well as Georgia – into the EU’s economy and energy, digital and transport markets. It is a key
mechanism to facilitate their accession efforts and unlock the benefits of European
integration.
The plan’s ambition is to mobilise up to EUR 17 billion of investment in the region in 2021-
2027 by leveraging EUR 2.3 billion of EU grants and guarantees. Flanking policy measures
and technical support are also part of the EIP’s implementation.
As of September 2023, a total amount of EUR 6.2 billion had been mobilised through
bilateral and regional grants, blending operations and guarantees in support of EIP priorities
in Ukraine, Moldova, and Georgia. EUR 3.5 billion of this amount is to support
implementation of country flagship projects. The number of investments mobilised so far
under the EIP represents 40% of the target amount of EUR 17 billion of investments to be
mobilised. In the first half of 2023, investment mobilised thanks to the plan picked up
rapidly. With the conclusion of new guarantee agreements with partner financial institutions
under the EFSD+ instrument, implementation of the plan is expected to accelerate further.
Sustainable transport
Sustainable transport connectivity has been a key priority in the region ever since the Eastern
Partnership was launched in 2009. In December 2021, the EU and its Eastern partners have
renewed their commitment to strengthen core transport links, with a focus on the extended
indicative core TEN-T network, including connections across the Black Sea. Improvements
to key air, road, rail, maritime and inland waterway connections have a huge potential to
stimulate sustainable economic development, market integration and cross-border trade in the
region and between the region and the EU. Since 2021, EUR 1.2 billion has been mobilised
in support of transport connectivity.
In Ukraine and Moldova, the EU has been living up to its commitment to support the
implementation of the EU-Ukraine Solidarity lanes initiative. Solidarity lanes are priority
transport axes connecting Ukraine and Moldova to the EU. They are the main route to trade
in essential goods from and to Ukraine, and they have become a lifeline for the country’s
economy. The Commission has been working with EU Member States, Ukraine, Moldova,
international partners and companies, as well as transport operators to expand and improve
the functioning of the solidarity lanes. The Commission is focusing on reducing transport and
logistics costs along the solidarity lanes through streamlined procedures, upgrading the
infrastructure and using the full potential of all routes. In this context, nine Connecting
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SWD(2021) 186 final.
50
Europe Facility projects, for a total EU support of almost EUR 250 million, will upgrade rail
and road cross-border points between neighbouring EU Member States (Hungary, Poland,
Romania and Slovakia) and Ukraine and Moldova.
In 2022, the Commission worked together with the Moldovan authorities, the European Bank
for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) and the European Investment Bank (EIB) to
support the rehabilitation of the north-south railway axis. The main objective is to improve
the capacity of the Moldovan railway network that covers approximately 128 km on the
Vălcineț-Ocnița-Ungheni-Chișinău-Căinari corridor, particularly in terms of weight norms
and travelling speed. This comes on top of short-term investments aiming to quickly upgrade
the main road border crossing point between Ukraine and Slovakia and purchase equipment,
such as scanners and generators, for priority border crossing points between Ukraine and EU
Member States. The Commission mobilised EUR 20 million in grants through the Foreign
Policy Instrument alongside a loan of EUR 12 million from the EBRD.
In Georgia, the EU and the EIB continued to invest in the east-west highway with a focus on
‘black spots’, which are sections of the road where the number of road accidents and fatalities
is particularly high. The EU and the EIB will continue to support the development of this
crucial corridor for a total amount of EUR 446 million (including EUR 16.8 million in
grants). In support of flagship 2 in Georgia, the EU also launched a comprehensive feasibility
study to assess the commercial viability of additional ferry/feeder lines to link Georgia to
Bulgaria through the Black Sea.
In November 2022, Ukraine, Moldova and Georgia became observing participants in the
Transport Community bodies. This will bring concrete benefits to the countries in terms of
implementation of the relevant EU transport acquis and the development of the indicative
TEN-T network on their territories, as well as the sharing good practices with the Western
Balkan regional partners and EU Member States. The Transport Community Treaty (TCT)
Permanent Secretariat has already started engaging with the observing participants at various
levels to introduce them to the work of the Transport Community, involve them in the work
of the TCT technical committees and kick-start the work on some of the major TCT
deliverables (such as the action plans on rail, road, road safety, transport facilitation,
waterborne transport and multimodality).
Moldova and Ukraine became associated to the Connecting Europe Facility in May and June
2023, respectively. This should lead to strengthened cooperation in the transport sector and
support implementation of the extended TEN-T.
Easing access to finance for SMEs
Since the launch of the EIP, the EU has actively supported its Eastern partners’ efforts to
kick-start their economies after 2 very difficult years of lockdowns and trade disruption due
to COVID-19. The EU has paid particular attention to addressing the financing needs of
MSMEs by mobilising EUR 1.5 billion in credit lines and business advisory services to help
them restart activity, reclaim foregone market shares and digitalise and modernise their
operations. EU-supported credit lines offer better borrowing terms for MSMEs, notably by
proposing longer maturities, reduced collateral requirements, tailor-made technical assistance
and investment incentives. The EU, in cooperation with BGK, provided Ukraine with a
EUR 10 million guarantee to enable renewed lending to SMEs that would not qualify for new
financing due to risks related to the ongoing war.
Trade facilitation
In October 2022, the EU launched the Eastern Partnership Trade Helpdesk, which aims to
facilitate companies’ access to trade-related information. The Helpdesk is an online portal
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with detailed access to market information (applicable export and import regulations, tariff
and non-tariff measures, duties, taxes, procedures, etc.), trade statistics and analytical insights
into the potential of EU and EaP national markets. Surveys of non-tariff measures
(regulatory, procedural) have been carried out in each country in order to identify obstacles to
trade in goods and services and provide recommendations to overcome them.
Implementation of the EU4Business: Connecting Companies project continued in 2022 and
early 2023. The project aims to promote trade relations and business partnerships in Eastern
partner countries by building bridges between SMEs and business support organisations
(BSOs) in the EU and their Eastern Partnership peers. A mobility scheme was developed
enabling exchanges between SMEs and BSOs from both regions.
Sustainable energy and decarbonisation of economies
Since the launch of the EIP, significant progress has been made in the crucially important
area of sustainable energy, where EUR 1.6 billion of investments have already been
mobilised throughout the Eastern Partnership region.
In 2022, the EU4Energy programme continued to support Ukraine, Moldova, and Georgia in
building their legal and regulatory energy frameworks. The programme also assisted Eastern
partners in creating a conducive environment for the development of renewable energy and
greener energy mixes. The programme played a central role in assisting Ukraine and
Moldova in the European Network of Transmission System Operators post-synchronisation
process. It also supported Ukraine in the ongoing reconstruction of its energy system,
contributing to the security of supply in the region.
Cooperation with the International Renewable Energy Agency (IRENA) was pursued. This
aimed to identify conditions and obstacles to the development and integration of renewable
energy sources in the Eastern Partnership countries.
In Ukraine, the EU-supported flagship initiative of the Energy Efficiency Fund (EEF)
(EUR 104 million covered by the EU) continued to successfully implement its programme of
energy efficiency investments in multi-apartment buildings. By the end of March 2023, the
EEF engaged almost 80 000 households, with 261 projects fully or partially completed in
multi-apartment buildings (over 80% of these have been deep renovations). In 2022, the EEF
introduced a new ‘restoration’ programme, which supports fast repairs of non-structurally
war-damaged residential buildings.
As part of the Eastern Europe Energy Efficiency and Environment Partnership (E5P), the EU
co-financed several EBRD-led projects on energy efficiency and district heating in Ukraine.
Projects on district heating rehabilitation cover Zhytomyr, Ternopil, Lviv, Lutsk and
Chernivtsi with a total budget of around EUR 110 million and an EBRD loan contribution of
EUR 48 million. Energy efficiency projects for Dnipro public buildings are ongoing with a
budget of EUR 39 million, including a EUR 20 million EBRD loan contribution. A major
new programme for renovating public buildings in Ukraine (up to 1 000 hospitals and
schools) was launched in March 2023 by the EIB with grants from the EU and the E5P
programme. This will now also cover non-energy efficiency aspects like bomb shelters, better
fire-safety measures and improved access for disabled persons. An important workstream,
which started in 2022 and is still ongoing, includes two EU-funded emergency assistance
programmes on housing for internally displaced people.
In Moldova, the energy efficiency programme was signed in 2022 (financed by a
EUR 15 million grant and two EUR 30 million loans from the EBRD and the EIB). It is the
first nationwide energy efficiency initiative in Moldova. The main categories of buildings
targeted by the programme are public buildings owned by the state and/or municipalities. The
52
total investment is estimated at around EUR 94 million. Financed under the E5P programme,
the Chişinău energy efficiency in public buildings programme entered its second phase of
implementation and aims to refurbish 119 public buildings. The Balti district heating phase 1
(EUR 11 million total budget, EUR 7 million EBRD loan) was completed, and phase 2 is
starting (EUR 18 million total budget, EUR 14 million EBRD loan).
In Georgia, a twinning project with the energy regulatory commission, implemented by a
consortium led by Austria and Germany, ended in April 2023. It covered activities to
promote the energy market’s development, including promoting the Georgian National
Energy and Water Supply Regulator’s role in market regulation, renewable energy
integration and energy efficiency. In 2021–2022, EU support amounting to EUR 135 million
was provided to Moldova to help the most vulnerable segments of the population deal with
rising energy costs and to support the country’s long-term socio-economic recovery, energy
security and energy transition. The Ukraine Energy Support Fund, managed by the Energy
Community Secretariat and co-chaired by the European Commission, has financed the
delivery of advanced gas equipment worth nearly EUR 7.6 million to the Gas Transmission
System Operator of Ukraine for the restoration of damaged facilities and those in liberated
territories.
In Georgia, under the E5P, an energy efficiency project for schools in mountainous regions
(EUR 2.6 million grant) was implemented. A parallel programme to improve the energy
efficiency of public buildings, supported by a EUR 13 million grant from the EU, is
implemented by the KfW and the EBRD.
The Finance and Technology Transfer Centre for Climate Change – EU4Climate
window, run by the EBRD, helps SMEs and mid-cap companies reduce their impact on the
environment as well as their energy and water costs by adopting innovative and green
technologies.
The ongoing EU4Climate programme has helped partner countries improve policies on
climate change mitigation and adaptation and move towards a low-emission and climate-
resilient economy in line with the Paris Agreement. A new project with the European
Environment Agency as implementing partner has been launched to help Georgia, Moldova
and Ukraine set up an effective governance system for climate action.
Natural assets management, climate and environment
In 2022, investment in the circular economy benefited from finance unlocked through SME
support. This was accompanied by regulatory support and advisory services for businesses,
primarily provided through the EU4Environment programme. In Ukraine, the EU continued
to support creating extended producer responsibility (EPR) schemes for various waste
streams. Furthermore, industrial waste maps were finalised for regions in Georgia and
Ukraine. In Moldova, pre-feasibility assessments for transforming the Free Economic Zone
Valkanes and the Industrial Park Tracom into eco-industrial parks were completed. In
Moldova, an assessment of the existing EPR mechanisms was completed and policy
recommendations provided. These included recommendations to improve the legal
framework on EPR implementation for waste from electrical and electronic equipment and
waste batteries. As concerns regulatory support, Georgia received assistance to update its
national waste strategy for 2016-2030 and develop a new national waste management plan
for 2022-2026. The government adopted these documents in August 2022. They include
updated targets, address issues related to biodegradable and hazardous waste and outline
requirements for EPR schemes.
53
On advisory support, eco-innovation assessments and roadmaps were developed for five
SMEs from the wine and clothing sectors in Moldova thanks to cooperation with the
Organisation for Entrepreneurship Development. Eight Georgian SMEs from the agriculture
and hospitality sectors received similar advisory support. The products of three export-
oriented companies in Ukraine and five export-oriented companies in Georgia are being
assessed using the product environmental footprint methodology.
Water infrastructure in Ukraine, Moldova and Georgia has been chronically lacking capital
investment, maintenance and repair. The EIP aims therefore to further upgrade water supply
and sanitation and help put river basin management plans into practice. Several investment
projects are under way in Ukraine, Moldova and Georgia with EU support. In the context of
Russia’s war of aggression, EU funding has helped 6.9 million people in Ukraine regain
access to clean water. The EU has leveraged funding for investment in water infrastructure in
cooperation with several international financial institutions, including AFD, EIB, EBRD,
KfW, and NEFCO.
In order to provide technical support for reform and investment in the water sector,
implementation of the EU4Environment – Water and Data programme was launched in early
2022 and produced its first results. The process of national policy dialogues on water was
restarted in all partner countries. Under the programme, the development of new river basin
management plans was launched in Georgia, and work continued on the Dnipro River basin
management plan in Ukraine. Support for identification of investments into forestry,
biodiversity and nature protection is at an inception phase. However, advances in that area
have been made by Ukraine and Moldova through their accession to the EU’s LIFE
Programme.
Support to identify investments in forestry and protected areas is at an inception phase.
Digital infrastructure and services
Through the EIP, the EU has committed to mobilising up to EUR 1.5 billion in public and
private investment to support the digital transformation of the region in line with EU
standards. The plan also provides for a set of flagship initiatives related to digital
connectivity, which have been jointly identified as investment priorities with the Eastern
partners. These projects feed into the wider Global Gateway strategy.
Since the launch of the EIP, the EU has worked actively with European and international
financial institutions, EU Member States and the private sector to support digital projects in
the region. This includes the roll-out of fast and affordable internet in rural areas in Georgia
as well as preparing the groundwork for the construction of a digital cable connecting the EU
to Georgia and the South Caucasus region through the Black Sea. The EU’s involvement in
these projects has been crucial to ensure their compliance with the EU’s digital standards, in
particular on cybersecurity (5G toolbox) and open access to the internet.
In the field of the digital economy, as part of the EU4Digital initiative, nine pilot activities
were implemented between EU Member States and Ukraine, Moldova and Georgia on e-
commerce, e-customs and e-signature to improve access to the European Union’s digital
single market. The Commission facilitated concluding voluntary roaming arrangements
between telecom operators in the EU and in Ukraine and Moldova, providing tangible
benefits to the public and businesses.
Broadband national strategies were developed in Moldova and Georgia to facilitate
investments in high-speed and affordable internet in the region. This included a
EUR 70 million co-investment by the EIB and the World Bank in Georgia to roll out
broadband in rural communities. The price of international connectivity for research and
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education institutions has decreased by 70% in recent years. In addition, two ultra-fast digital
highways (up to 400 Gbps) were set up between the EU, Moldova and Ukraine to facilitate
cooperation in research and innovation, including participation in Horizon Europe.
In Ukraine, the additional funding mobilised since the beginning of the Russian aggression
has supported the country’s resilient digital transformation, including the interoperability of
registries, electronic identity aligned with EU standards and data back-ups. Support is also
helping align Ukraine’s legislation with the relevant EU roaming telecom acquis so that the
country could join the EU roam like at home area.
Health and health systems
In Moldova, an EU-World Health Organization (WHO) vaccine deployment project provided
technical support to the Ministry of Health and other stakeholders in developing vaccination
service delivery plans, national immunisation contingency plans and a risk assessment in the
context of the country welcoming refugees. Resources were allocated to purchase cold chain
and IT equipment. This included computers and equipment for the national warehouses and
10 regional vaccine warehouses, and 15 vehicles for supportive supervision visits by the
National Agency for Public Health. The EU supported communication campaigns in 10 of the
37 districts with the lowest vaccination coverage.
In Georgia, focused technical assistance was provided to develop a protocol for qualitative
formative research on immunisation and an integrated training package for healthcare staff on
routine immunisation and COVID-19 vaccination. The EU-WHO project also delivered cold
chain equipment to strengthen vaccine storage infrastructure at national and district levels.
Human capital
Support to education reform, including primary, higher and vocational education,
professional training and lifelong learning, is a key focus of the EIP. Providing opportunities
for youth and student exchanges (e.g. through Erasmus+) and stronger investment in research
capacity are central parts of the EIP’s support to human capital development.
On student exchanges, 3 507 students from Ukraine, Moldova and Georgia were able to study
in universities from the EU in 2022, and 429 students could study in one of the three
countries’ universities. A total of 2 504 academic staff were able to spend time in another
European university, and 1 864 academic staff spent time in one of the three countries’
universities.
In Ukraine, the EU has been supporting the education sector a long time, roughly divided
into four areas: support to primary/secondary education and the ‘New Ukrainian School’
reform (EUR 2 million); support to vocational education and training (VET) reforms
(EUR 16 million as technical assistance) and refurbishment (EUR 21 million); and support to
higher education through grants to universities displaced in 2014 due to the Russian
aggression in the east of Ukraine (various grants, EUR 10 million).
The Russian war of aggression against Ukraine has led to a readjustment of existing
support and additional priorities to allow for emergency support (for instance, electricity
generators for VET schools). In addition, the EU has: (i) rehabilitated school facilities –
EUR 66 million provided in budget support (alongside EUR 34 million via European
Commission-managed projects); (ii) procured school buses (EUR 14 million); and (iii) under
U-LEAD with Europe Phase II: Local School Rehabilitation for Resilience, provided
EUR 5 million to make war-affected municipalities resilient providers of local public
services, in particular education, to mitigate the local impact of the Russian war of aggression
against Ukraine.
55
In 2022, the EU allocated EUR 12 million in support of education and employment in
Moldova, of which EUR 10 million focused on education to improve the quality and
relevance of education and lifelong learning opportunities for all. The other amount of
EUR 2 million aimed to improve the legal framework, policies and capacity for increased
access to the labour market and better working conditions in the country.
In Georgia, the skills development and matching labour market needs programme (EUR
48.5 million) aims to support the strengthening of skills to match the private sector’s needs
by increasing the quality of VET. In 2022, EUR 7 million was disbursed under the budget
support part of this programme. Particular progress was made with the introduction of a new
methodology for VET qualification development to bring Georgia’s system closer to EU and
international standards.
56
Indexes
THIRD PARTY INDICATORS RELATED TO THE STATUS OF DEMOCRACY, GOOD GOVERNANCE AND THE RULE OF LAW IN CANDIDATE
COUNTRIES AND POTENTIAL CANDIDATES
26
Albania
Bosnia and
Herzegovina
Kosovo
North
Macedonia
Montenegro Serbia Türkiye
Georgia Moldova Ukraine
Nations in Transit 2023 -
Democracy Scores, Freedom
House
https://freedomhouse.org/count
ries/nations-transit/scores
Total score:
46/100
(2022: 46/100)
Status:
Transitional or
Hybrid Regime
(2022:
Transitional or
Hybrid Regime)
Total score:
37/100
(2022: 38/100)
Status:
Transitional or
Hybrid Regime
(2022:
Transitional or
Hybrid Regime)
Total score:
38/100
(2022: 38/100)
Status:
Transitional or
Hybrid Regime
(2022:
Transitional or
Hybrid Regime)
Total score:
48/100
(2022: 47/100)
Status:
Transitional or
Hybrid Regime
(2022:
Transitional or
Hybrid Regime)
Total score:
46/100
(2022: 47/100)
Status:
Transitional or
Hybrid Regime
(2022:
Transitional or
Hybrid Regime)
Total score:
46/100
(2022: 46/100)
Status:
Transitional or
Hybrid Regime
(2022:
Transitional or
Hybrid Regime)
n/a
Total score:
34/100
(2022: 35/100)
Status:
Transitional or
Hybrid Regime
(2022:
Transitional or
Hybrid Regime)
Total score:
36/100
(2022: 35/100)
Status:
Transitional or
Hybrid Regime
(2022:
Transitional or
Hybrid Regime)
Total score:
39/100
(2022: 39/100)
Status:
Transitional or
Hybrid Regime
(2022:
Transitional or
Hybrid Regime)
Freedom in the World 2023 -
Global Freedom Score,
Freedom House
https://freedomhouse.org/count
ries/freedom-world/scores
Total score:
67/100
(2022: 67/100)
Status: Partly
free
(2022: Partly
free)
Total score:
52/100
(2022: 53/100)
Status: Partly
free
(2022: Partly
free)
Total score:
60/100
(2022: 56/100)
Status: Partly
free
(2022: Partly
free)
Total score:
68/100
(2022: 67/100)
Status: Partly
free
(2022: Partly
free)
Total score:
67/100
(2022: 67/100)
Status: Partly
free
(2022: Partly
free)
Total score:
60/100
(2022: 62/100)
Status: Partly
free
(2022: Partly
free)
Total score:
32/100
(2022: 32/100)
Status: Not free
(2022: Not free)
Total score:
58/100
(2022: 58/100)
Status: Partly
free
(2022: Partly
free)
Total score:
62/100
(2022: 62/100)
Status: Partly
free
(2022: Partly
free)
Total score:
50/100
(2022: 61/100)
Status: Partly
free
(2022: Partly
free)
Democracy Index 2022 - The
Economist Intelligence Unit
https://www.eiu.com/n/campaig
ns/democracy-index-2022/
Overall Score:
6.41/10
(2021: 6.11/10)
Rank: 64/167
(2021: 68/167)
Regime type:
Flawed
democracy
(2021: Flawed
democracy)
Overall Score:
5.00/10
(2021: 5.04/10)
Rank: 97/167
(2021: 95/167)
Regime type:
Hybrid regime
(2021: Hybrid
regime)
n/a
Overall Score:
6.10/10
(2021: 6.03/10)
Rank: 72/167
(2021: 73/167)
Regime type:
Flawed
democracy
(2021: Flawed
democracy)
Overall Score:
6.45/10
(2021: 6.02/10)
Rank: 61/167
(2021: 74/167)
Regime type:
Flawed
democracy
(2021: Flawed
democracy)
Overall Score:
6.33/10
(2021: 6.36/10)
Rank: 68/167
(2021: 63/167)
Regime type:
Flawed
democracy
(2021: Flawed
democracy)
Overall Score:
4.35/10
(2021: 4.35/10)
Rank: 103/167
(2021: 103/167)
Regime type:
Hybrid regime
(2021: Hybrid
regime)
Overall Score:
5.20/10
(2021: 5.12/10)
Rank: 90/167
(2021: 91/167)
Regime type:
Hybrid regime
(2021: Hybrid
regime)
Overall Score:
6.23/10
(2021: 6.10/10)
Rank: 69/167
(2021: 69/167)
Regime type:
Flawed
democracy
(2021: Flawed
democracy)
Overall Score:
5.42/10
(2021: 5.57/10)
Rank: 87/167
(2021: 86/167)
Regime type:
Hybrid regime
(2021: Hybrid
regime)
26
The table presents the latest available ranking and/or scores by third parties. Additional reference to data from previous assessment is shown in between parenthesis, when available.
57
World Press Freedom Index
2023 - Reporters without
borders
https://rsf.org/en/index
Global Score:
57.86/100
(2022:
56.41/100)
Rank: 96/180
(2022: 103/180)
Global Score:
65.43/100
(2022:
65.64/100)
Rank: 64/180
(2022: 67/180)
Global Score:
68.38/100
(2022:
67.00/100)
Rank: 56/180
(2022: 61/180)
Global Score:
74.35/100
(2022:
68.44/100)
Rank: 38/180
(2022: 57/180)
Global Score:
74.28/100
(2022:
66.54/100)
Rank: 39/180
(2022: 63/180)
Global Score:
59.16/100
(2022:
61.51/100)
Rank: 91/180
(2022: 79/180)
Global Score:
33.97/100
(2022:
41.25/100)
Rank: 165/180
(2022: 149/180)
Global Score:
61.69/100
(2022:
59.30/100)
Rank: 77/180
(2022: 89/180)
Global Score:
77.62/100
(2022:
73.47/100)
Rank: 28/180
(2022: 40/180)
Global Score:
61.19/100
(2022:
55.76/100)
Rank: 79/180
(2022: 106/180)
Rule of Law Index 2022 -
World Justice Project
https://worldjusticeproject.org/
rule-of-law-index/global/2022/
Overall Score:
0.49/1
(2021: 0.49/1)
Global Rank:
87/140
(2021: 83/139)
Overall Score:
0.52/1
(2021: 0.52/1)
Global Rank:
70/140
(2021: 72/139)
Overall Score:
0.56/1
(2021: 0.55/1)
Global Rank:
57/140
(2021: 60/139)
Overall Score:
0.53/1
(2021: 0.53/1)
Global Rank:
63/140
(2021: 64/139)
n/a
Overall Score:
0.49/1
(2021: 0.49/1)
Global Rank:
83/140
(2021: 81/139)
Overall Score:
0.42/1
(2021: 0.42/1)
Global Rank:
116/140
(2021: 117/139)
Overall Score:
0.60/1
(2021: 0.61/1)
Global Rank:
49/140
(2021: 49/139)
Overall Score:
0.52/1
(2021: 0.51/1)
Global Rank:
68/140
(2021: 73/139)
Overall Score:
0.50/1
(2021: 0.51/1)
Global Rank:
76/140
(2021: 74/139)
Worldwide Governance
Indicators 2022 – Rule of Law,
The World Bank Group
http://info.worldbank.org/gove
rnance/wgi/
Percentile Rank:
47.17/100
Percentile Rank:
41.5/100
Percentile Rank:
39.62/100
Percentile Rank:
50.00/100
Percentile Rank:
48.58/100
Percentile Rank:
49.06/100
Percentile Rank:
36.79/100
Percentile Rank:
56.60/100
Percentile Rank:
41.98/100
Percentile Rank:
18.87/100
Worldwide Governance
Indicators 2022 – Governance
Effectiveness, The World Bank
Group
http://info.worldbank.org/gove
rnance/wgi/
Percentile Rank:
56.60/100
Percentile Rank:
12.74/100
Percentile Rank:
44.34/100
Percentile Rank:
49.53/100
Percentile Rank:
51.42/100
Percentile Rank:
57.08/100
Percentile Rank:
43.87/100
Percentile Rank:
72.64/100
Percentile Rank:
40.57/100
Percentile Rank:
33.02/100
Worldwide Governance
Indicators 2022 – Control of
Corruption, The World Bank
Group
http://info.worldbank.org/gove
rnance/wgi/
Percentile Rank:
38.68/100
Percentile Rank:
25.94/100
Percentile Rank:
47.17/100
Percentile Rank:
43.87/100
Percentile Rank:
50.94/100
Percentile Rank:
35.38/100
Percentile Rank:
34.91/100
Percentile Rank:
72.17/100
Percentile Rank:
42.92/100
Percentile Rank:
29.25/100
58
Corruption Perceptions Index
2022 - Transparency
International
https://www.transparency.org/
en/cpi/2022
Score: 36/100
(2021: 35/100)
Rank: 101/180
(2021: 110/180)
Score: 34/100
(2021: 35/100)
Rank: 110/180
(2021: 110/180)
Score: 41/100
(2021: 39/100)
Rank: 84/180
(2021: 87/180)
Score: 40/100
(2021: 39/100)
Rank: 85/180
(2021: 87/180)
Score: 45/100
(2021: 46/100)
Rank: 65/180
(2021: 64/180)
Score: 36/100
(2021: 38/100)
Rank: 101/180
(2021: 96/180)
Score: 36/100
(2021: 38/100)
Rank: 101/180
(2021: 96/180)
Score: 56/100
(2021: 55/100)
Rank: 41/180
(2021: 45/180)
Score: 39/100
(2021: 36/100)
Rank: 91/180
(2021: 105/180)
Score: 33/100
(2021: 32/100)
Rank: 116/180
(2021: 122/180)
59
STATISTICAL DATA (as of 31/08/2023), part 1 (Albania – Montenegro)
Demography Note
Albania
Bosnia and
Herzegovina
Kosovo North Macedonia Montenegro EU-27
2020
2021
2020
2021
2020
2021
2020
2021
2020
2021
2020
2021
Total population (thousands)
2 846 s
2 830 s
:
:
1 782 s
1 798 s
2 076 s
2 069 s
622 s
621 s
447 485
s
447 001
bps
Share of 15-64 in total
population (%)
68.4 s
68.2 s
:
:
67.1 s
67.3 s
69.3 s
69.1 s
66.5 s
66.2 s
64.3 ps
64.1 bps
Crude rate of natural
population change (per 1 000
inhabitants)
0.2
- 1.2
:
:
7.4 ep
:
- 3.2
- 5.1
- 0.3
- 3.4
- 2.5 ep
- 2.7 bep
Life expectancy at birth, males
(years)
75.2
73.6
:
:
:
:
72.2
71.1 b
73.2
70.8
77.5 ep
77.2 bep
Life expectancy at birth,
females (years)
79.6
77.7
:
:
:
:
76.7
75.5 b
78.8
77.0
83.2 ep
82.9 bep
Labour market
Note
2020
2021
2020
2021
2020
2021
2020
2021
2020
2021
2020
2021
Economic activity rate for
persons aged 20-64:
proportion of the population
aged 20-64 that is
economically active (%)
Total
1) 2) 3) 4) 5) 6) 7)
75.3 ew
75.1 ew
62.3 bw
63.4 bw
42.9 w
43.9 w
70.5
70.5 w
67.2
64.7 w
77.6
78.4 b
Males
1) 2) 3) 4) 5) 6) 7)
83.9 ew
84.2 ew
75.4 bw
76.7 bw
63.0 w
63.8 w
82.5
83.2 w
74.6
71.7 w
83.6
84.0 b
Females
1) 2) 3) 4) 5) 6) 7)
66.9 ew
66.3 ew
49.1 bw
50.0 bw
23.1 w
24.4 w
58.2
57.4 w
59.9
57.8 w
71.7
72.9 b
Employment rates, aged 20-
64 (% of the population)
Total
1) 2) 3) 4) 5) 6)
66.3 ew
66.3 ew
52.5 bw
52.6 bw
32.3 w
35.1 w
59.1
59.5 w
55.2
54.2 w
72.2
73.1 b
Males
1) 2) 3) 4) 5) 6)
74.0 ew
74.6 ew
64.9 bw
66.0 bw
48.8 w
51.9 w
68.9
69.5 w
61.7
59.8 w
78.0
78.5 b
Females
1) 2) 3) 4) 5) 6)
58.8 ew
58.3 ew
40.0 bw
39.1 bw
16.0 w
18.5 w
49.0
49.2 w
48.8
48.7 w
66.5
67.6 b
Persons aged 15-24 not in
employment, education or
training, % of the population in
the age group
1) 2) 8) 5) 4) 9)
26.6 w
24.0 w
21.6 w
19.9 w
33.6 w
32.1 w
19.6
17.9 w
21.1
20.2 w
11.1
10.8 b
60
Labour market (cont.) Note
Albania
Bosnia and
Herzegovina
Kosovo North Macedonia Montenegro EU-27
2020
2021
2020
2021
2020
2021
2019
2020
2021
2020
2021
2020
Persons aged 15-29 not in
employment, education or
training, % of the population in
the age group
1) 2) 8) 5) 4) 9)
27.9 w
26.1 w
25.9 w
25.1 w
40.4 w
36.6 w
26.2
24.3 w
26.6
26.5 w
13.8
13.1 b
Employment by main sectors
Agriculture, forestry and
fisheries (%)
1) 2) 3) 4) 5) 6) 10)
36.1 ew
33.8 ew
12.0 bw
9.4 bw
4.8 w
2.8 w
12.0 s
11.5 w
7.5 s
6.4 w
4.3 s
3.8 bs
Industry (%)
1) 2) 3) 4) 5) 6) 10)
13.4 ew
13.8 ew
23.9 bw
24.4 bw
16.3 w
14.8 w
23.9 s
23.9 w
10.1 s
10.2 w
18.2 s
18.0 bs
Construction (%)
1) 2) 3) 4) 5) 6) 10)
7.0 ew
8.1 ew
9.5 bw
9.1 bw
11.1 w
10.5 w
6.9 s
6.8 w
8.3 s
6.7 w
6.6 s
6.6 bs
Services (%)
1) 2) 3) 4) 5) 6) 10)
43.5 ew
44.3 ew
54.7 bw
57.0 bw
67.9 w
71.9 w
57.1 s
57.7 w
73.5 s
76.7 w
70.1 s
70.9 bs
People employed in the public
sector as a share of total
employment, persons aged
20-64 (%)
11) 12) 13) 5) 4)
15.5 ew
16.3 ew
19.1 bw
19.8 bw
28.7 w
28.3 w
24.4 w
25.6 w
30.5 w
32.7 w
:
:
People employed in the
private sector as a share of
total employment, persons
aged 20-64 (%)
14) 1) 13) 2) 5)
84.5 ew
83.7 ew
80.9 bw
80.2 bw
71.3 w
71.7 w
75.6 w
74.4 w
65.6 w
63.7 w
:
:
Unemployment rates (% of the
labour force)
Total
1) 2) 3) 4) 5) 6) 15)
16)
11.8 ew
11.6 ew
15.9 bw
17.4 bw
25.8 w
20.6 w
16.4
15.7 w
17.9
16.6 w
7.1
7.1 b
Males
1) 2) 3) 4) 5) 6) 15)
16)
11.6 ew
11.4 ew
14.2 bw
14.4 bw
23.4 w
18.9 w
16.7
16.4 w
17.5
17.1 w
6.8
6.8 b
Females
1) 2) 3) 4) 5) 6) 15)
16)
12.0 ew
11.8 ew
18.6 bw
22.0 bw
32.2 w
24.9 w
15.9
14.6 w
18.4
15.9 w
7.4
7.4 b
Youth, aged 15-24
1) 2) 3) 4) 5) 6)
26.5 ew
27.1 ew
36.6 bw
38.3 bw
49.1 w
38.0 w
35.7
36.4 w
36.0
37.1 w
16.8
16.7 b
Long-term (>12 months)
1) 2) 3) 4) 5) 6) 15)
16)
7.0 ew
7.3 ew
11.9 bw
13.7 bw
18.4 w
14.5 w
12.4
12.5 w
13.4
11.0 w
2.5
2.8
Average nominal monthly
wages and salaries (EUR)
17) 18) 19) 20) 21) 6)
434 sw
474 sw
489 sw
510 sw
466 sw
484 sw
441 sw
466 sw
524 sw
532 sw
:
:
61
Education Note
Albania
Bosnia and
Herzegovina
Kosovo North Macedonia Montenegro EU-27
2020
2021
2020
2021
2020
2021
2019
2020
2021
2020
2021
2020
Early leavers from education
and training: percentage of the
population aged 18-24 with at
most a lower secondary
education and not in further
education or training (%)
1) 2) 8) 5) 4)
15.6 w
17.4 w
4.7 w
4.7 w
7.8 w
7.0 w
5.7
4.6 w
3.6
6.7 w
9.9
9.8 b
Public expenditure on
education relative to GDP (%)
6) 22) 23)
3.3 psw
3.1 sw
4.3 sw
:
4.6 sw
4.3 sw
:
:
:
:
5.0 d
:
Percentage of the population
aged 20-24 with at most lower
secondary education, total
1) 2) 3) 4) 5) 6) 24)
17.9 w
17.2 w
5.8 bw
6.1 bw
10.2 w
9.8 w
6.1
4.9 w
:
2.8 w
15.7
15.6 b
Percentage of the population
aged 20-24 with at most lower
secondary education, males
1) 2) 3) 4) 5) 6)
18.5 w
18.4 w
5.8 bw
6.8 bw
9.1 w
10.3 w
5.9
4.9 w
:
3.4 w
18.5
18.1 b
Percentage of the population
aged 20-24 with at most lower
secondary education, females
1) 2) 3) 4) 5) 6)
17.4 w
16.1 w
5.9 bw
5.3 bw
11.5 w
9.4 w
6.2
4.9 w
:
2.2 w
12.9
12.9 b
Percentage of the population
aged 20-24 with upper
secondary or post secondary
non-tertiary education, total
1) 2) 3) 4) 5) 6)
51.5 w
56.3 w
84.2 bw
84.5 bw
78.8 w
75.6 w
85.2
88.8 w
83.3
85.2 w
66.8
65.7 b
Percentage of the population
aged 20-24 with upper
secondary or post secondary
non-tertiary education, males
1) 2) 3) 4) 5) 6)
60.2 w
65.0 w
86.1 bw
86.5 bw
83.1 w
78.4 w
89.0
91.8 w
85.7
87.6 w
67.5
66.3 b
Percentage of the population
aged 20-24 with upper
secondary or post secondary
non-tertiary education,
females
1) 2) 3) 4) 5) 6)
42.4 w
48.1 w
82.3 bw
82.4 bw
73.8 w
72.6 w
81.1
85.7 w
80.6
82.6 w
66.0
65.1 b
Percentage of the population
aged 30-34 with tertiary
education, total
1) 2) 3) 4) 5) 6)
33.2 ew
32.1 ew
28.4 bw
28.8 bw
29.1 w
32.3 w
39.7
36.9 w
38.4
39.0 w
41.1
41.9 b
Percentage of the population
aged 30-34 with tertiary
education, males
1) 2) 3) 4) 5) 6)
26.7 ew
25.4 ew
23.2 bw
23.9 bw
28.1 w
30.8 w
34.3
31.8 w
35.1
34.9 w
36.0
36.6 b
Percentage of the population
aged 30-34 with tertiary
education, females
1) 2) 3) 4) 5) 6)
40.0 ew
39.3 ew
34.0 bw
34.0 bw
30.3 w
34.0 w
45.3
42.3 w
41.7
43.0 w
46.2
47.2 b
62
National accounts Note
Albania
Bosnia and
Herzegovina
Kosovo North Macedonia Montenegro EU-27
2020
2021
2020
2021
2020
2021
2019
2020
2021
2020
2021
2020
Gross domestic product
In current prices (EUR million)
6) 23)
13 310
15 157 p
17 756
19 995
6 772
7 958
10 852
11 688 p
4 186
4 955
13 471
071
14 567
204
Per capita (EUR)
6) 23)
4 690
5 390 p
:
:
3 800 s
4 426 s
5 240 e
5 672
sw
6 740
8 000
30 050
32 520
In purchasing power
standards (PPS) per capita
9 213
10 296 p
10 200
:
:
:
11 349 e
:
13 436
15 538
30 054
32 524
In purchasing power
standards (PPS) per capita,
relative to the EU average
(EU-27 = 100)
30.7
31.7
33.1 s
:
:
:
37.8
:
44.7
47.8
100
100
Real (volume) annual rate of
change, compared with the
previous year (%)
6) 23)
- 3.5 p
:
- 3.0
7.4
- 5.3
10.7
- 4.7
3.9 p
- 15.3
13.0
- 5.6
5.6
Gross value added by main
sectors
Agriculture, forestry and
fisheries (%)
6) 23) 25)
21.9
21.1 p
7.0
6.0
8.9
8.6
9.8
8.4 p
9.1
8.0
1.8
1.8
Industry (%)
6) 23) 25)
12.8
12.9 p
22.8
24.5
24.1
23.6
19.8
19.6 p
13.5
12.5
19.7
20.0
Construction (%)
6) 23) 25)
10.2
10.9 p
5.4
5.1
9.3
10.6
6.0
6.3 p
7.3
5.8
5.5
5.5
Services (%)
6) 23) 25)
55.2 s
55.2 ps
64.7 s
64.3 s
57.7 s
57.2 s
64.3 s
65.8 ps
70.0 s
73.8 s
73.0 s
72.7 s
Balance of payments
Note
2020
2021
2020
2021
2020
2021
2020
2021
2020
2021
2020
2021
Net (inward - outward) foreign
direct investment (FDI) (million
euro)
63) 64) 59) 65) 66)
893.6 s
988.8 s
322.2 w
459.8 w
286.6 w
320.4 w
154.7 w
387.5 w
470.5 w
581.6 w
c
- 318
026.0 s
Net (inward - outward) foreign
direct investment (FDI) (% of
GDP)
63) 64) 67) 23)
6.71 s
6.52 ps
1.84 sw
2.41 sw
4.23 s
4.03 s
1.45
psw
3.32 ps
11.24
sw
11.74
sw
c
- 2.18 s
Net (inward - outward) foreign
direct investment (FDI) in
relation to EU-27 (million euro)
68) 59) 65) 69) 66)
506.8 s
652.5 s
226.3 w
186.8 w
135.6 s
189.1 s
11.1 w
390.0 s
92.9 w
180.1 w
c
- 56 205.8
s
Net (inward - outward) foreign
direct investment (FDI) in
relation to EU-27 (% of GDP)
68) 70) 23)
3.81 s
4.30 sp
1.29 sw
0.98 sw
2.00 s
2.38 s
0.10
psw
3.34 sp
2.22 sw
3.64 sw
c
- 0.39 s
Remittances as % of GDP
71) 72) 23)
5.06 s
5.02 ps
7.26 s
7.78 s
14.47 s
14.49 s
3.07 s
2.95 ps
6.26 s
6.82 s
0.15 s
0.14 s
63
External trade in goods Note
Albania
Bosnia and
Herzegovina
Kosovo North Macedonia Montenegro EU-27
2020
2021
2020
2021
2020
2021
2019
2020
2021
2020
2021
2020
Share of exports to EU-27
countries in value of total
exports (%)
26) 27)
74.7 s
72.2 s
72.4 s
72.8 s
34.5 s
31.5 s
77.5 s
77.1 s
37.7 s
31.1 s
:
:
Share of imports from EU-27
countries in value of total
imports (%)
26) 27)
57.9 s
54.4 s
60.8 s
58.9 s
45.8 s
44.3 s
46.3 s
46.2 s
44.2 s
45.7 s
:
:
Trade balance (EUR million)
26) 28) 27)
- 2 670
- 3 533
- 3 254
- 3 744
- 2 822
- 3 929
- 1 818
- 2 678
- 1 739
- 2 067
215 288
55 040
International trade in goods
and services relative to GDP
Imports (% of GDP)
6) 23)
37.2
44.7 p
47.9
53.9
53.9
65.2
70.5
82.3 p
61.0
62.2
42.8
46.7
Exports (% of GDP)
6) 23)
22.7
31.3 p
34.2
42.2
21.7
33.4
57.8
66.2 p
26.0
42.8
46.4
50.5
Public finance
Note
2020
2021
2020
2021
2020
2021
2020
2021
2020
2021
2020
2021
General government surplus
(+) / deficit (-) (%)
29) 30) 31) 23)
- 6.8 w
- 6.8 fw
- 5.3 w
:
- 5.2 w
:
- 8.1 w
:
- 10.7
ew
:
- 6.7
- 4.8
General government debt (%)
32) 29) 33) 31) 34)
23)
72.7 w
76.7 fw
36.6 w
w
21.8 w
:
51.2 w
:
103.1 w
:
90.0
88.0
64
Financial indicators Note
Albania
Bosnia and
Herzegovina
Kosovo North Macedonia Montenegro EU-27
2020
2021
2020
2021
2020
2021
2019
2020
2021
2020
2021
2020
Annual change in consumer
prices (%)
35) 36) 37) 38)
2.2 d
2.3 d
- 1.1 w
2.0 w
0.2 d
3.4 d
1.2 d
3.4 d
- 0.5 d
2.5 d
0.7
2.9
Private debt, consolidated,
relative to GDP (%)
39) 40)
:
:
- 1.2 w
:
:
:
:
:
:
:
:
:
Total external debt, relative to
GDP (%)
41) 42) 43) 44) 23)
64.2 s
64.4 ps
64.3 sw
60.1 sw
37.2 sw
37.4 sw
78.7 s
81.9 ps
221.6 s
191.5 s
:
:
Total debt in foreign currency,
relative to GDP (%)
45)
66 w
:
:
:
:
:
:
:
17 w
:
:
:
Lending interest rate (one
year), per annum (%)
46) 47) 48) 49) 50)
51) 52)
6.05 w
5.91 w
3.05 w
3.20 w
6.21 w
5.96 w
2.00 w
1.75 w
5.84 w
5.66 w
:
:
Deposit interest rate (one
year), per annum (%)
46) 53) 48) 54) 55)
50) 56) 57)
0.40 w
0.48 w
0.07 w
0.05 w
1.49 w
1.33 w
0.15 w
0.15 w
0.40 w
0.35 w
:
:
Value of reserve assets
(including gold) (million euro)
48) 41) 42) 43) 58)
59)
3 942.4
w
4 972.2
w
7 091.0
w
8 359.1
w
900.8 w
1 100.3
w
3 359.9
w
3 643.3
w
1 738.5
w
1 748.8
w
:
:
International reserves -
equivalence in months of
imports
60) 48) 41) 42) 61)
62)
9.6 sw
17.0 sw
10.0 sw
:
3.0 sw
:
5.3 sw
:
8.2 sw
:
:
:
65
Business Note
Albania
Bosnia and
Herzegovina
Kosovo North Macedonia Montenegro EU-27
2020
2021
2020
2021
2020
2021
2019
2020
2021
2020
2021
2020
Industrial production index
(2015 = 100)
73) 74) 75) 76)
89.5 w
113.0 w
96.7
106.2
:
:
102.4
103.9
105.8
110.3
98.5
107.5
Infrastructure
Note
2020
2021
2020
2021
2020
2021
2020
2021
2020
2021
2020
2021
Density of railway network
(lines in operation per
thousand km²)
77) 78) 79) 80) 81)
82)
7.8 sw
7.8 s
19.9 sw
19.9 sw
30.5 sw
30.5 sw
26.9 s
26.9 s
18.0 s
18.0 s
:
:
Length of motorways
(kilometres)
83)
22
25
218
218
137 w
137 w
335
335
z
z
:
:
Energy
Note
2020
2021
2020
2021
2020
2021
2020
2021
2020
2021
2020
2021
Net energy imports in relation
to GDP
84)
1.7 s
2.7 ps
2.7 s
3.5 s
4.2 s
6.7 s
4.8 s
7.7 ps
2.6 s
4.1 s
1.6 s
2.7 s
66
STATISTICAL DATA (as of 31/08/2023), part 2 (Serbia – Ukraine)
Demography Note
Serbia
Türkiye
Georgia
Moldova
Ukraine
EU-27
2020
2021
2020
2021
2020
2021
2020
2021
2020
2021
2020
2021
Total population (thousands)
6 927 s
6 872 s
83 155 s
83 614 s
3 717 s
3 729 s
2 640 s
2 597 ps
41 733 s
41 419 s
447 485
s
447 001
bps
Share of 15-64 in total
population (%)
64.8 s
64.5 s
67.8 s
67.7 s
64.5 s
64.2 s
:
66.7 ps
67.6 s
67.4 s
64.3 ps
64.1 bps
Crude rate of natural
population change (per 1 000
inhabitants)
- 8.0
- 10.9
:
:
- 1.1
- 3.8
- 3.8 ep
:
- 7.8
- 10.7 e
- 2.5 ep
- 2.7 bep
Life expectancy at birth, males
(years)
71.6
70.0
:
:
:
:
:
:
:
:
77.5 ep
77.2 bep
Life expectancy at birth,
females (years)
77.5
75.7
:
:
:
:
:
:
:
:
83.2 ep
82.9 bep
Labour market
Note
2020
2021
2020
2021
2020
2021
2020
2021
2020
2021
2020
2021
Economic activity rate for
persons aged 20-64:
proportion of the population
aged 20-64 that is
economically active (%)
Total
1) 2) 3) 4) 5) 6) 7)
72.5
75.0 b
58.7
61.2 bw
63.2 bw
64.5 w
51.1 w
52.8 w
72.0 w
71.9 w
77.6
78.4 b
Males
1) 2) 3) 4) 5) 6) 7)
79.9
82.6 b
79.8
82.3 bw
74.0 bw
76.2 w
55.5 w
57.8 w
78.4 w
78.2 w
83.6
84.0 b
Females
1) 2) 3) 4) 5) 6) 7)
65.2
67.4 b
37.5
40.0 bw
52.8 bw
53.4 w
47.0 w
48.1 w
66.0 w
66.0 w
71.7
72.9 b
Employment rates, aged 20-
64 (% of the population)
Total
1) 2) 3) 4) 5) 6)
65.9
66.7 b
51.0
53.9 bw
51.1 bw
50.6 w
49.1 w
51.1 w
65.2 w
64.8 w
72.2
73.1 b
Males
1) 2) 3) 4) 5) 6)
72.9
74.2 b
70.1
73.6 bw
58.7 bw
58.1 w
53.1 w
55.6 w
70.8 w
70.8 w
78.0
78.5 b
Females
1) 2) 3) 4) 5) 6)
58.9
59.3 b
32.0
34.1 bw
43.9 bw
43.5 w
45.5 w
46.9 w
60.0 w
59.3 w
66.5
67.6 b
Persons aged 15-24 not in
employment, education or
training, % of the population in
the age group
1) 2) 8) 5) 4) 9)
15.9
16.4 b
28.3
24.7 bw
28.5 bw
26.8 w
17.6 w
17.2 w
15.5 w
14.3 w
11.1
10.8 b
67
Labour market (cont.) Note
Serbia
Türkiye
Georgia
Moldova
Ukraine
EU-27
2020
2021
2020
2021
2020
2021
2019
2020
2021
2020
2021
2020
Persons aged 15-29 not in
employment, education or
training, % of the population in
the age group
1) 2) 8) 5) 4) 9)
20.0
18.8 b
32.0
28.4 bw
35.1 bw
34.6 w
26.0 w
26.4 w
20.0 w
19.8 w
13.8
13.1 b
Employment by main sectors
Agriculture, forestry and
fisheries (%)
1) 2) 3) 4) 5) 6) 10)
14.6 s
15.0 bs
17.6 s
17.2 bw
19.8 bw
18.9 w
21.1 w
21.5 w
14.1 w
14.1 w
4.3 s
3.8 bs
Industry (%)
1) 2) 3) 4) 5) 6) 10)
22.6 s
23.7 bs
20.5 s
21.3 bw
11.4 bw
11.3 w
14.6 w
14.4 w
17.8 w
18.2 w
18.2 s
18.0 bs
Construction (%)
1) 2) 3) 4) 5) 6) 10)
5.4 s
6.0 bs
5.7 s
6.2 bw
6.9 bw
7.8 w
7.2 w
7.7 w
7.0 w
7.0 w
6.6 s
6.6 bs
Services (%)
1) 2) 3) 4) 5) 6) 10)
57.5 s
55.3 bs
56.2 s
55.3 bw
61.9 bw
62.1 w
57.1 w
56.4 w
61.1 w
60.7 w
70.1 s
70.9 bs
People employed in the public
sector as a share of total
employment, persons aged
20-64 (%)
11) 12) 13) 5) 4)
26.4 w
25.8 w
17.7 w
16.9 bw
23.5 bw
24.3 w
29.6 w
28.6 w
:
:
:
:
People employed in the
private sector as a share of
total employment, persons
aged 20-64 (%)
14) 1) 13) 2) 5)
73.6 w
74.2 w
82.3 w
83.1 bw
76.5 bw
75.7 w
70.4 w
71.4 w
:
:
:
:
Unemployment rates (% of the
labour force)
Total
1) 2) 3) 4) 5) 6) 15)
16)
9.1
11.1 b
13.2
12.0 bw
18.5 bw
20.6 w
3.8 w
3.2 w
9.5 w
9.8 w
7.1
7.1 b
Males
1) 2) 3) 4) 5) 6) 15)
16)
8.8
10.2 b
12.4
10.7 bw
20.2 bw
22.7 w
4.3 w
3.9 w
9.8 w
9.5 w
6.8
6.8 b
Females
1) 2) 3) 4) 5) 6) 15)
16)
9.5
12.1 b
14.9
14.8 bw
16.2 bw
17.8 w
3.3 w
2.5 w
9.1 w
10.1 w
7.4
7.4 b
Youth, aged 15-24
1) 2) 3) 4) 5) 6)
26.6
26.4 b
25.1
22.6 bw
39.4 bw
42.9 w
10.9 w
9.2 w
19.3 w
19.1 w
16.8
16.7 b
Long-term (>12 months)
1) 2) 3) 4) 5) 6) 15)
16)
4.5
4.9
3.3
3.7 bw
5.8 bw
7.2 w
0.7 w
0.8 w
2.0 w
2.4 w
2.5
2.8
Average nominal monthly
wages and salaries (EUR)
17) 18) 19) 20) 21) 6)
706 sw
772 sw
384 sw
256 sw
296 sw
372 sw
376 sw
447 sw
334 sw
453 sw
:
:
68
Education Note
Serbia
Türkiye
Georgia
Moldova
Ukraine
EU-27
2020
2021
2020
2021
2020
2021
2019
2020
2021
2020
2021
2020
Early leavers from education
and training: percentage of the
population aged 18-24 with at
most a lower secondary
education and not in further
education or training (%)
1) 2) 8) 5) 4)
5.6
6.3 b
26.7
23.0 bw
8.2 w
7.3 w
16.9 w
19.6 w
:
:
9.9
9.8 b
Public expenditure on
education relative to GDP (%)
6) 22) 23)
3.5 sw
3.3 psw
4.0
3.5 sw
3.8 psw
3.6 sw
:
:
5.4 sw
:
5.0 d
:
Percentage of the population
aged 20-24 with at most lower
secondary education, total
1) 2) 3) 4) 5) 6) 24)
6.4
6.7 b
34.4
29.5 bw
7.9 w
7.3 w
21.2 w
23.3 w
2.9 w
2.7 w
15.7
15.6 b
Percentage of the population
aged 20-24 with at most lower
secondary education, males
1) 2) 3) 4) 5) 6)
6.0
7.7 b
36.7
31.6 bw
8.3 w
7.4 w
24.5 w
27.3 w
3.1 w
2.9 w
18.5
18.1 b
Percentage of the population
aged 20-24 with at most lower
secondary education, females
1) 2) 3) 4) 5) 6)
6.8
5.7 b
32.2
27.3 bw
7.5 w
7.2 w
18.0 w
19.4 w
2.8 w
2.5 w
12.9
12.9 b
Percentage of the population
aged 20-24 with upper
secondary or post secondary
non-tertiary education, total
1) 2) 3) 4) 5) 6)
85.4
85.3 b
43.1
47.8 bw
77.3 w
77.2 w
69.4 w
68.2 w
54.9 w
55.2 w
66.8
65.7 b
Percentage of the population
aged 20-24 with upper
secondary or post secondary
non-tertiary education, males
1) 2) 3) 4) 5) 6)
87.5
86.3 b
45.3
51.1 bw
82.4 w
84.0 w
68.7 w
66.4 w
59.6 w
58.9 w
67.5
66.3 b
Percentage of the population
aged 20-24 with upper
secondary or post secondary
non-tertiary education,
females
1) 2) 3) 4) 5) 6)
83.2
84.1 b
40.8
44.5 bw
71.3 w
70.2 w
70.2 w
69.9 w
50.0 w
51.3 w
66.0
65.1 b
Percentage of the population
aged 30-34 with tertiary
education, total
1) 2) 3) 4) 5) 6)
33.0
35.3 b
33.1
35.5 bw
38.2 w
35.5 w
31.5 w
31.8 w
57.1 w
58.0 w
41.1
41.9 b
Percentage of the population
aged 30-34 with tertiary
education, males
1) 2) 3) 4) 5) 6)
27.1
27.7 b
33.9
36.1 bw
33.6 w
32.3 w
24.3 w
28.6 w
49.7 w
51.4 w
36.0
36.6 b
Percentage of the population
aged 30-34 with tertiary
education, females
1) 2) 3) 4) 5) 6)
39.1
43.2 b
32.2
35.0 bw
42.7 w
38.9 w
38.2 w
34.7 w
64.8 w
64.8 w
46.2
47.2 b
69
National accounts Note
Serbia
Türkiye
Georgia
Moldova
Ukraine
EU-27
2020
2021
2020
2021
2020
2021
2019
2020
2021
2020
2021
2020
Gross domestic product
In current prices (EUR million)
6) 23)
46 815
53 329
626 742
689 547
13 871
w
15 732
w
10 116
w
11 569
w
137 133
w
168 710
w
13 471
071
14 567
204
Per capita (EUR)
6) 23)
6 790
7 800
7 520
8 190
3 726 w
4 242 w
3 839 w
4 424 w
3 285 w
4 077 w
30 050
32 520
In purchasing power
standards (PPS) per capita
12 812
14 349
18 325
20 337
:
:
12 977
w
16 069
w
:
:
30 054
32 524
In purchasing power
standards (PPS) per capita,
relative to the EU average
(EU-27 = 100)
42.6
44.2
61.0
62.7
:
:
:
:
:
:
100
100
Real (volume) annual rate of
change, compared with the
previous year (%)
6) 23)
- 0.9
7.5
1.9
11.4
- 6.8 w
10.5 w
- 8.3 w
13.9 w
- 3.8 w
3.4 w
- 5.6
5.6
Gross value added by main
sectors
Agriculture, forestry and
fisheries (%)
6) 23) 25)
7.6
7.6
7.5
6.2
8.3 w
7.4 w
10.8 w
12.3 w
10.8 w
12.7 w
1.8
1.8
Industry (%)
6) 23) 25)
23.4
23.0
25.6
29.1
15.5 w
17.0 w
15.2 w
14.7 w
20.9 w
23.8 w
19.7
20.0
Construction (%)
6) 23) 25)
6.6
7.3
5.9
5.7
8.7 w
7.5 w
11.5 w
9.3 w
3.3 w
3.2 w
5.5
5.5
Services (%)
6) 23) 25)
62.4 s
62.2 s
61.0 s
59.1 s
67.5 w
68.1 w
62.5 w
63.6 w
65.0 w
60.3 w
73.0 s
72.7 s
Balance of payments
Note
2020
2021
2020
2021
2020
2021
2020
2021
2020
2021
2020
2021
Net (inward - outward) foreign
direct investment (FDI) (million
euro)
63) 64) 59) 65) 66)
2 938.5
w
3 656.9
w
3 942.6
s
5 832.2
s
498.7 w
783.6 w
133.4 w
322.7 w
- 50.8 w
6 351.5
w
c
- 318
026.0 s
Net (inward - outward) foreign
direct investment (FDI) (% of
GDP)
63) 64) 67) 23)
c
6.86 s
0.63 s
0.85 s
3.60 sw
4.98 sw
1.32 sw
2.79 sw
- 0.04
sw
3.76 sw
c
- 2.18 s
Net (inward - outward) foreign
direct investment (FDI) in
relation to EU-27 (million euro)
68) 59) 65) 69) 66)
c
1 801.0
s
140.6 s
600.5 s
178.9 w
189.7 w
:
:
- 691.7
w
4 748.7
w
c
- 56 205.8
s
Net (inward - outward) foreign
direct investment (FDI) in
relation to EU-27 (% of GDP)
68) 70) 23)
c
3.38 s
0.02 s
0.09 s
1.29 sw
1.21 sw
:
:
- 0.50
sw
2.81 sw
c
- 0.39 s
Remittances as % of GDP
71) 72) 23)
4.81 s
:
0.02 s
:
7.34 sw
8.65 sw
8.87
dpsw
:
0.75
psw
:
0.15 s
0.14 s
70
External trade in goods Note
Serbia
Türkiye
Georgia
Moldova
Ukraine
EU-27
2020
2021
2020
2021
2020
2021
2019
2020
2021
2020
2021
2020
Share of exports to EU-27
countries in value of total
exports (%)
26) 27)
66.2 s
65.8 s
41.1 s
41.1 s
20.9 ew
16.9 sw
66.4 sw
62.5 sw
:
:
:
:
Share of imports from EU-27
countries in value of total
imports (%)
26) 27)
55.6 s
53.9 s
33.1 s
31.1 s
23.0 ew
22.9 sw
45.6 sw
46.6 sw
:
:
:
:
Trade balance (EUR million)
26) 28) 27)
- 5 019
- 6 279
- 42 293
- 38 925
- 3 838
sw
- 5 171
sw
- 2 572
sw
- 2 166
sw
- 4 438
sw
:
215 288
55 040
International trade in goods
and services relative to GDP
Imports (% of GDP)
6) 23)
56.5
62.3
32.2
35.5
56.6 w
59.6 w
51.4 w
57.8 w
40.3 w
41.9 w
42.8
46.7
Exports (% of GDP)
6) 23)
48.2
54.5
28.7
35.3
37.3 w
43.2 w
27.9 w
30.6 w
38.8 w
40.7 w
46.4
50.5
Public finance
Note
2020
2021
2020
2021
2020
2021
2020
2021
2020
2021
2020
2021
General government surplus
(+) / deficit (-) (%)
29) 30) 31) 23)
- 8.0 w
- 4.2 ew
- 4.7 w
:
- 9.3 w
- 6.3 w
- 5.1 ew
0.0 ew
- 5.4 w
- 3.3 w
- 6.7
- 4.8
General government debt (%)
32) 29) 33) 31) 34)
23)
57.7 w
57.5 ew
39.8 w
:
60.1 w
49.6 w
33.1 w
32.6 w
60.4 w
49.0 w
90.0
88.0
71
Financial indicators Note
Serbia
Türkiye
Georgia
Moldova
Ukraine
EU-27
2020
2021
2020
2021
2020
2021
2019
2020
2021
2020
2021
2020
Annual change in consumer
prices (%)
35) 36) 37) 38)
1.8 d
4.0 d
12.3 d
19.6 d
5.2 w
9.6 w
3.8 w
5.1 w
2.7 w
9.4 w
0.7
2.9
Private debt, consolidated,
relative to GDP (%)
39) 40)
:
:
13.0 w
7.6 w
:
:
:
:
:
:
:
:
Total external debt, relative to
GDP (%)
41) 42) 43) 44) 23)
c
75.8 s
60.4 sw
54.3 sw
135.5
sw
124.0
sw
65.5 sw
66.9 sw
74.6 sw
67.8 sw
:
:
Total debt in foreign currency,
relative to GDP (%)
45)
:
:
:
:
:
:
:
:
:
:
:
:
Lending interest rate (one
year), per annum (%)
46) 47) 48) 49) 50)
51) 52)
1.90 w
1.90 w
16.25 w
22.79 w
8.52 w
9.46 w
5.15 w
8.50 w
7.89 w
7.67 w
:
:
Deposit interest rate (one
year), per annum (%)
46) 53) 48) 54) 55)
50) 56) 57)
0.10 w
0.10 w
13.51 w
17.85 w
8.46 w
9.13 w
0.15 w
4.50 w
7.22 w
6.95 w
:
:
Value of reserve assets
(including gold) (million euro)
48) 41) 42) 43) 58)
59)
13 491.7
w
16 454.5
w
81 937.5
w
94 006.1
w
3 532.4
w
3 787.3
w
3 082.9
w
3 445.8
w
23 711.1
w
27 294.4
w
:
:
International reserves -
equivalence in months of
imports
60) 48) 41) 42) 61)
62)
6.1 sw
:
4.9 sw
6.3 sw
5.4 sw
4.8 sw
7.1 sw
:
:
:
:
:
72
Business Note
Serbia
Türkiye
Georgia
Moldova
Ukraine
EU-27
2020
2021
2020
2021
2020
2021
2019
2020
2021
2020
2021
2020
Industrial production index
(2015 = 100)
73) 74) 75) 76)
111.0
118.5
115.4
135.6
:
:
107.1 w
120.3 w
102.7 w
105.0 w
98.5
107.5
Infrastructure
Note
2020
2021
2020
2021
2020
2021
2020
2021
2020
2021
2020
2021
Density of railway network
(lines in operation per
thousand km²)
77) 78) 79) 80) 81)
82)
37.9 sw
38.1 sw
13.3 sw
13.5 sw
22.6 sw
22.2 sw
34.0 sw
34.0 sw
32.8 sw
32.7 sw
:
:
Length of motorways
(kilometres)
83)
928
928 w
3 523
3 532
208 w
263 w
:
:
15 w
15 w
:
:
Energy
Note
2020
2021
2020
2021
2020
2021
2020
2021
2020
2021
2020
2021
Net energy imports in relation
to GDP
84)
2.9 s
4.0 s
3.3 s
5.2 s
1.0 sw
1.8 sw
:
:
:
:
1.6 s
2.7 s
Source: Eurostat and/or the statistical authorities of the enlargement countries
: = not available
b = break in series
c = confidential value
d = definition differs
e = estimated value
f = forecast
p = provisional
s = Eurostat estimate
w= data supplied by and under the responsibility of the national statistical authority and published on an "as is" basis and without any assurance as regards their quality and adherence to
EU statistical methodology
z = not applicable and therefore equal to 0
Footnotes:
1)
North Macedonia: The new IESS regulation has not been implemented
2)
Bosnia and Herzegovina: Since January 2020, the Labour Force Survey in Bosnia and Herzegovina has been conducted continuously, throughout the year, with quarterly data
release. Also, from 2020 the procedure of weight calibration according to population estimates by five-year age groups and sex is carried out.
3)
Bosnia and Herzegovina: From January 2021, the Agency for Statistics of Bosnia and Herzegovina began to apply the new, redesigned methodology of the Labour Force Survey. The
redesign of the survey took place on the basis of and in accordance with the new Regulation of the European Parliament and the Council, which entered into force on 1st January
2021. With the introduction of the new, redesigned methodology of the Labour Force Survey from January 2021, the series of data published in the previous year was interrupted.
4)
Türkiye: *In HLFS, the series is not comparable to previous years due to the adjustments in the definition, scope and design of the survey with the year 2021.
5)
Türkiye: Annual LFS results.
6)
Ukraine: Data exclude the temporarily occupied territory of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea, the city of Sevastopol and the parts of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions which are
temporarily occupied.
7)
Ukraine: Fixing from 2019 economically active population - labour force.
74
8)
Bosnia and Herzegovina: From 2020 onwards LFS is conducted on a quarterly basis leading to break in series compared to results from previous years. With the introduction of the
new, redesigned methodology of the Labour Force Survey (Regulation (EU) 2019/1700; Implementing Regulation (EU) 2019/2240) from January 2021, the series of data published in
the previous year was interrupted. This means that the data for 2020 and 2021 are also not comparable.
9)
Ukraine: Data exclude the temporarily occupied territory of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea, the city of Sevastopol and the parts of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions which are
temporarily occupied.
10)
Georgia: Since 2020 - NACE Rev.2, before 2020 - NACE Rev.1.1.
11)
Montenegro: Data refer to number of employees in the public sector as a share of the total number of persons employed.
12)
North Macedonia: In the public sector are included data: Other (mixed, collective, state, undefined)
13)
Bosnia and Herzegovina: The public sector includes NACE Rev. 2 Sections O, P and Q while the private sector includes other NACE Sections.
14)
Montenegro: Break in series as previously only employees were answering this question; Since 2018 all employed persons are giving answer to this question.
15)
Ukraine: Persons aged 15 years and over.
16)
Georgia: Persons aged 15 years and older.
17)
Serbia: Wages and salaries are obtained from administrative sources (tax administration records). Average earnings are calculated on the basis of the total amount of accrued
earnings for the reporting month and the number of full-time equivalent (FTE) employees.
18)
Albania: Source of information: General Directorate of Taxation, social insurance contributors; INSTAT's calculation
19)
Bosnia and Herzegovina: Net earnings.
20)
Türkiye: Source: Income and Living Conditions Survey.
21)
Moldova: Includes units with 1 and more employee.
22)
Georgia: GDP is calculated according to 2008 SNA.
23)
Georgia: Based on 2008 SNA.
24)
Georgia: Persons without education are excluded.
25)
Georgia: Calculations are made according to NACE Rev. 2.
26)
Moldova: January to August.
27)
Georgia: Data converted in EUR by Eurostat
28)
Ukraine: Data exclude the temporarily occupied territory of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea, the city of Sevastopol and the parts of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions which are
temporarily occupied.
29)
Albania: Forecasts of the Ministry of Finance and Economy.
30)
Ukraine: Modified cash data (Government finance statistics manual 2014).
31)
Ukraine: Data exclude the temporarily occupied territory of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea, the city of Sevastopol and the parts of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions which are
temporarily occupied.
32)
Montenegro: Preliminary data. The final data will be available by the end of March 2021
33)
Bosnia and Herzegovina: End of year (31 December).
34)
Ukraine: State and state guaranteed debt.
35)
Bosnia and Herzegovina: Consumer price inflation
36)
Moldova: Consumer price inflation
37)
Ukraine: Data exclude the temporarily occupied territory of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea, the city of Sevastopol and the parts of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions which are
temporarily occupied.
38)
Georgia: Consumer price inflation
39)
Bosnia and Herzegovina: Data for monetary financial institutions.
40)
Türkiye: Data cover debt securities and loans.
41)
Bosnia and Herzegovina: Based on IMF balance of payments manual, sixth edition.
75
42)
Türkiye: Average of year exchange rate used to convert to euros.
43)
Moldova: Converted from USD to EUR using end-of-year exchange rates, according to the National Bank of Moldova.
44)
Ukraine: Assets and debt converted from US dollars to euro using cross rates at the end of the reporting year.
Data exclude the temporarily occupied territory of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea, the city of Sevastopol and the parts of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions which are temporarily
occupied.
45)
Albania: External debt (including FDI).
46)
Montenegro: Weighted average effective interest rate, outstanding amounts, annual.
47)
Albania: Average weighted rate applied to new 12-month loans over the respective month, on 12-month maturity.
48)
North Macedonia: End of year (31 December).
49)
Bosnia and Herzegovina: Short-term lending rates in national currency to non-financial corporations (weighted average).
50)
Moldova: The rate is established by the National Bank of Moldova (NBM) starting from 2001. The NBM applies the interest "corridor" method: the highest rate is applied on overnight
credits, the lowest one on overnight deposits. End-of year values.
51)
Ukraine: Average weighted interest rate on all instruments of National bank's refinancing.
52)
Georgia: Refinancing credits auctions.
53)
Albania: Deposit interest rate represents the average weighted rate for newly accepted deposits over the respective month, on 12-month maturity.
54)
Bosnia and Herzegovina: Demand deposit rates in national currency of households (weighted average).
55)
Türkiye: Average of monthly data. Overnight deposit facility.
56)
Ukraine: Distribution of deposit certificates of the National Bank of Ukraine.
57)
Georgia: CD auctions.
58)
Ukraine: Assets and debt converted from US dollars to euro using cross rates at the end of the reporting year.
59)
Ukraine: the temporarily occupied territory of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea, the city of Sevastopol and the parts of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions which are temporarily
occupied. are excluded from the External Sector' data.
60)
Albania: End of August 2021
January-June 2021
61)
Türkiye: Average of year exchange rate used to convert to euros.
As of Third Quarter of 2021.
As of October 2021.
62)
Moldova: Converted from USD to EUR using end-of-year exchange rates, according to the National Bank of Moldova.
Converted from USD to EUR using annual average exchange rates, according to the National Bank of Moldova.
63)
Bosnia and Herzegovina: Based on IMF balance of payments manual, Asset - Liability Approach
64)
Moldova: Converted from USD to EUR using annual average exchange rates, according to the National Bank of Moldova.
65)
Ukraine: Since 2021 the National bank of Ukraine have improved the foreign direct investment compilation, in context of which non-financial corporations' reinvested earnings have
been incorporated in FDI flows and stocks data. Therefore, BoP, IIP, FDI data for 2015- 2020 were revised.
66)
Ukraine: Since 2021 the National bank of Ukraine have improved the foreign direct investment compilation, in context of which loans between fellow enterprises have been
incorporated in FDI flows and stocks data. Therefore, BoP, IIP, FDI data for 2015- 2020 were revised.
67)
Ukraine: Data exclude the temporarily occupied territory of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea, the city of Sevastopol and the parts of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions which are
temporarily occupied. Since 2021 the National bank of Ukraine have improved the foreign direct investment compilation, in context of which non-financial corporations' reinvested
earnings have been incorporated in FDI flows and stocks data. Therefore, BoP, IIP, FDI data for 2015- 2020 were revised.
68)
Bosnia and Herzegovina: Based on IMF balance of payments manual, sixth edition and OECD Benchmark Definition of Foreign Direct Investment - 4th edition
69)
Ukraine: FDI Data were recalculated taking into account EU-27 Member States, excluding the United Kingdom.
70)
Ukraine: Data exclude the temporarily occupied territory of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea, the city of Sevastopol and the parts of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions which are
76
temporarily occupied. FDI Data were recalculated taking into account EU-27 Member States, excluding the United Kingdom.
Since 2021 the National bank of Ukraine have improved the foreign direct investment compilation, in context of which loans between fellow enterprises have been incorporated in FDI
flows and stocks data. Therefore, BoP, IIP, FDI data for 2015- 2020 were revised.
71)
Moldova: Converted from USD to EUR using annual average exchange rates, according to the National Bank of Moldova.
Personal transfers.
72)
Ukraine: Data exclude the temporarily occupied territory of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea, the city of Sevastopol and a part of temporarily occupied territories in the Donetsk and
Luhansk regions.
Previous data
73)
Albania: Activity B_D
74)
Moldova: Starting with 2016 the Industrial production volume index are adjusted seasonally by number of working days and seasonality, the time series was corrected
75)
Ukraine: Adjustment for the effect of calendar days of the dynamic series of indices to the average monthly value of the base. (2016) year is carried out using the DEMETRA+
program, using the TRAMO/SEATS methodactivity.
76)
Ukraine: Data exclude the temporarily occupied territory of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea, the city of Sevastopol and the parts of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions which are
temporarily occupied.
77)
The data was taken from the Republic Geodetic Authority.
78)
Bosnia and Herzegovina: Inland waters estimated at 210 km².
79)
Türkiye: Main lines only.
Area values are calculated by reference to corine classifications and adapted to LUCAS. Corine data production period is 6 years.
80)
Moldova: Including the Transnistrian region.
As of the end of the year.
81)
Moldova: Including the Transnistrian region.
As of the end of the year.
Including wetlands.
82)
Ukraine: Data exclude the temporarily occupied territory of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea, the city of Sevastopol and the parts of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions which are
temporarily occupied. Data of the State Service on Geodesy, Cartography and Cadastre of Ukraine.
Data are given according to the new Classification of Land Types.
83)
Ukraine: Data exclude the temporarily occupied territory of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea, the city of Sevastopol and the parts of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions which are
temporarily occupied.
84)
Georgia: Data converted in EUR by Eurostat
Based on 2008 SNA.
