Journal
of
medical
ethics
1993;
19:
99-103
Beyond
voluntary
consent:
Hans
Jonas
on
the
moral
requirements
of
human
experimentation
Charles
Fethe
Kean
College,
New
Jersey,
USA
Author's
abstract
In
his
essay,
Philosophical
Reflections
on
Experimenting
with
Human
Subjects,
Hans
Jfonas
contends
that
except
in
cases
of
widespread
medical
emergencies,
people
do
not
have
a
moral
or
social
obligation
to
volunteer
to
be
subjects
in
medical
experiments.
He
further
argues
that
any
appealfor
volunteer
subjects
in
medical
experiments
should
whenever
possible
give
priority
to
those
who
can
identify
with
the
project
and
offer
a
strong
sense
of
commitment
to
its
goals.
The
first
of
these
claims
is
given
support
against
some
recent
criticisms,
but
argument
is
offered
to
show
that
the
second
claim
not
only
does
little
to
enhance
the
stature
of
the
standard
requirement
offree
and
informed
consent
but
may
even
weaken
the
moral
validity
of
the
consent.
Introduction
The
history
of
medical
research
in
the
twentieth
century
provides
abundant
evidence
to
show
how
easy
it
is
to
exploit
individuals,
especially
the
sick,
the
weak
and
the
vulnerable,
when
the
only
moral
guide
for
science
is
a
naive
utilitarian
dedication
to
'the
greatest
good
for
the
greatest
number'.
So
the
central
problem
we
face
in
formulating
an
ethical
policy
for
research
on
human
beings
is
to
find
some
way
to
safeguard
experimental
subjects
without
stopping
the
progress
of
scientific
exploration.
A
common
solution
to
this
problem
lies
in
developing
guidelines
which
stress
individual
rights
and
the
need
for
free
and
informed
consent;
but
one
of
the
most
widely
reproduced
philosophical
essays
on
human
experimentation
takes
a
very
different,
and
ethically
more
rigorous,
approach
to
protecting
the
research
subject.
Now
generally
recognised
as
a
classic
in
the
field
of
medical
ethics,
Hans
Jonas's
essay,
Philosophical
Reflections
on
Experimenting
with
Human
Subjects
devotes
little
attention
to
the
impor-
tance
of
rights
or
the
need
to
balance
individual
risk
with
social
good.
(1).
Instead,
Jonas
advocates
that
experimentation
be
based
on
a
concept
of
consent
which
has
its
source
in
a
quasi-religious
sense
of
the
holy
and
goes
well
beyond
the
requirement
that
a
morally
valid
consent
must
be
informed
and
uncoerced.
Jonas's
essay
gives
us
a
helpful
means
for
assessing
some
of
the
commonly
accepted
assumptions
which
now
govern
the
use
of
consent
in
protecting
experi-
mental
subjects,
and
in
this
paper
I
should
like
to
examine
two
claims
he
makes
in
his
defence
of
this
morally
'higher'
or
at
least
more
demanding
concept
of
consent.
The
first
is
his
claim
that
consenting
to
be
an
experimental
subject
falls
beyond
the
bounds
of
our
normal
social
and
moral
obligations;
and
the
second
is
his
claim
that
a
morally
valid
consent
must
be
not
only
uncoerced
and
informed
but
based
on
a
strong
sense
of
personal
commitment
to
the
experi-
ment.
These
two
claims
by
no
means
exhaust
Jonas's
rich
description
of
a
morally
valid
consent,
but
they
are
central
to
his
argument
and
provide
a
good
insight
into
his
basic
ethical
philosophy.
Consent
and
moral
obligation
Jonas
introduces
his
analysis
of
consent
by
reflecting
on
the
conditions
under
which
society
would
be
justified
in
soliciting
subjects
for
medical
experimen-
tation.
He
recognises
that
widespread
medical
disasters,
such
as
an
unchecked
plague
or
a
sudden
drop
in
birthrate,
might
justify
the
use
of
extreme
measures
to
support
the
requirements
for
human
experimentation;
but
since
events
such
as
these
are
fortunately
rare,
he
focuses
his
analysis
on
the
solici-
tation
or
recruitment
procedures
which
should
be
used
to
obtain
volunteer
subjects
under
normal
cir-
cumstances.
What
kinds
of
argument,
what
sorts
of
appeal
are
medical
researchers
justified
in
making
to
potential
subjects
when
their
goal
is
not
to
avoid
a
pandemic
medical
emergency
but
to
advance
the
general
cause
of
health
and
continue
the
everyday
struggle
against
disease,
illness
and
infirmity?
In
the
case
of
therapeutic
experiments,
where
the
experimental
subject
is
a
patient
who
might
gain
direct
health
benefits
from
the
knowledge
obtained
through
the
experiment,
the
appeal
for
volunteers
can
be
properly
made
on
the
basis
of
the
subject's
Key
words
Medical
experimentation;
human
subjects;
Hans
Jonas.
100
Beyond
voluntary
consent:
Hans
J7onas
on
the
moral
requirements
of
human
experimentation
self-interest.
But
what
of
those
very
common
experiments
where
the
appeal
must
be
made
to
healthy
people
who
would
derive
no
medical
benefit
from
their
participation,
as
would
normally
be
the
case,
for
example,
in
testing
new
vaccines?
It
is
the
appeal
for
subjects
in
these
non-therapeutic
experi-
ments
which
most
clearly
displays
the
moral
problems
of
experimental
recruitment;
for
some
researchers
have
attempted
to
enhance
the
appeal
by
claiming
that
people
have
a
general
social
duty
to
volunteer,
at
least
when
the
experiments
pose
mini-
mal
risk
or
threat
of
harm.
Volunteering
to
be an
experimental
subject,
in
this
view,
is
simply
a
way
of
fulfilling
our
obligations
and
paying
a
debt
we
owe
to
present
and
future
generations.
Jonas
strongly
objects
to
this
moral
claim:
there
is,
he
argues,
no
general
social
obligation
or
moral
duty
to
volunteer
to
be
an
experimental
subject.
Jonas's
objection
to
the
attempt
to
bring
partici-
pation
in
experiments
within
the
bounds
of
social
and
moral
obligation
is
based
on
his
conviction
that
all
experimentation,
even
when
it
is
non-harmful,
treats
the
experimental
subject
as
a
passive
'token'
or
sample
and
thereby
threatens
the
dignity
of
the
person
as
a
unique
individual.
Since
respect
for
the
dignity
of
the
individual
is
an
essential
element
in
our
moral
code,
it
would
be
wrong
to
include
within
the
terms
of
the
social
contract
an
obligation
to
sacrifice
one's
status
as
an
active,
unique
and
self-
determining
individual.
Jonas
reinforces
this
argu-
ment
by
noting
that
any
attempt
to
present
the
act
of
volunteering
as
a
social
duty
would
certainly
be
a
way
to
pressure
people
and
so
would
endanger
the
moral
validity
of
the
act
of
consent.
A
truly
moral
consent
-
what
Jonas
calls
'authentic'
consent
-
must
lie
beyond
the
call
of
duty.
It
represents
a
higher
ethical
calling.
'The
ethical
dimension,'
says
Jonas,
'far
exceeds
that
of
the
moral
law
and
reaches
into
the
sublime
solitude
of
dedication
and
ultimate
com-
mitment,
away
from
all
reckoning
and
rule
-
in
short,
into
the
sphere
of
the
holy.
From
there
alone
can
the
offer
of
self-sacrifice
genuinely
spring
...'
(2).
Whether
people
will
make
such
a
commitment,
says
Jonas,
is
a
matter
that
must
be
left
to
fortuitous
'grace'.
In
a
critique
of
Jonas's
views
on
the
moral
duty
to
be
a
subject
of
a
medical
experiment,
Arthur
Shafer
expresses
a
common
objection
in
claiming
that
'Jonas's
position
would
require
the
virtual
cessation
of
medical
research
on
human
beings'
(3).
But
what
grounds
are
there
for
expecting
such
a
dire
con-
sequence?
Shafer
is
led
to
this
judgement
because
he
interprets
Jonas
as
holding
that
'the
submission
of
human
subjects
to
research
which
is
hazardous
should
not
be
sought
or
accepted
unless
the
com-
munity
is
faced
with
the
sort
of
"clear
and
present
danger"
which
a
raging
epidemic
poses'
(3).
I
believe
this
is
a
mistaken
interpretation
of
Jonas's
position.
Jonas
does
not
deny
that
society
can
accept
volun-
teers
in
non-emergency
situations;
had
he
held
such
a
view
he
would
not
have
devoted
so
much
attention
to
reformulating
the
moral
requirements
of
consent.
Nor
does
Jonas
deny
that
society
can
solicit
volun-
teers.
He
argues
only
that
such
solicitation
must
not
be
bolstered
with
the
claim
that
heeding
the
call
is
a
civic
or
moral
obligation.
It
may
well
be
true
that
a
society
which
follows
Jonas's
moral
philosophy
would
have
far
fewer
volunteers
for
non-therapeutic
medical
experiments
than
would
a society
which
uses
coercion,
pressure
or
the
appeal
to
social
duty,
but
the
call
for
subjects
would
still
be
made
and
I
see
no
reason
to
think
that
adopting
Jonas's
position
would
bring
non-therapeutic
medical
experimenta-
tion
to
a
halt.
To
attack
Jonas's
position
effectively,
one
must
look
not
at
the
obstacles
it
might
pose
for
obtaining
experimental
subjects
but
at
the
validity
of
Jonas's
claim
that
volunteering
for
medical
experimentation
is
not
part
of
the
normal
repertoire
of
moral
obliga-
tions
and
social
duties.
In
a
later
part
of
his
article,
Shafer
attempts
to
refute
or
at
least
weaken
Jonas's
contention
by
arguing
that
it
is
morally
eccentric.
'It
is
now
widely,
though
not
universally,
accepted
that
we
have
an
obligation
as
a
society
to
provide
adequate
medical
care
for
everyone,'
says
Shafer.
'This
obligation
would
seem
to
entail
that
society
promote
the
development
of
effective
treatments.
To
forego
medical
experimentation
would
be
to
deprive
ourselves
of
the
benefits
of
new
remedies;
and
not
only
ourselves,
but
future
generations
as
well'
(4).
I
would
agree
with
Shafer
that
people
do
have
a
moral
obligation
to
support
a
system
of
health
care,
but
it
is
not
clear
to
me
how
one
can
forge
a
link
between
this
obligation
and
a
duty
to
volunteer
as
an
experimental
subject.
The
social
obligation
to
provide
adequate
health
care
certainly
would
justify
society
in
demanding
contributions
to
support
the
system
of
health
care,
and
so
I
am
sure
that
most
people
would
agree
that
government
is
within
its
rights
when
it
imposes
taxes
to
pay
for
hospitals,
nursing
homes,
medical
fees
and
the
like.
But
I
doubt
that
people
would
believe
that
a
medical
con-
scription
to
obtain
an
army
of
experimental
subjects
or
even
the
attempt
to
apply
moral
pressure
to
obtain
such
subjects
would
be
justified.
'Tax
me
but
don't
test
me,'
seems
a
perfectly
sensible
view.
Taxation,
after
all,
represents
a
standard
procedure
for
exacting
social
obligations;
but
introducing
a
social
duty
to
volunteer
for
medical
experiments
presents
a
claim
for
a
different
kind
of
sacrifice:
here
my
body
rather
than
my
fungible
resources
is
being
used,
and
so
the
sacrifice
is
more
personal,
deeper
within
that
sphere
which
we
normally
like
to
think
of
as
protected
from
social
encroachment.
Furthermore,
while
the
taxation
requirement
attempts
to
be
equitable,
making
greater
demands
on
those
who
have
greater
wealth,
the
moral
basis
for
determining
who
should
carry
the
greatest
weight
of
the
duty
to
be
a
medical
volunteer
is
much
less
clear:
who
should
be
exempt
from
the
call
-
the
elderly,
the
Charles
Fethe
101
sick,
the
poor?
It
may
be
possible
to
deduce
a
general
moral
obligation
to
volunteer
for
medical
experi-
ments
from
the
social
duty
to
support
an
adequate
level
of
health
care,
but
it
will
require
more
argu-
ment
than
Shafer
or
anyone
else
known
to
me
has
given
it.
Jonas's
claim
that
the
act
of
volunteering
for
a
medical
experiment
lies
beyond
the
realm
of
social
obligations
is
part
of
his
general
effort
to
portray
the
unique
moral
character
of
this
action.
Of
equal
importance
in
this
project
is
his
argument
that
the
act
of
volunteering
should
whenever
possible
be
based
on
the
subject's
'identification'
or
sincere
commitment
to
the
experiment.
I
believe
it
is
here,
in
his
discussion
of
identification,
that
Jonas's
essay
faces
its
most
serious
philosophical
objections.
Identification
and
authentic
consent
Not
all
consents,
not
even
all
uncoerced
and
informed
consents,
are
morally
valid.
To
determine
the
moral
quality
of
an
act
of
consent
we
must
look
beyond
the
act
itself
and
consider
its
motives
and
the
role
it
plays
in
the
life
of
the
person
who
makes
it.
To
Jonas,
a
truly
moral
or
'authentic'
consent
must
be
not
only
free
and
informed:
it
must
also
represent
the
subject's
identification
with
the
pro-
ject
he
is
consenting
to.
The
following
quotation
is
Jonas's
description
of
the
kind
of
identification
needed
to
give
full
moral
validity
to
the
act
of
consent:
'The
ruling
principle
in
our
considerations
is
that
the
"wrong"
of
reification
can
only
be
made
"right"
by
such
authentic
identification
with
the
cause
that
it
is
the
subject's
as
well
as
the
researcher's
cause
-
whereby
his
role
in
its
service
is
not
just
permitted
by
him,
but
willed.
That
sovereign
will
of
his
which
embraces
the
end
as
his
own
restores
his
personhood
to
the
otherwise
depersonalizing
context.
To
be
valid
it
must
be
autonomous
and
informed.
The
latter
condition
can,
outside the
research
community,
only
be
fulfilled
by
degrees;
but
the
higher
the
degree
of
the
understanding
regarding
the
purpose
and
the
technique,
the
more
valid
becomes
the
endorsement
of
the
will.
A
margin
of
mere
trust
inevitably
remains.
Ultimately,
the
appeal
for
volunteers
should
seek
this
free
and
generous
endorsement,
the
appropriation
of
the
research
purpose
into
the
person's
own
scheme
of
ends.
Thus,
the
appeal
is
in
truth
addressed
to
the
one,
mysterious,
and
sacred
source
of
any
such
generosity
of
the
will
-
"devo-
tion,"
whose
forms
and
objects
of
commitment
are
various
and
may
invest
different
motivations
in
different
individuals'
(5).
It
is,
of
course,
rather
difficult
to
recognise
when
a
volunteer's
choice
is
based
on
a
devotion
of
this
kind,
and
so
Jonas
offers
us
some
suggestions
on
where
it
is
likely
to
be
found:
'The
following,
for
instance,
may
be
responsive
to
the
"call"
we
are
discussing:
compassion
with
human
suffering,
zeal
for
humanity,
reverence
for
the
Golden
Rule,
enthusiasm
for
progress,
homage
to
the
cause
of
knowledge,
even
longing
for
sacri-
ficial
justification
(do
not
call
that
"masochism",
please).
On
all
these,
I
say,
it
is
defensible
and
right
to
draw
when
the
research
objective
is
worthy
enough;
and
it
is
a
prime
duty
of
the
research
com-
munity
(especially
in
view
of
what
we
called
the
"margin
of
trust")
to
see
that
this
sacred
source
is
never
abused
for
frivolous
ends'
(5).
Requiring
a
commitment
of
this
kind
from
research
subjects
would
reduce
the
number
of
acceptable
volunteers,
but
Jonas
believes
a
reduction
in
resources
is
simply
the
price
one
must
be
willing
to
pay
in
order
to
ensure
the
moral
validity
of
the
act
of
consent.
There
are,
however,
other
obstacles
in
the
way
of
accepting
the
identification
requirement,
and
I
shall
try
to
show
that
they
pose
a
stronger
threat
to
the
moral
basis
of
Jonas's
recommendations.
Moral
problems
with
the
identification
requirement
Jonas
undoubtedly
believes
that
the
identification
requirement
enhances
the
moral
stature
of
consent.
The
identification
requirement
would
give
validity
only
to
consent
based
on
the
subject's
own
values
and
thus
reduce
the
chances
that
the
subject
could
be
manipulated
or
pressured
into
agreement.
But
I
believe
the
identification
requirement
would
not
seriously
affect
the
possibility
of
manipulation
nor
would
it
guarantee
that
the
consent
is
an
expression
of
the
individual's
free
choice.
A
good
example
of
the
way
in
which
identification
can
be
put
in
the
service
of
manipulation
is
Stanley
Milgram's
famous
psychological
experiment
on
obedience
(6).
In
this
experiment,
Milgram
set
up
a
deceptive
situation
in
which
volunteer
subjects
believed
they
were
inflicting
electrical
shocks
on
someone
as
part
of
an
experiment
to
test
how
pain
affects
memorisation.
In
actual
fact,
no
one
was
being
given
shocks,
and
the
aim
of
Milgram's
exper-
iment
was
to
see
whether
the
volunteer
subjects
would
continue
to
obey
the
instruction
to
give
the
shocks
even
when
it
appeared
to
them
that
someone
was
being
seriously
hurt
by
what
they
were
doing.
Milgram's
experiment
was
strongly
attacked
because
of
its
use
of
deception
and
because
of
the
possible
serious
psychological
damage
that
subjects
might
suffer
later
when
they
came
to
think
about
what
they
had
done;
but
Milgram
argued
in
his
own
defence
that
the
experiment
was
justified
because
in
post-
experiment
interviews
a
large
number
of
the
subjects
expressed
full
support
for
the
experiment,
agreed
that
it
should
have
been
done,
and
even
in
some
cases
said
that
it
was
one
of
the
most
valuable
experiences
in
their
lives
(7).
102
Beyond
voluntary
consent:
Hans
J7onas
on
the
moral
requirements
of
human
experimentation
Milgram's
subjects
undoubtedly
identified
with
the
experiment,
but
they
were
manipulated
nonethe-
less.
It
might
be
thought
that
the
Milgram
experi-
ment
does
not
really
pose
a
problem
for
Jonas's
view
since
Jonas
would
insist
that
a
consent
expressing
identification
must
also
be
free
and
fully
informed.
Since
Milgram's
experiment
was
based
on
decep-
tion,
it
would
automatically
be
ruled
out
by
Jonas
as
invalid.
But
this
reply
shows
a
failure
to
understand
the
significance
of
Milgram's
experiment,
for
what
Milgram
has
unwittingly
demonstrated
is
how
easy
it
is
to
get
people
to
consent
to
an
experiment
and
identify
with
its
aims.
If
experimental
subjects
who
are
tricked
into
doing
something
that
is
considered
morally
wrong
still
commit
themselves
to
the
experi-
ment
and
express
strong
support
of
it,
how
much
easier
will
it
be
to
elicit
such
identification
when
everything
is
on
the
up
and
up
and
the
goals
of
the
experiment
are
presented
as
worthy
of
pursuit.
I
am
not
aware
of
any
statistics
on
whether
people
who
take
part
in
experiments
tend
to
support
the
experiments
when
they
are
over,
but
I
would
expect
that
the
high
degree
of
support
that
Milgram
received
would
not
be
unusual,
even
when
people
enter
the
experiment
for
pay
or
just
to
have
some-
thing
to
do.
It
is
a
fact
of
human
nature
that
people
want
to
find
value
in
the
activities
they
engage
in;
and
when
as
in
the
case
of
a
medical
experiment,
the
activity
is
surrounded
with
the
aura
of
science
and
the
prospect
for
some
kind
of
improvement
for
humanity,
it
is
surely
very
easy
to
make
the
kind
of
identification
and
commitment
which
Jonas
stresses
as
so
morally
important.
If
the
above
argument
is
correct,
then
the
identifi-
cation
requirement
would
probably
not
provide
much
more
of
a
guarantee
against
manipulation
than
we
already
have
with
the
basic
requirement
that
the
consent
be
free
and
informed.
But
I
think
if
we
consider
some
of
the
motives
which
often
lie
behind
commitments
to
experiments,
we
can
see
even
further
objections
to
Jonas's
belief
that
the
identifi-
cation
requirement
enhances
the
moral
quality
of
consent.
There
are
many
reasons
why
a
person
might
commit
him
or
her
self
to
a
medical
experiment
and
identify
with
it,
and
not
all
of
these
reasons
would
support
the
moral
stature
of
the
commitment.
Jonas
recognises
this,
and
in
the
passage
quoted
above,
he
offers
a
sample
of
the
reasons
that
would
make
the
commitment
a
morally
acceptable
one.
Some
of
these,
such
as
'zeal
for
humanity'
and
'sacrificial
justification',
are
a
bit
difficult
to
understand,
but
the
language
suggests
that
a
fairly
strong
commit-
ment
is
needed.
The
moral
problem
I
see
here
is
that
people
who
are
guided
by
motives
of
this
sort
are
not
the
kind
of
people
who
are
best
able
to
make
the
kind
of
commitment
we
normally
would
like
to
have.
Suppose,
for
example,
we
discover
that
one
of
our
volunteer
subjects
is
strongly
committed
to
a
medi-
cal
experiment
because
members
of
his
family
have
suffered
from
the
disease
which
is
the
subject
of
the
experiment.
Does
his
commitment
here
have
a
moral
quality
to
it?
Those
who
follow
a
Kantian
philosophy
would
certainly
think
not,
for
it
may
be
that
what
we
have
here
is
not
a
moral
commitment
based
on
principle
but
an
emotional
drive.
And
even
if
we
find
this
Kantian
view
too
harsh,
it
still
must
be
admitted
that
a
person
in
this
situation
may
not
be
in
a
good
position
to
look
at
his
choice
objectively
and
determine
whether
this
is
actually
a
sensible
choice
to
make.
The
kinds
of
motives
which
Jonas
appeals
to
and
would
set
up
as
the
moral
foundation
of
an
authentic
choice
are
quite
powerful
motives,
easily
associated
with
fanaticism;
they
may
represent
not
a
strong
expression
of
self
but
fears,
false
hopes,
even
a
sense
of personal
unworthiness
and
desire
for
self-
sacrifice.
I
am
not
saying
this
would
be
true
in
all
or
even
many
cases,
but
the
possibility
of
this
occur-
rence
indicates
that
the
requirement
of
identification
which
Jonas
imposes
carries
with
it
moral
risks
and
cannot
be
accepted
as
something
which
will
always
enhance
the
moral
character
of
the
volunteer's
choice.
Conclusion
Moral
restrictions
on
who
will
be
accepted
as
volun-
teers
for
human
experimentation
must
always
be
designed
to
ensure
the
protection
of
the
subject.
Jonas's
suggestion
that
a
morally
valid
consent
must
be
based
on
a
strong
sense
of
identification
and
commitment
to
the
experiment
does
not
appear
to
me
to
achieve
this
goal;
for
although
this
restriction
would
prohibit
solicitation
of
those
who
are
uncer-
tain
or
hesitant
to
make
a
commitment,
it
would
not
protect
those
whose
commitment
is
the
result
of
morally
dubious
emotional
states
which
drive
people
towards
self-sacrifice.
Sometimes
we
need
to
protect
people
from
themselves.
But
I
would
agree
with
Jonas
that
however
we
define
a
morally
valid
consent
to
be
an
experimental
subject,
we
must
always
recog-
nise
that
this
kind
of
act
of
volunteering,
especially
in
non-therapeutic
experiments,
requires
more
than
that
the
choice
be
free
and
uncoerced.
I
hesitate
to
follow
Jonas
in
thinking
of
the
act
as
'holy'
and
a
testimony
to
'grace';
but
it
is
surely
beyond
the
realm
of
the
normal
call
to
duty,
and
any
moral
guidelines
for
human
experimentation
which
failed
to
recognise
its
special
moral
stature
would
have
to
be
judged
inadequate.
Charles
Fethe
is
Professor
in
the
Department
of
Philosophy,
Kean
College,
Union,
New
J7ersey,
USA.
References
(1)
Jonas
H.
Philosophical
reflections
on
experimenting
with
human
subjects.
Daedalus
1969;
98:
219-247.
My
citations
will
be
taken
from
the
expanded
version
of
Charles
Fethe
103
this
essay
which
appears
in
Jonas's
book,
Philosophical
essays:
from
ancient
creed
to
technological
man.
Chicago:
University
of
Chicago
Press,
1974:
105-131.
(2)
See
reference
(1):
1
19.
(3)
Shafer
A.
Experimentation
with
human
subjects:
a
critique
of
the
views
of
Hans
Jonas.
J'ournal
of
medical
ethics
1983:
9;
76.
(4)
See
reference
(3):
77.
(5)
See
reference
(3):
122.
(6)
See
Milgram,
S.
Obedience
to
authority:
an
experimental
view.
New
York:
Harper
and
Row,
1974.
(7)
On
page
199
of
Obedience
to
authority,
Milgram
says:
'The
central
moral
justification
for
allowing
a
procedure
of
the
sort
used
in
my
experiment
is
that
it
is
judged
acceptable
by
those
who
have
taken
part
in
it.
Moreover,
it
was
the
salience
of
this
fact
through-
out
that
constituted
the
chief
moral
warrant
for
the
continuation
of
the
experiments.'
News
and
notes
Imperial
College
Annual
Intensive
Ethics
Course
The
course
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from
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September
1993
in
London.
Designed
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