16
on transitional adjustment see Box A. But such measures were not confined to businesses or
individuals. Under the National Competition Policy, state governments were entitled to receive
so-called ‘competition payments’ from the federal government upon implementing agreed policy
changes. The payments recognised that although the reforms were expected to deliver productivity
gains that would boost federal government revenue, the cost of implementing the reforms would be
borne by state governments. Similarly, support for the introduction of a GST in 2001 was aided by
the federal government’s commitment that all revenue raised would be distributed to the states.
Finally, as in other countries,
36
governments in Australia have repeatedly drawn on independent
advice to build consensus for economic reform. This includes advice from independent agencies,
such as the Productivity Commission or the Australian Competition and Consumer Commission, as
well as from government-commissioned public inquiries, such as the 1981 Campbell Financial System
Inquiry, the 1992 Hilmer Report on competition policy, the 1997 Wallis Report on the financial
system, the 2014 Murray Financial System Inquiry and the 2015 Harper Review on competition
policy. These fora can lend much-needed credibility to the case for change – credibility that is
founded upon both technical expertise and independence. They provide a mechanism for experts,
free from political or vested interests, to identify challenges, sift through proposed responses, and
recommend the best way forward – whether or not it accords with the government’s own views.
37
Successive Australian governments have used such advice to build a case for politically challenging
reforms.
38
For instance, soon after winning the 1983 election the new government initiated the
Martin Committee
39
in order to revive the financial deregulation agenda previously recommended by
the Campbell Review
40
– a review that had helped to shape the discussion around capital controls
and the Australian dollar in the early 1980s, and which prepared the ground for the dollar’s float a
couple of years later. More recently, a 2011 Productivity Commission review of disability support
arrangements supported the introduction of a National Disability Insurance Scheme (NDIS).
41
The credibility of independent institutions has been bolstered by those occasions they have made
recommendations that do not accord with the government’s views – at least, not initially. For
instance, the Tariff Board, which was established in the 1920s as the agency responsible for
determining how much protection should be granted to Australian industry, used its independence
to argue against protectionism from the 1960s – a stance at odds with the government of the day.
The Productivity Commission, a descendant of the Tariff Board, continues in that tradition by
providing independent, evidence-based analysis and advice on economic policy. In an example of its
preparedness to exert reform pressure on itself, the government recently asked the Productivity
36 Notably in Canada where major commissions have included: (1) the 1933 Royal Commission on Banking and Currency,
which led to establishment of Royal Bank of Canada; (2) the 1957 Royal Commission on Canada’s Economic Prospects,
which reviewed the policy of allowing foreign interests to purchase control of Canada's natural resources and other
business enterprises; (3) the 1968 Task Force on Foreign Ownership and the Structure of Canadian Investment, which
recommended strict regulation of foreign investment in Canada; (4) the 1964 Royal Commission on Banking and Finance,
which made a range of recommendations to reduce regulation in the banking sector; and (5) the 1984 Royal Commission
on Economic Union and Development Prospects for Canada, which recommended greater reliance on market mechanisms
and a free trade agreement with the United States and reform of the welfare state model.
37 Despite the independence of the institutions and the reviews/inquiries, it is important to note that the government has
discretion in appointing the chairs and other senior executives.
38 Other countries have also taken this path. In Canada, the recommendations of the Macdonald Commission were a
significant factor in garnering support for the 1988 Canada-US Free Trade Agreement.
39 Note this is different to the Martin Committee commissioned by the government in 1983, with the 1983 committee led by
Vic Martin and the 1990 committee led by Stephen Martin.
40 Committee of Inquiry into the Australian Financial System 1981.
41 Productivity Commission 2011.