The agency received four quotations by the due date of August 21, 2020, including from
Karl Storz and Stryker. COS at 6. As relevant here, Karl Storz’s quotation did not
include proof that it possessed an ATO. AR, Tab 27, Karl Storz’s Submission at 6.
Instead, the protester provided an explanation that it “would be submitting documents to
DHA to receive an ATO-C,” and it provided a letter from DHA that granted a “6-month
Rapid ATO on date of signature” with conditions.
4
COS at 6.
Based on Karl Storz’s submission, on September 2, 2020, the agency asked the
company to clarify the status of its ATO or ATO-C. AR, Tab 29, Agency Interchange
with Karl Storz at 1. In response, the protester confirmed that it did not have a valid
ATO or ATO-C; rather, Karl Storz explained that it was in the process of obtaining an
extension of its ATO that expired in early August. AR, Tab 30, Karl Storz’s Interchange
Response at 1-2.
Subsequently, the agency made an inquiry to the relevant point of contact at DHA who
confirmed that Karl Storz’s rapid ATO had expired on August 5, 2020, and that the
company was still in the process of submitting an extension request. AR, Tab 31, DHA
Email regarding Karl Storz’s ATO at 1-2. Accordingly, the technical evaluation team
concluded that the protester’s quotation failed to meet the cybersecurity requirement to
have a valid ATO at the time of quotation submission, and excluded its quotation from
further consideration. AR, Tab 33, Karl Storz Technical Evaluation at 1.
In contrast, Stryker’s quotation included a valid ATO for “Stryker [DELETED] Operating
Room System,” that was granted on June 6, 2019, for an 18 month period. AR, Tab 28,
Stryker ATO Certificate at 1. To address Karl Storz’s earlier allegations that Stryker did
not have a valid qualifying ATO, the technical evaluation team contacted an individual
who was responsible for approving installation and network connectivity at Wright-
Patterson Air Force Base, and requested that this individual review the items included in
Stryker’s quotation. AR, Tab 37, Technical Team ATO Confirmation Email at 1.
In responding to this request, the approving official did not identify any issues with
connectivity or installation of Stryker’s proposed equipment. Id. Additionally, the
technical team confirmed the status of Stryker’s ATO in DHA’s tracking and reporting
system for ATOs, the Consolidated System Tracking & Reporting (CSTAR). COS at 7.
After evaluating Stryker’s quotation and receiving confirmation from both the Wright-
Patterson approving officials and DHA, the technical evaluation team concluded that
Stryker’s quotation met the RFQ’s cybersecurity requirements. AR, Tab 34, Stryker
the visit, which was attended by Karl Storz’s representatives, the Air Force reiterated
the importance of the ATO or ATO-C requirement. Id. Karl Storz’s representatives did
not ask any questions about the ATO requirement during the visit. Id.
4
The letter provided by Karl Storz was undated and unsigned. AR, Tab 27, Karl Storz’s
Submission at 8-9.