federal circuits, the prosecutor’s disclosure duty is not limited to admissible evidence. For
Brady purposes, inadmissible evidence may be material if it could have led to the discovery
of admissible evidence.
14
This means that prosecutors need to analyze their evidence in light of the Rules of
Evidence and consider the various ways that evidence can be used. For example,
affirmatively exculpatory evidence is relevant under Rule 401.
15
However, the law of
impeachment must also be considered.
16
Rules 608 and 609 provide methods of impeaching
witnesses by using a witness’s reputation and prior acts of dishonesty and certain types of
convictions. Sometimes Rule 404(b) (evidence of other wrongful acts) may be relevant. For
example, in a prosecution for assaulting a police officer or resisting arrest, allegations of
prior misconduct by the officer, particularly involving the misuse of force, may be evidence
that the defense could present. In addition to the rules themselves, most states continue to
permit many common law forms of impeachment, such as prior inconsistent statements
17
and
bias, as well as evidence that relates to questions of competence – the ability to observe,
recall, and relate. Bias can relate to the particular defendant or to a class to which she
belongs. It can also mean bias in favor of the prosecution, as was true in Giglio. Witnesses
who have hearing and vision problems or drug and alcohol problems may present
“competence” questions about their ability to observe, recall, and relate.
18
Using evidence-based materiality is a more effective means of avoiding Brady
problems because the focus is not on a harmless error standard. The harmless error standard
may be useful to defend a conviction on appeal but is likely to lead to poor choices before
the evidence at issue may be “favorable to the accused”; if so, it must be disclosed
without regard to whether the failure to disclose it likely would affect the outcome of the
upcoming trial.
United States v. Safavian, 233 F.R.D. 12, 16 (D.D.C. 2005).
14
Johnson v. Folino, 705 F.3d 117, 130 (3d Cir. 2013); Ellsworth v. Warden, 333 F.3d 1, 5 (1st Cir.
2003) (en banc); United States v. Gil, 297 F.3d 93, 104 (2d Cir. 2002); Bradley v. Nagle, 212 F.3d 559,
567 (11th Cir. 2000); United States v. Phillip, 948 F.2d 241, 249 (6th Cir. 1991). But see Hoke v.
Netherland, 92 F.3d 1350, 1356 n. 3 (4th Cir. 1996); Jardine v. Dittmann, 658 F.3d 772, 777 (7th Cir.
2011). In United States v. Morales, 746 F.3d 310, 315 (7th Cir. 2014), the court questioned the validity of
the Jardine rule, but did not reconsider the issue.
15
This would include evidence that might show that someone else committed the crime. Kyles v.
Whitley, supra; Leka v. Portuondo, 257 F.3d 89 (2d Cir. 2001) (Brady violation found where eyewitness
described how murder occurred, but the description of the crime by another witness, who made no
identification, cast doubt on the factual description of the eyewitness. The evidence from the non-
of how a prosecutor could view evidence as merely impeaching – a failure to make an identification that
only seems relevant if the witness testifies – while it can also be viewed as affirmatively exculpatory.
16
Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150 (1972).
17
Kyles, supra, requires disclosure of such evidence.
18
These issues can involve sensitive questions regarding the personal privacy of a witness. A witness
who successfully completed drug rehabilitation is one such example. These may be cases for in camera
disclosure to the court first. United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97 (1975); Pennsylvania v. Ritchie, 480 U.S.
39 (1987). However, prosecutors should be alert to these questions and not ignore them.