Two (or more) persons may of course bind themselves contractually as to their
future conduct, and that will prevail for as long as one of them desires that this
regime should remain in place. But if they both (or all) agree, in some form
recognised by the law, that they should no longer be bound, why should their
previous agreement to the contrary stand in their way? While statute may, in the
public interest, require certain formalities for the making of certain types of
contract, the common law leaves the parties to choose their own, so long as the
essential elements of offer, acceptance and consideration are observed. These
matters are as applicable to the variation of an existing contract as they are to the
making of a contract in the first place.
23. This basic concept, that parties to a contract have complete freedom by
further agreement to “unbind” themselves as to their future conduct, is in principle
applicable not merely to their substantive mutual obligations, but also to any
procedural restraints upon which they may agree, including restraints as to how
they may vary their existing contractual relationship. It is therefore fully applicable
to the constraint upon their future conduct imposed by a NOM clause. No-one
doubts that parties to a contract containing a NOM clause are at liberty thereafter
to remove it from their bargain, temporarily or permanently, by a compliant written
variation, following which it will not inhibit them from agreeing further variations
purely orally.
24. The critical questions for present purposes are, first: whether the parties
can agree to remove a NOM clause from their bargain orally and, second:
whether, if so, such an agreement will be implied where they agree orally upon a
variation of the substance of their relationship (which the NOM clause would
require to be in writing) without saying anything at all about the NOM clause.
Must they be taken so to have agreed by the very fact that they have made the
substantive variation orally? Lord Sumption would answer the first question in the
negative, so that, for him, the second question would not arise. For the reasons
which follow, I would answer the first question in the affirmative, but not
(generally at least) the second. The outcome on the present facts is the same. In
this case the alleged oral agreement to vary the Licence said nothing whatsoever
about the NOM clause (of which both Mr Idehen and Ms Evans were probably
entirely unaware), and I would not treat it as having been done away with by
necessary implication. The result is that their alleged agreement as to the terms
of a variation had no immediately binding force, any more than an agreement
made subject to contract. This will probably be the outcome on any comparable
or likely fact-set since, leaving aside emergencies, once the parties focus on the
obstacle presented by the NOM clause, they would almost certainly remove it by
a simple written variation, or indeed make the whole of the substantive variation
itself in writing.
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