May 2018 | Report 401

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102 YEARS OF UNCOMPROMISING POLICY RESEARCH

38777 Six Mile Road, Suite 208 | Livonia, MI 48152 | 734.542.8001

115 West Allegan, Suite 480 | Lansing, MI 48933 | 517.485.9444

P.O. Box 1612 | Holland, MI 49422 | 616-294-8359 | crcmich.org

Editor’s Note: The Citizens Research Council of Michigan has been asked many

times over the past couple of years to look at the eect that term limits has had on

changed. After the initial ndings were published in 2010, the two scholars contin-

ued their work and published a book on their ndings in 2017 (reference below).

We asked them to summarize their work for us. This report is that summary.

Implementing Term Limits: The Case of the Michigan Legislature

(2017) is avail-

Summary ........................................................................................................................................................iii

The Promises of Term Limits .......................................................................................................................... 1

Michigan’s Term Limits Law in Context ..........................................................................................................2

Information Gathering ...................................................................................................................................10

Chamber Leaders and Committee Chairs .................................................................................................... 12

Relationships between the Legislative and Executive Branches ................................................................. 14

Recap of Findings.........................................................................................................................................15

Have Term Limits Helped or Hurt Michigan as a Whole? ............................................................................. 15

Should Citizens Change Term Limits? .......................................................................................................... 17

for selecting the leaders of the legislative chambers.

Michigan, this report analyzes whether and to what

three two-year terms (six years) maximum in its lower

this question depends on the nature of the issue being

considered. For a politically charged issue like school

choice, interest groups appear to become more inu-

ential sources of information after term limits, at the

expense of local sources in the Senate and colleagues

in the House. On the technically complex issues of

licensing and regulating health care professionals, or-

ganized groups gain inuence, while local sources lose

issue. For information during committee deliberations,

rather than the inuence of bureaucrats and inter-

est groups? Before term limits, local ocials were

a more important source of information and guidance

to legislators on issues and how bills would aect lo-

recruiting candidates often provide information and

guidance to legislators. After term limits, legislators

their constituents. Political parties in Michigan became

limits proponents railed against.

legislation decreased after term limits, but the priority

they place on studying new laws has increased. This

could suggest that more bills are developed outside

the chamber, potentially by lobbyists or interest groups.

local ocials as a source of information on issues.

versity, in 2008, 70 percent of respondents approved

of term limits. Therefore, a ballot proposal to eliminate

states that have adopted them. For Michigan, the

issues have become particularly evident because its

limits are too short to allow talented newcomers to

More than two decades ago, term limits proponents

ing Michigan, that limiting legislators’ tenure in oce

would revitalize American democracy. They promised

to their constituents’ needs and views rather than

the inuence of bureaucrats and interest groups. In

limits ballot initiative, which voters did in 1992, would

reduce gridlock and introduce a merit-based system

for selecting the leaders of the legislative chambers,

(i.e., the Speaker of the House, Majority Leader of the

Senate, and so on). Not surprisingly, voters jumped at

the chance to, as the saying goes, “drain the swamp.”

lot of dierent tasks ranging from monitoring the imple-

mentation of state programs to helping constituents

eort among these tasks. After term limits, we found

in how legislators allocate their time. Many of the

48 percent before term limits

to 71 percent afterward. So,

seem to surprise some newly elected ocials. To nd

prioritize, we asked them to tell us how much time

they spent on each of 11 tasks: 1) studying legislation,

2) developing new legislation, 3) building coalitions in

state agencies, 6) talking to voters, 7) attending meet-

ings in the district, 8) helping voters with problems, 9)

Before term limits, a sizeable proportion of representa-

with their colleagues to turn to them when they need

For licensing and regulating health care professionals,

sources lose inuence.

limits, probably because there were a handful of legisla-

in health care and related elds (e.g., doctors, nurses,

nursing home operators). More post-term-limits sena-

tors say that colleagues are their most important source

groups seem to replace local sources of information.

To examine information gathering during committee de-

into

: 1) those inside the chamber

they have never worked with and do not know very well.

Post-term-limits senators display an aversion to local

or outside sources of information during committee

but they still do not turn to them anywhere nearly as

often as they turn to mid-range sources such as inter-

representatives rely upon the most for information that

limits. These mid-range sources are ones that are

knowledge and intelligence, and they also considered

commander, or coordinator), that experienced legisla-

respondents, who expressed buyers’ remorse about

term limits—leaders gained

influence. The interviews

asked legislators who they

chamber and those questions were followed up with

questions asking what makes someone inuential in a

in the chamber decreased after term limits. And most

of this decline is in the rank-and-le legislators, those

inuence wielded by these rank-and-le colleagues to

these were honest brokers to whom one could turn for

information on key issues or for political advice.

After term limits, holding a formal position of author-

increased inuence by nine percentage points among

representatives and by 24 percentage points among

h

checks and balances between three co-equal branches

lature appears weaker than

servants—professionals who

autonomy and power as legislators prove less inter-

ested in and less able to monitor the work of state

This means that legislators exercise less restraint over

the service delivery apparatus. Interest groups have

i

nation has diminished substantially. Michigan has gone

below average. The combination of Michigan’s single

state recession in the rst decade of this century fol-

lowed immediately by the impact of the Great Reces-

sion of 2007-09 made governing dicult at all levels.

will restore state coffers

rather than taking action

to improve the state’s re-

of Michigan’s post-term-

boom and bust economy.

Governor Snyder, whose

some level of fiscal re-

when the economy favors more educated workers.

they provide.

The lost

revenue reduces the payroll

in local municipalities for po-

Compared to the 1990s, Michigan, after 1998, looks

like a state in decline. But how much of Michigan’s

be attributed to term limits? Three factors may impli-

cate legislative term limits. First, with a term-limited

until a legislator is out of oce (kicking the can down

legislators’ decision about

Michigan’s state government,

limits have accentuated pre-

much more politically ambitious than were their

by electioneering concerns than their predecessors.

could help with reelection to their legislative seats,

term-limited legislators’ electioneering activities are

focused on moving up (from the House to the Senate

Congress) or down (to county

commissions, city councils, or

other local government elected

positions).

The implications of this are that

meetings with constituents and

(while important and admirable) take precedent over