THE MUELLER REPORT EXPOSED WEAKNESSES IN U.S.

 
 
 
 
ANALYSIS: THE MUELLER REPORT EXPOSED WEAKNESSES IN U.S. 
DEMOCRATIC INSTITUTIONS THAT H.R.1 WOULD ADDRESS 
 
“There were multiple, systematic efforts to interfere in our election . . . That 
allegation deserves the attention of every American.”  
 
This was Special Counsel Robert Mueller’s conclusion after conducting a two-year 
investigation into Russian meddling in the 2016 U.S. election. His report 
highlighted serious gaps in U.S. law that have left our elections vulnerable to 
foreign interference, which Russia and other foreign powers will almost certainly 
seek to exploit again in 2020. It also documented numerous potential violations of 
campaign finance and ethics rules and, in Volume II, a sustained effort by the 
president to interfere in the special counsel’s investigation. 
 
Despite these grave conclusions, there is good news. Many of the worst problems 
documented in the Mueller Report would be addressed by H.R. 1, the For the 
People Act of 2019, a sweeping democracy reform package passed by the House of 
Representatives earlier this year. The transformative changes in H.R. 1 would make 
our electoral system more fair, democratic, and responsive to the priorities of all 
Americans. They include automatic voter registration, which could add 50 million 
new voters to the rolls; small donor public financing, which would reshape the way 
campaigns are funded and amplify the voices of ordinary Americans; and 
redistricting reform to curtail antidemocratic partisan gerrymandering. The package 
also encompasses a number of provisions that would directly respond to the 
vulnerabilities highlighted in the Mueller Report, and blunt future efforts by Russia 
and others to exploit them.  
 
Here is an overview of the vulnerabilities documented by the special counsel that 
H.R.1 would address: 
 
Disinformation and Propaganda: Among the special counsel's most well-known 
findings was his conclusion that Russia engaged in a concerted disinformation and 
propaganda campaign over the Internet to stoke discord among the U.S. electorate, 
suppress voter turnout, and, eventually, promote the candidacy of Donald Trump. 
Russia’s tactics undermined the basic premise that our campaigns involve real 
debates among Americans about issues and candidates. Its strategy was successful 
in part because of gaps in U.S. campaign finance law that leave most paid political 
ads over the Internet unregulated, as well as the failure of our evenly-divided and 
gridlocked national campaign finance regulator, the Federal Election Commission 
(FEC), to enforce existing rules. All signs point to Russia and other hostile state 
actors like Iran employing these tactics again ahead of the 2020 vote. To blunt this 
threat, H.R. 1 would: 
 
•  Close major campaign finance loopholes related to disclosure and the 
prohibition on campaign spending by foreign nationals. 
•  Require major online platforms to create publicly accessible online 
databases of requests to purchase Internet political ads. 

• Overhaul the FEC to curtail gridlock and streamline enforcement of

campaign finance rules.

Weak Election Security and Infrastructure: The Mueller Report also found that

Russian intelligence agents targeted vulnerable election infrastructure and private

companies that provide states with election technology, allowing them to hack into

a voter registration database, the network of at least one Florida county, and a

private elections vendor. These attacks were almost certainly a dry run for future

operations that could disrupt U.S. elections and call into question their results. To

address this grave danger, H.R. 1 would:

• Replace paperless voting systems with machines that provide a paper

record of each vote.

• Provide funding to cash-strapped election jurisdictions to replace

antiquated voting systems.

• Fund risk-limiting audits to ensure the accuracy of electronic vote

tallying.

• Impose federal regulatory safeguards on private election systems and

software vendors.

• Expand early voting to decrease the pressure on Election Day poll

workers and allow early detection of potential threats.

Voter Suppression: The special counsel found evidence of Russian-controlled

social media accounts specifically targeting African-Americans and other minority

communities. These accounts spread messages to discourage target communities

from voting, including messages that contained false information about when,

where, and how to vote. Such tactics are a pernicious form of voter suppression,

one that is likely to play an even bigger role in future election interference

operations. To address this problem, H.R. 1 would:

• Boost transparency and other safeguards for online political ads.

• Ban the use of deceptive practices for voter suppression.

• Require election officials to take concrete steps to counteract the

dissemination of misleading information about the voting process.

Direct Foreign Assistance to Campaigns: The Mueller Report also documented

Russian attempts to directly assist the Trump campaign in violation of U.S. law.

Campaign officials were at times receptive to these overtures (such as in the

infamous Trump Tower meeting between senior campaign staff and Russian

nationals claiming to have “incriminating” information about Hillary Clinton). The

report also discussed at length the activities of campaign officials who were

unregistered agents of foreign governments. In both cases, weak enforcement of

existing rules meant there was no incentive to comply with critical laws designed to

curb foreign influence over America’s political system. To remedy this problem,

H.R. 1 would:

• Overhaul the FEC to boost enforcement of campaign finance rules,

including the prohibition on foreign assistance to campaigns.

• Shore up enforcement of the Foreign Agents Registration Act (FARA).

Conflicts of Interest: The Mueller Report also described various Russia-connected

business dealings of the president and other campaign officials, including

negotiations over the possible construction of a new Trump Tower in Moscow.

Now that President Trump is in office (and has refused to divest from his

businesses), such ties create an ongoing risk of government policy—including

sensitive relations with foreign governments—being driven by personal financial

considerations rather than the public interest. Even the appearance that this is

happening can further erode public trust in government institutions. To address

risks posed by the business dealings described in the Mueller Report, H.R. 1 would,

among other things:

• Require the president and vice president to divest from all financial

interests that pose conflicts of interest.

• Require the president, vice president, and candidates for those offices

to disclose their tax returns.

• Impose basic ethics standards for presidential transitions.

• Strengthen the agency that oversees ethics regulation in the Executive

Branch, the Office of Government Ethics (OGE).

Obstruction of Justice: Finally, Volume II of the Mueller Report documented the

president’s efforts to stop or otherwise interfere with the special counsel’s

investigation, including through pressure placed on then-Attorney General Jeff

Sessions to un-recuse himself from overseeing the investigation. These findings

raise fundamental questions about the role of senior government officials when

confronted with a president determined to thwart an ongoing investigation into his

own conduct. To begin to address this problem, H.R. 1 would:

• Require presidential appointees to refrain from any involvement in

specific matters concerning the president or their spouse.

• Give OGE final authority over waivers of ethics rules, including rules

that require recusal.

***

Russia’s interference in the 2016 election and the other abuses documented in the

Mueller Report have exposed serious vulnerabilities in America’s democratic

institutions. H.R. 1 would address many of these problems, as documented further

below. Enacting this legislation would help blunt future attempts by Russia and

others to undermine American sovereignty and the integrity of our government.

In-Depth Analysis

I. Disinformation and Propaganda

What Mueller Found: The Mueller Report documented Russia’s now well-known

campaign to meddle in our elections through disinformation and propaganda over

the Internet. Russia’s efforts focused on stoking and amplifying social discord in

the U.S. electorate, lowering turnout (especially in minority communities), and,

once Donald Trump became the Republican nominee, helping him defeat Hillary

Clinton. Paid posts on major social media platforms like Facebook and Twitter

were a primary tool for Russian operatives seeking to spread their messages, often

making use of these platforms’ sophisticated targeting capabilities to reach key

audiences in swing states while remaining invisible to the wider public. The

Mueller Report documented how operatives working for the Internet Research

Agency (IRA), a Russian company tied to the Kremlin, purchased over 3,500

advertisements on Facebook alone, likely reaching tens of millions of users. Some

of these ads mentioned specific candidates with hashtags like #nohillary2016 and

#KIDS4TRUMP. Many others aimed to stir up tensions on divisive issues like

immigration, race relations, and gun control.

Why It Matters: Russia’s tactics, which it has deployed in other countries as well,

undermine the basic premise that our election campaigns involve real debates

among Americans about issues and candidates. All signs point to Russia using

these tactics again in 2020, as will other hostile foreign powers like Iran, which

worked to spread disinformation during the 2018 midterms.

Current law does not provide adequate safeguards. While federal law prohibits

campaign spending by non-U.S. citizens or green card-holders, and requires

disclosure for some campaign ads, Internet campaign activity is largely exempt

from these requirements. And even those rules that do apply are rarely enforced by

the evenly divided and perpetually gridlocked FEC. FEC dysfunction has also

helped fuel the prevalence of “dark money” from political nonprofits that are not

required to disclose their donors. While not addressed in the Mueller Report, dark

money creates another vulnerability for Russia and other powers to exploit. In

2016, Russian agents allegedly funneled money to a dark money group connected

to the National Rifle Association, which spent over $30 million on pro-Trump

campaign ads. Overall, more than $1 billion in secret spending from dark money

groups has flooded into U.S. elections since 2010. Since the origins of this

spending are undisclosed, we cannot tell for certain how much of it may have come

from foreign sources.

What H.R. 1 Would Do: H.R. 1 would address the threat of disinformation and

propaganda by shoring up campaign finance rules. First, it would close gaps in U.S.

law that have essentially exempted digital advertisements on the Internet, including

social media, from the rules that apply to all other ads. Most notably, it includes the

bipartisan Honest Ads Act, which would expand existing campaign disclosure

requirements to cover paid Internet and digital communications. The Honest Ads

Act would also require large social media platforms like Facebook, Instagram, and

Twitter to keep a public record of requests to purchase political ads mentioning

candidates or prominent national issues—a critical tool for the media, law

enforcement, and members of the public looking to understand who is trying to

influence American voters. Other provisions of H.R. 1 would prohibit foreign

governments and those acting on their behalf from purchasing a broader array of

candidate-focused ads and issue ads.

H.R. 1 also includes the DISCLOSE Act, which would eliminate dark money by

requiring organizations that spend significant sums on campaigns in an election

cycle to disclose all of the donors who paid for that spending. It would also prohibit

foreign-owned or controlled companies from election spending, eliminating a

loophole that could permit even a state-controlled foreign entity like the IRA to

spend money directly on U.S. campaigns through a domestic subsidiary.

Finally, H.R. 1 would strengthen the FEC, which is charged with enforcing

campaign finance laws, by restructuring it to curb partisan gridlock and streamline

enforcement. H.R. 1 would reduce the number of commissioners from six to five,

including a tie-breaking independent commissioner, and reduce the hurdles to staff

investigations of alleged violations.

II. Weak Election Security and Infrastructure

What Mueller Found: The Mueller Report also highlights Russia’s repeated efforts

to target U.S. election infrastructure. The special counsel found that a Russian

intelligence agency, known as the GRU, “sought access to state and local computer

 
 
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networks by exploiting known software vulnerabilities on websites of state and 
local governmental agencies.” Using these tactics, the GRU hacked into the Illinois 
State Board of Elections network and accessed its voter registration database, 
which contains registration information for millions of Illinois voters. Operatives 
also sent “spearphishing” emails to election officials and persons working at private 
voting technology companies in an effort to place malware on their systems. At 
least one Florida county’s network was successfully breached. So was that of VR 
Systems, a company that supplies voter registration technology in eight states.  
 
Why It Matters: Attacks on election infrastructure pose a grave threat. Although 
there is no indication that Russian operatives made changes to voter rolls or 
changed votes, their exploratory attacks revealed vulnerabilities that could enable 
adversaries to disrupt future elections as they are happening or attempt to 
undermine public confidence in their results. As leading national security experts 
have warned, Russia’s attacks in 2016 were almost certainly a dry run for more 
advanced operations that will be carried out in 2020 and beyond. Shoring up the 
security of our election infrastructure must therefore be a top priority. Today, 
counties and towns in 11 states—including battleground states like Georgia and 
Pennsylvania—continue to use antiquated, paperless voting machines, which 
experts agree are dangerously insecure. If these machines are tampered with, there 
is no independent paper record that can be used to check the software results and 
recover from the tampering. And even where states have paper backups for every 
vote, they frequently do not review them to ensure that electronic tallies are 
accurate. While Congress appropriated $380 million in 2018 to help the states with 
election security, that amount was not nearly enough to address all the 
vulnerabilities spread out over America’s vast and de-centralized election 
infrastructure, which includes over 8,000 distinct local election jurisdictions. For 
example, local election officials in 31 states recently reported needing to replace 
their voting equipment before the 2020 election, but nearly two-thirds said they did 
not have adequate funds to do so, even after the distribution of $380 million from 
Congress last year. 
 
What H.R. 1 Would Do: H.R. 1 would address the threats to our election 
infrastructure through a title called the Election Security Act (ESA). The ESA 
would require states to replace paperless voting systems with machines that provide 
a paper record of each vote. It would also provide states with funds to run risk-
limiting audits of their elections, which involve hand counting a statistically 
meaningful sample of ballots to ensure that the electronic tally is correct. The ESA 
would also impose new legal safeguards on private vendors of elections systems 
and software, who have historically gone unregulated. And it would ensure 
consistent federal funding for future election security improvements. 
 
H.R. 1 would also establish a minimum two-week early voting period for federal 
elections across the country. Early voting prevents would-be miscreants from 
marring elections, both by enabling election officials to discover and fix problems 
before Election Day and reducing the pressure on Election Day poll workers, since 
fewer people actually go to the polls on that day. Last year, for instance, Texas 
election officials were alerted to poorly designed voting machines changing votes 
during the early voting period and were able to warn voters and instruct them on 
how to use the machines to minimize errors. While the Texas incident does not 
appear to have involved deliberate tampering, early voting would provide the same 
benefits in the event of problems resulting from an attack. 
 
III. Voter Suppression 

What Mueller Found: The Mueller Report explains how Russian operatives

specifically targeted African-American voters, including through Facebook groups

with names like “Black Matters,” “Blacktivist,” “Don’t Shoot Us,” and “Black

Fist.” An indictment filed by the special counsel and other research document how

such accounts, and accounts targeting other communities like American Muslims,

were used for voter suppression and demobilization. Messages posted from these

accounts called on the target communities to vote for third party candidates or to

boycott the election entirely. Some accounts also posted false information about

when, where, and how to vote or spread inflammatory messages about supposed

voter fraud. For example, one Twitter account falsely said that people who voted

for Bernie Sanders in the primary would not be able to vote for Hillary Clinton in

the general election. Another falsely urged voters to vote online instead of waiting

in line at the polls.

Why It Matters: Deceptive practices and misinformation can mar elections by

driving down turnout in communities of color and other targeted communities.

Russia started weaponizing these tactics in 2016, and leading experts expect that

the use of online disinformation to “discourage and confuse voters from

participating in elections” will play an even bigger role in future election

interference operations. What is more, the use of these disinformation and vote

suppression tactics is not limited to Russian operatives; they have long been

deployed by unscrupulous domestic political actors, albeit on a smaller scale. These

activities are currently governed by an uneven patchwork of state laws that do not

adequately protect voters and would not address many of the tactics used by Russia

in the 2016 election.

What H.R. 1 Would Do: H.R. 1 would address this problem in two ways. The

increased safeguards for online campaign ads described above would make it

difficult for foreign adversaries to use paid digital content for any electoral

communications, including misinformation campaigns. In addition, H.R. 1 includes

the Deceptive Practices and Voter Intimidation Prevention Act, which would

prohibit false or misleading statements and intimidation tactics aimed at depressing

voter turnout and participation. It would also require election officials to take active

steps to counteract such tactics, including by disseminating accurate information to

voters.

IV. Other Foreign Assistance to Campaigns

What Mueller Found: Despite the strict ban on donated foreign assistance to U.S.

election campaigns, the Mueller Report documented many attempts to directly

assist the Trump campaign that were directed or encouraged by the Russian

government. At times, Trump campaign officials appear to have solicited—or at

least been open to receiving—help from abroad. For example, the report describes a

Trump Tower meeting between leading campaign staff, including Donald Trump

Jr., Jared Kushner, and Paul Manafort, and Russian nationals who claimed to have

information “incriminating to Hillary and her dealings with Russia.” Although the

special counsel recognized that soliciting such information might have been illegal,

he declined to prosecute any of the meeting’s participants, in part because he

concluded they were ignorant of the law. The Mueller Report also devotes

significant attention to the activities of campaign officials—Manafort, Rick Gates,

and Michael Flynn—who worked as foreign agents (though not agents of Russia).

None of them were in compliance with FARA, which requires U.S. persons

advocating on behalf of a foreign government, corporation, or other principal to

activities.

Why It Matters: Laws curbing foreign campaign donations and requiring

transparency from foreign agents operating in the United States are essential to

blunting outside manipulation of the American political process. But these

safeguards mean little without robust enforcement, which has not happened. Thus,

Trump campaign officials appear to have had no incentive to familiarize

themselves with clear rules barring them from accepting “incriminating” research

on Hillary Clinton from Russian sources (rules that even the special counsel’s team

did not fully understand). Nor did Manafort, Flynn, and Gates apparently have

much incentive to comply with foreign agent transparency rules.

What H.R. 1 Would Do: H.R. 1 would shore up enforcement of both the ban on

foreign campaign donations and FARA. As noted, it would overhaul the FEC to

curtail partisan gridlock and allow professional staff to investigate potential

violations. Other provisions of H.R. 1 boost FARA enforcement by, among other

things, establishing a dedicated enforcement unit within the Department of Justice,

authorizing civil as well as criminal penalties for violators, and requiring all FARA

registration statements to be made available online.

V. Conflicts of Interest

What Mueller Found: The Mueller Report also documented various Russia-

connected business dealings of President Trump and others on his campaign.

During the election, candidate Trump denied that he had any business ties to

Russia, but the special counsel’s investigation established that this statement was

untrue. In fact, well into the 2016 campaign, Trump Organization lawyer Michael

Cohen was conducting negotiations over the construction of a new Trump Tower in

Moscow. “Given the size of the Trump Moscow project,” the report notes, Cohen

and Felix Sater (another Trump associate) “believed the project required approval

(whether express or implicit) from the Russian national government, including

from the Presidential Administration of Russia.” Apart from the president, the

report also describes a meeting his son-in-law and senior advisor, Jared Kushner,

had during the transition period with Russian banker Sergey Gorkov. When

questioned about the meeting, Kushner insisted that it was “diplomatic,” but

Gorkov stated they discussed business. Kushner failed to disclose this meeting on

his security clearance forms.

Why It Matters: Foreign business dealings by the president or other senior officials

create a risk of sensitive government decisions being driven by officials’ personal

financial interests rather than the public interest. To avoid even the appearance of

such self-dealing, every president going back five decades until President Trump

chose to voluntarily divest from personal business holdings and other potentially

conflicting assets, despite being exempt from conflict of interest rules. President

Trump's failure to do so raises the prospect of more deals like the one over Trump

Tower Moscow being used as leverage to influence U.S. policy. And while other

senior officials like Kushner are theoretically bound by conflict of interest and

other ethics rules, they have suffered few consequences for high-profile ethical

lapses.

What H.R. 1 Would Do: H.R. 1 would require the president and vice president to

divest from all financial interests that pose conflicts of interest. It would also

require the president, vice president, and candidates for those offices to disclose

their personal and business income tax returns, which would, among other things,

show how much they are paying in foreign taxes. H.R. 1 also incorporates the

Transition Team Ethics Improvement Act, which would impose basic ethical

standards for presidential transitions, including requiring them to deal with

conflicts of interest on the part of transition team members. And H.R. 1 would

strengthen OGE so that it can better investigate ethical breaches and hold high-

ranking officials accountable.

VI. Obstruction of Justice

What Mueller Found: Finally, Volume II of the Mueller Report, dealing with

obstruction of justice, detailed numerous attempts by the president to stop or

otherwise interfere with the special counsel’s investigation. President Trump

repeatedly placed pressure on then-Attorney General Jeff Sessions to un-recuse

himself from overseeing the investigation, despite recommendations to the contrary

from DOJ ethics experts. For instance, when then-FBI Director James Comey

testified before Congress, the president told the attorney general, “This is terrible

Jeff. It’s all because you recused. . . . You left me on an island. I can’t do

anything.” The president also pressured White House staff to stop or otherwise

interfere with the investigation. He is reported to have said, “maybe I’ll get rid of”

then-White House Counsel Don McGahn after McGahn did not carry out his order

to fire the special counsel. And the president attempted to have Deputy National

Security Advisor K. T. McFarland create a witness statement denying that the

president had directed Michael Flynn’s transition-period discussions of U.S.

sanctions with Russian Ambassador Sergey Kislyak, a request that was

“sufficiently irregular” that McFarland “felt the need to document” it. McFarland

was subsequently offered the position of ambassador to Singapore, which a lawyer

in the White House Counsel’s Office opined could look like “a quid pro quo.”

Why It Matters: The conclusions in Volume II of the Mueller Report raise

fundamental questions about the role of senior government officials when faced

with a president determined to thwart an ongoing investigation. The conduct of

Attorney General William Barr, who has been accused of misrepresenting the

Special Counsel’s findings and seeking to undercut the his credibility, has only

deepened these concerns.

What H.R. 1 Would Do: H.R. 1 would take important steps in this area. First, it

would prevent government officials whom the president has appointed—who may

be most vulnerable to pressure from the president—from overseeing investigations

or other proceedings involving the president or their spouse. That would have

buttressed Sessions’ recusal and also required Barr to recuse himself from matters

related to the Mueller investigation. H.R. 1 would also give OGE final authority

over all waivers of Executive Branch ethics rules that might require recusal, which

would prevent the White House from attempting an end-run around these

requirements. More safeguards are needed, but these provisions would provide at

least some protection from White House interference in high profile investigations

like the special counsel’s.

***

The House passed H.R. 1 in March of this year, and the Senate companion was

introduced that same month. However, no Senate vote has been scheduled. The

Senate should immediately take up and pass this historic package of reforms to

safeguard America's democratic institutions.

The following Brennan Center experts are available for additional consultation:

Wendy R. Weiser, Vice President for Democracy

Daniel I. Weiner, Senior Counsel, Democracy Program

Spencer P. Boyer, Director, Washington Office

For media inquiries, contact: Alexandra Ringe; [email protected]; 646-925-

8744