Direct Democracy

Linda Maduz

University of Zurich | Center for International and Comparative Studies | [email protected]

First published: March 2010

Most recent version available at http://www.livingreviews.org/lrd-2010-1

The rising use of direct democratic procedures within states but also cross-nationally increases the

interest in and the relevance of the research on direct democracy. At the theoretical as well as at the

empirical level, scholars, who have been participating in the long-standing debate on direct

democracy, came up with different conclusions and evidence about the extent and kind of impact that

direct democratic procedures have on the political processes and system as a whole. The purpose of

the article is to give a thorough picture of major contributions that have helped to advance this

dynamic field of research. It will be shown how the theoretical and empirical approaches applied

have considerably changed and improved over time, whereas the questions at the heart of the direct

democracy debate have basically remained the same.

Introduction

Shaun Bowler (2002: 285f.) once noted that few other terms in

political science generate such heated and hostile debates

within the academic community as “direct democracy” – and

that it would “raise the blood pressure” not only of political

scientists but also of politicians.

There are two basic theoretical views of how direct democracy

– or participatory democracy as it is also called – can be

understood and defined: either as a variation on the democratic

form of regime (e.g. in contrast to representative democracy) or

alternatively as the essential form of democracy.

If we define democracy as a concept referring to popular rule in

a broad and general sense, direct democracy is used to describe

a system , in which the people literally rule themselves directly.

Whereas all democracy is to some degree participatory, with

some form of an original consent given (e.g. constitution) and

periodic popular elections, according to its advocates direct

democracy involves, the extensive and active engagement of

citizens in the self-governing process. Seen in this light, direct

or participatory democracy can be described as democracy

itself, properly understood (See The Encyclopedia of

Democracy, edited by Lipset 1995).

The focus of this article is on empirical studies. When

appropriate however, reference will be made to normative

models of democracy. In line with the definition above, we

consider two broad types, into which the wide range of

normative models of democracy can be categorized (Held 1987,

2006). The first; liberal or representative democracy refers to a

system in which the citizens’ role is essentially restricted to the

election of “officers” in charge of “representing” the interests

and views of citizens within a fixed framework of “the rule of

law”. The second; participatory or direct democracy

corresponds to a situation where citizens are directly and

widely included in the political decision-making. From the

perspective of the adherents of the participatory model, direct

democracy is “strong democracy”. Thus, in Barber’s (1984)

words, it is a system of “self-government by citizens rather than

representative government in the name of citizens”. Direct

democracy’s adherents consider that in order to achieve this

self-determination by citizens, democratic rights should not be

restricted to political decision-making, but be extended from

the State to all important societal institutions (Pateman 1970).

In practice, direct democracy is a term denoting a variety of

processes and institutions, guaranteeing people’s (direct)

involvement in political decision-making. These processes

include initiatives and referendums. The research on these two

direct democratic institutions, which are the most important and

widely used direct democratic processes, forms the focus of this

literature review article.

At the theoretical, as well as the empirical level, scholars, who

have been participating in the long-standing direct democracy

debate, have come up with diverging evidence and conclusions

on the extent and kind of impact that direct democratic

procedures have on the political processes and system as a

whole. While the questions at the heart of the debate have

basically remained the same, the theoretical and empirical

approaches applied have changed considerably and improved

over time. As for the questions, Lupia and Matsusaka (2004)

have discerned four “old” questions at the center of the direct

democracy debate, which are: Are voters competent? What role

does money play? How does direct democracy affect policy?

Does direct democracy benefit the many or the few?

In search

of answers to these questions, scholars in the past have mostly

taken descriptive or normative approaches. In recent decades,

researchers started to use more systematically empirical

procedures to test the scientific propositions made in the

context of direct democracy. The growing sophistication of

econometrics and the introduction of low-cost computing have

allowed them to work with large data sets, and make it possible

to identify key effects and establish robust empirical relations.

Moreover, new theoretical tools, such as formal modelling,

have been developed and theoretical approaches have been

combined with approaches used in other scientific disciplines.

This gives scholars the possibility of a more sophisticated

examination of direct democracy’s policy-related,

informational, and strategic aspects.

Taking Lupias and Matsusaka’s (2004) four “old” questions as a

starting point, the purpose of this review article is to explore the

recent literature on direct democracy and to extend the

discussion to additional aspects not touched upon by their

For a detailed discussion on the differences between representative

and direct democracy, see Kriesi (2005).

See also Matsusaka (2005).

Center for Comparative and International Studies, ETH Zurich and University of Zurich Living Reviews in Democracy, 2010 | 1

review. Thus, we shall also discuss questions referring to the

educative effects of direct democracy. The books and articles

are presented in terms of their contributions to one of the four

central questions above.

How these questions at the heart of the direct democratic debate

are answered depends among other things, on the institutional

context, which varies between the countries and geographical

regions under study. This becomes evident when considering

how diverse the design and use of direct democratic institutions

are in different countries. We shall, therefore, begin with a

discussion of the country-specific focus of recent literature on

direct-democratic procedures (section 2). We then (section 3)

turn to the central questions of the debate on direct democracy,

and the answers provided by contemporary research. Section 4

concludes.

The country-specific focus of direct democracy

literature

The recently observed increase in the use of direct democratic

instruments in different regions of the world (i.e., referendums

and initiatives), as well as the incorporation of related

provisions in a number of new constitutions, explains the

growing interest in the subject matter. A classical overview that

covers experiences with direct democracy across the world is

provided by Butler and Ranney (1994). Like many other

scholars, they analyze the spread of direct democracy in terms

of how frequently relevant devices are used. Scarrow (2001),

by contrast, focuses on institutional changes as indicators to

evaluate direct democracy’s global spread, and for this purpose

studies the experience of 22 OECD-countries in different parts

of the world. Cain, Dalton, and Scarrow (2003) further continue

this line of research and provide an assessment of the extent of

institutional reform in contemporary democracies, including an

analysis of how the actors of representative democracies

respond to the new structures. In a recent publication, edited by

Freitag and Wagschal (2007), the authors take stock of current

developments in the well-established direct democratic systems

of Germany, Europe, USA, and Switzerland. Further useful

insights into the global spread and development of direct

democratic institutions are given by LeDuc (2003) or LeDuc et

al. (2002).

Other overviews of direct democracy literature have a more

regional focus. “Direct Democracy in Europe” has, for instance,

been the subject of a recent collection of essays (Pállinger et al.

2007) that comprises theoretical and empirical studies on direct

democratic institutions at the local, national, and European

level. Compared to earlier writers on direct democracy in the

European context, researchers today have access to a wide

range of information on the various provisions, practices and

trends within Europe (Pallinger et al. 2007: 1) For instance,

updated information on direct democratic procedures in Europe

is available at www.iri-europe.org (Initiative and Referendum

Institute). Reflecting the historical path of direct democratic

developments in Europe, earlier studies exhibit a clear focus on

the direct democratic experience of Western Europe (see e.g.

“The Referendum Experience in Europe” by Gallagher and

Uleri 1996). In recent times, the post-communist countries of

Eastern Europe have undertaken a number of institutional

reforms, favourable to direct democracy. Moreover, new

procedures, like the referendum, are being used more and more

frequently. Except for Bulgaria, all new Eastern European

countries have asked their citizens to vote in a referendum at

least once. These recent developments in Eastern Europe attract

the interest of many academic researchers (see Auer and Bützer

2001).

The bulk of the literature on direct democracy focuses however,

on the established democracies of the North Atlantic region

and, in particular, on Switzerland and the USA. In a worldwide

comparison, these two countries stand out for their long-

standing and extensive experience with direct-democratic

procedures. When looking at the specific form of direct

democracy that exists in the two countries, we find some

important differences: The practice in the member states of the

U.S. can be characterized as an unmediated, populist form of

direct democracy (Budge 1993, Kriesi 2008). The original

purpose of the popular initiative was to circumvent state

parliaments controlled by political parties, and today still it is

primarily used by social movements and interest groups with

the same goal.. By contrast, in Switzerland direct democracy is

much more organized and more tightly controlled by the

political elites; direct-democratic procedures are closely linked

to the procedures of representative democracy and parties have

a full role to play (Budge 2001). In the Swiss context, two main

instruments shape the direct democratic system, i.e. the popular

initiative and the referendum. The latter is the earlier form of

direct-democracy in Switzerland, and in contrast to the US

context, it is the procedure that plays the most important role in

Swiss direct democracy, and in all other European varieties of

direct democracy (Kriesi 2008).

Switzerland is often portrayed as the country where the roots of

direct democracy lie (Kobach 1993, Lloyd 1907, Zimmermann

1999).Depicting direct democracy as having a purely Swiss

lineage would, however, be erroneous (see e.g. Auer 1996).

Important contributions on the functioning, implications, and

consequences of the Swiss direct democratic system include

books written by Kirchgässner et al. (1999), Kriesi (2005),

Linder (2005), and Papadopoulos (1998). Among the studies

that provide a good overview of the direct-democratic

institutions as used at the different sub-national political levels

in Switzerland, we find the analyses by Bützer (2007), Ladner

and Bühlmann (2007), Trechsel (2000), Trechsel and Serdült

(1999), and Vatter (2002),. Assuming that the mechanisms and

logic behind direct democratic voting are not specific to the

country, but relevant for all places with direct democratic

experience, many authors consider the Swiss case to offer a

fruitful basis for the analysis of direct-democratic choice and

procedures and to allow for general conclusions on direct

democracy.

The most extensive literature in the field of direct democracy,

however, covers the American case. In the United States, direct

democratic procedures are widely practiced, but their use is

restricted to the state and city level (Tolbert and Smith 2006).

Bowler et al. (1998), Cronin (1989), Ellis (2002), Magleby

(1984), and Sabato et al. (2001) are among the authors who

wrote standard works, containing general overviews on the

direct democratic system in the USA.

A recent trend, which can be observed in the direct democracy

literature, is that more and more countries that had been

neglected for studies, have now become the subject of detailed

analyses. Examples are the studies of Clarke et al. (2004) or

Mendelsohn and Cutler (2000) on Canada, Higley and

McAllister (2002) on Australia, Aimer and Miller (2002) or

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Parkinson (2001) on New Zealand, Svensson (2002) on

Denmark, Sinnott (2002) on Ireland, Freire and Baum (2003)

on Portugal, and Denver (2002) on Scotland and Wales.

Weixner (2002) wrote an interesting study on Germany, where

– after the reunification of the country – an extension and more

intense use of citizens’ direct participatory rights can be

observed. She also contributed to a publication by the

Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung (2006) that gives a good

overview on the direct democratic system in Germany.

An interesting strand of writings within the general direct

democratic literature is concerned with comparative treatments

of direct democratic procedures. Von Arx (2002) provides, for

instance, a valuable comparison of the Swiss and American

institutions. In the European context, Christin and Hug (2002),

Hug (2002), and Hug and Sciarini (2000) compare countries’

experience with referendums on EU integration. Given the

similar context that many (sub-groups of) European countries

are facing, these countries lend themselves as a good basis for

comparative studies.

Although some of the findings gained from these country- or

region-specific studies can be generalized and are not only

valid for the specific case (s) under investigation, it is important

to put them into context. As a consequence of the different

institutional settings and also of the different factors that

influence and shape the use of direct democratic instruments in

a given country or region, including for example, the economic,

social and organizational environment, in which citizens reside

and vote (see e.g. Bützer 2007 and Trechsel 2000), the focus

and emphasis of the studies, as well as the resulting conclusions

differ considerably. For instance, articles and books on the

American case generally exhibit a higher interest in the

influence of money in direct democratic votes than studies on

the Swiss case. The context, in which studies are written, also

determines and explains the differences in terms of the answers

they provide to the “four old questions”.

Answers to the key questions of direct

democracy research

Are voters competent?

The increased use of direct democratic procedures in well-

established, as well as in newer democracies, has led to a more

direct and larger participation by citizens in the decision-

making process of these countries. There has, therefore, been a

growing interest in the question of whether citizens in direct

democratic systems are competent enough to make reasonable

decisions.

Contrasting normative positions on this issue are provided by

the participatory and the representative model of democracy

respectively. Whereas in the participatory model, citizens are

seen as sufficiently qualified to participate in political

decisions, and consequently should be directly involved in the

decision-making process, the representative model of

democracy puts citizens’ competence into question. Schumpeter

(1962) and other adherents of the representative/ liberal model

support the view that ordinary citizens lack political interest

and the competence to directly participate in decision-making.

This explains their skepticism regarding direct democratic

procedures and why, according to their view, citizens’

participatory rights in the decision-making process should be

restricted to the election of representatives: “The mass of the

citizens are not qualified to decide high policy, so they can be

allowed to influence it only indirectly, by choosing those who

are to decide rather than deciding themselves” (Budge 1996).

By contrast, adherents of the participatory model argue that the

inclusion of citizens in the decision-making creates the

preconditions for their participation and competent choices. In

their view, direct democratic participation has an educative,

empowering effect on the citizens engaging in it.

The competence of the voters

In order to be able to judge on an empirical basis whether

voters are competent enough, one needs to know how they

arrive at their choices. Techniques that have been developed in

recent times, such as specially designed surveys, game theoretic

communication models, and laboratory experiments (see Lupia

and Matsusaka 2004) allow researchers to more accurately

study and empirically assess the context and mechanisms that

lead citizens to make a given choice in a direct democratic vote.

Particularly important in this regard are the analytical

approaches and insights gained from the research in the

psychology of attitudes (see e.g. Simon 1957, Tversky and

Kahneman 1974). Early empirical work on public opinion in

the 1950s and 1960s tended to strongly confirm belief in the

ignorance and incompetence of ordinary citizens, and in doing

so supported the view of the proponents of the representative

model of direct democracy. According to the dominant

paradigm of public opinion research at that time, mass publics

were distinguished by their minimal levels of political attention

and competence (Sniderman 1993). More recently, this

traditional “minimalist” view of voters has been challenged by

what Sniderman calls “the New Look in Public Opinion

Research”. Proponents of this view (including Lupia and Mc

Cubbins 1998, Page and Shapiro 1992), while recognizing that

most citizens are usually little interested in politics and badly

informed about it, argue that voters are nonetheless capable of

making reasonable decisions based upon cognitive short-cuts or

heuristics. Such “short-cuts” or “cues”, as they are also called,

can be provided for instance by political parties, interest

groups, or the media. Scholars differ in their presentation of the

kinds and number of short-cuts that are available to the voters

and in regard to which short-cut(s) they consider to be most

relevant.

In one of the first direct empirical examinations in this strand of

literature, Lupia (1994) shows that voters can use simple pieces

of information as substitutes for more detailed information. On

the basis of data drawn from an exit poll, Lupia defines three

categories. He distinguishes a first category of voters who know

neither the answers to the detailed questions about the

propositions to be voted on, nor the preferences of the actor that

has launched the initiative. A second category consists of

“model citizens” who know the answers to both the detailed

questions and the “initiator’s” preferences, and a third, middle-

range category with respondents who are not able to answer the

detailed questions but who know the “initiator’s preferences”.

The finding that leads Lupia to a positive conclusion about the

use of cues is that the “model citizens” as well as voters of the

middle-range category vote in very similar ways (see Lupia

2001, Lupia and Matsusuka 2004).

In the same vein as Lupia’s (2001) analysis, Bowler and

Donovan (1998) conducted a more expansive empirical study,

including numerous states and elections (with a focus on

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California), using both individual-level survey data and

aggregate data. They show how citizens employ cues and

heuristics in various contexts, focusing on three elements they

consider to be decisive in the voter’s decision-making:

“avoiding uncertainty by voting no, using instrumental

evaluations of propositions, and taking cues from political

elites” (Hug 2000: 455). Their finding is that citizens, although

not being fully informed about the details of a vote, “appear to

be able to figure out what they are for and against in ways that

make sense in terms of their underlying values and interests.

Failing that, others appear to use a strategy of voting ‘no’, when

information is lacking or when worries about general state

conditions are greatest.” They note that “just as legislators do,

these voters make choices purposefully, using available

information” (Bowler and Donovan 1998). How voters cope

with informational demands in Swiss referendum voting, is the

subject of Christin et al.’s (2002) study.

Following Eagly and Chaiken’s (1993) dual process theory, two

qualitatively different paths or strategies of individual opinion

formation can be distinguished: in addition to the heuristic

(shortcut-based) path, there is also a systematic path. Whereas

heuristic opinion formation relies on cues, not making any

reference to substantive arguments, systematic opinion

formation is essentially argument based.

Researchers differ on the questions of what the relative

importance of short-cuts or argument-based voting is, and what

circumstances make voters choose a specific type of cue or

strategy. Applying insights from the psychology of attitudes to

the study of direct democracy, many studies – primarily those

conducted in the U.S. context – found that people base their

choices mostly on relatively simple kinds of information, even

when the issue debated is of high relevance and complexity (see

Lupia and Matsusaka 2004). The results of Kriesi’s (2005)

study, which focuses on the Swiss experience, challenge this

finding and allow a rather optimistic conclusion with regard to

citizens’ competence. Kriesi shows that argument-based

decisions are generally highly important in direct democratic

votes and that citizens are consequently less minimalist than is

usually assumed. He finds that citizens who actually participate

in the vote prove to be significantly more competent than the

electorate overall, i.e. the most incompetent usually do not

participate in the vote. This kind of self-elimination mechanism

of the incompetent thus leads to a quasi-automatic reduction of

the possibility of an unreasonable decision – a finding that has

the potential to appease the fears of the critics of direct-

democratic procedures.

As a decisive factor in determining citizens’ competence, Kriesi

(2005) identifies the role played by the political elite during the

campaign preceding a vote. Combining individual-level survey

data and aggregate data, Kriesi studies the interaction process

between citizens and the political elites, and is able to show that

the more intense a campaign is, the more information is

provided to the average voter, which in turn raises the voters’

issue-specific competence and consequently increases

argument-based voting. Kriesi demonstrates that the political

elite, being in a position to determine the intensity of the

campaign that precedes a vote, decisively influences the quality

of the vote. Competence as considered in Kriesi’s study, is a

dynamic concept which is subject to changes that depend,

amongst others, on the behavior of the political elite (See also

the discussion on Educative effects of direct democracy).

Kriesi’s study covers a period of almost 20 years and should be

seen as a continuation and extension of the recently emerged

direct democracy literature on Switzerland that builds on

Zaller’s (1992) theory on the nature and origin of public

opinion. Previous contributions in this field include studies

written by Sciarini (2000) and Sciarini and Marquis (2000),

which mainly focus on votes on foreign policy issues. In the

same strand of literature, we also find studies that consider a

larger set of policy areas and propositions, as for example,

Bützer and Marquis (2002).

To conclude, the recent studies considered here on voter

competence in direct democratic systems, indicate that citizens

are sufficiently competent to make the kinds of decisions they

face in direct democratic votes.

Educative effects of direct democracy

The literature on educative effects completes the discussion on

the level of voter competency. At the same time it is an

extension to the research work on direct democracy’s effects on

public policy (see How does direct democracy affect policy?).

Educative effects can be understood as spillover effects of

direct democracy (Smith and Tolbert 2007, Tolbert and Smith

2006). The research focus here is not on the substantive policy

consequences that result from direct democratic votes, but on

how direct democratic voting measures potentially affect the

electoral process itself. The focus lays on the changes in citizen

attitudes and behavior and includes considerations on changes

in the strategies of interest groups and political parties (Tolbert

and Smith 2006).

Studies on direct democracy’s educative effects conclude that

citizens who are exposed to initiatives have more political

knowledge (M. Smith 2002, Tolbert and Mc Neal 2003) and

interest in politics (Tolbert and Mc Neal 2003). In explaining

the mechanism leading to more political knowledge and

interest, different authors emphasize the importance of the

institutional particularities of a direct democratic system. Kriesi

(2005) makes this point with regard to the Swiss system, where

direct democratic votes take place in a well-structured context,

and where the format of the vote is standardized and well

known by the citizens. In such a setting, with regularly and

frequently organized votes, voters have been shown to be likely

to "accumulate a set of habits allowing them to manage the task

of voting with a minimal amount of effort" (Kriesi 2005: 138).

Barankay et al. (2003) also concluded that the educative effect

of direct-democratic procedures depends on the institutional

specificities. Their focus is on institutional openness, which

they measure by the number of signatures necessary to force a

ballot and the time limit within which they have to be gathered.

Data for ballots in the Swiss cantons for the period from 1970

to 1996 serve as the basis for their empirical analysis. The

requirement of a large number of signatures has a positive

effect on awareness in the population at large, and generates

more information about the issues at hand, which – and this is a

key finding of their study – eventually leads more voters to turn

out.

How does direct democracy affect policy?

The question of how direct democracy affects policy is crucial.

It also pre-structures the possible answers to the other two

remaining “old” questions, i.e. the question relating to the role

of money, and the question of who the main beneficiaries of a

direct democratic system are – “the many or the few”.

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Direct democratic institutions affect policy in various ways.

Researchers generally distinguish between direct and indirect

effects. This distinction was already made by early writers on

direct democracy (e.g. Key and Crouch 1939, Rappard 1912)

and has been further developed by a growing number of recent

theoretical models dealing with referendums, such as those

proposed by Besley and Coate (2001), Gerber (1996), Hug

(2004), Matsusaka and Mc-Carty (2001), and Steunenberg

(1994).

Direct effects can be defined as the effects engendered

by the adoption of a proposition by the voters that would not

have found the necessary support in the legislature. Thus, direct

effects are the immediate consequences of popular votes.

Indirect effects of direct democracy, by contrast, refer to

differences in policies that do not depend on the success of a

popular vote on a given proposal; they concern the changes in

legislative behavior through the anticipation of the possible use

of direct democratic procedures (see Bowler and Donovan

2004, Gerber and Hug 2001). Direct and indirect effects of

direct democratic institutions often interact in complex and

subtle ways and sometimes may even cancel each other out.

From an empirical perspective, it is consequently extremely

difficult to make a distinction between them and study them

separately (Gerber and Hug 2001). We focus here on direct

effects and discuss the indirect effects in the next section.

Regarding the study of direct democracy’s direct effects,

scholars often center their research on the question of whether

initiative and referendum lead to better or to worse decisions

and outcomes. Is direct democracy desirable or not? This is an

essential question that has been extensively addressed in the

literature, going to the very heart of the direct democracy

debate, dividing the proponents of participatory democracy and

proponents of representative democracy into two opposing

camps. Among these studies we find those that attempted to

assess the quality of public decisions in terms of the economic

success that a given political unit has had, i.e. they use

economic indicators to measure direct democracy’s effect on

the political system. For Switzerland, a number of authors have

conducted comparisons at the cantonal and local level and

found a beneficial effect of direct democratic institutions in that

they would – through the more direct control – lead to better

macro-economic performance, lower public debt, lower public

expenditures in general and lower health expenditures in

particular, lower levels of tax evasion, and better public

services (Feld and Kirchgässner 2001, Feld and Matsusaka

2003, Feld and Savioz 1997, Kirchgässner et al. 1999, Freitag

and Vatter 2000, Pommerehne 1978, Vatter 2002, Vatter and

Rüefli 2003, Wagschal 1997). Blomberg et al. (2001) also adopt

a macroeconomic approach to studying the differences between

American states with and without a direct democratic system.

The finding is that states with the initiative system experience

faster growth in output per capita than those without, and that

the same states perform better in terms of public spending, i.e.

public spending in these states is found to be less wasteful (see

also Matsusaka 1995).

Studies concluding that direct democracy has an overall

beneficial effect on a country’s economy are challenged by

scholars, such as Borner and Rentsch (1997) whose research

focuses on direct democracy’s effects on economic growth.

According to their theoretical argumentation and empirical

findings, direct democratic instruments compromise the

conditions that allow an economy to grow successfully. The

existence of a direct democratic system would have a negative

For details see Hug and Häfliger (2007).

impact on a country’s capacity to innovate and to adapt to

changing circumstances; it would give interest groups the

power to slow down reform processes and may even enable

them to render a coherent and consistent strategy impossible. In

this perspective, direct democracy is presented as a danger for

stable, foreseeable framework conditions. The primacy of

popular sovereignty would lead to arbitrariness in state actions,

and hinder the political system in the setting of clear priorities.

The uncertainty related to such a political system would also

negatively impact on a country’s external relations – another

factor considered to be vital for the prosperity of a country’s

economy. As a particularly striking example in this context

Borner and Rentsch cite Switzerland’s rejection of entering the

European Economic Area in 1992, which, according to them,

can be traced back to the country’s institutional setting, i.e.

Switzerland’s direct democratic system.

The recent statistics-based research is informed by theoretical

models which consider the uncertainty on various aspects of the

political process, with which the government and the legislature

are confronted in a direct democratic system. Importantly, these

models suggest that the effect of direct legislation on policy

outcomes crucially depends on voter preferences, which

consequently should be taken into consideration when studying

direct democracy’s effects on public policy. In contrast to the

large number of studies focusing on economic outcomes,

studies of non-economic policies, which developed more

recently, attempt to make this link between preferences and

expected changes in policy consequences clearer by employing

more direct measures of preferences based on survey results

(Gerber and Hug 2001). Gerber’s well-known studies (1996 and

1999) on the differences that exist between US states with

regard to particular sets of social policies are examples of such

studies. Gerber finds that states with direct democratic

experience are more likely to require parental notification when

minors seek abortion and are more likely to use capital

punishment.

Placing the focus on voter preferences also allows us to better

understand why effects of direct democratic procedures on

public policies may differ considerably depending on the policy

area under consideration, i.e. different policy issues may

respond to direct democratic institutions in heterogeneous

ways. Context factors may play a key role. For the area of

defense policy, Bühlmann et al. (2006) identify a number of

political, economic, and sociological factors as being of

importance in determining policy outcomes. These include;

unemployment rate, proportion of foreign population,

population density, religion, as well as the composition of the

cantonal or municipal government (proportion of women,

presence of right-center majority). With regard to foreign

policy, Sciarini and Marquis (2000) compare the process of

voters’ opinion formation in foreign policy with the process in

domestic politics in general and find that while the process as

such is not intrinsically different, foreign policy appears

nevertheless as a particular case concerning the circumstances

in which opinion formation takes place (higher level of conflict,

higher intensity of campaign, different alignment within the

party system).

For a detailed discussion on the particularity of foreign policy in the

context of the Swiss direct democracy debate and its comparability and

interconnectedness with domestic politics, see Delley (1999). See also:

Marquis (2006).

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Among the scholars who highlight the importance of

institutions in determining policy outcomes, there are those

who point to particularities in the institutional framework as

being highly relevant. Starting from the criticism that most

studies on direct democracy’s effect on policy have simply

assumed that all initiatives are the same, Bowler and Donovan

(2004) show that the impact of the initiative process varies

depending on its specific design and use. They find that the

initiative has a greater impact where it is easier to get a measure

on the ballot, where it can more easily circumvent the

legislative process, and where it is used the most. Also

interesting in this context is Kriesi’s (2005) finding that the two

main direct democratic instruments existing in Switzerland,. the

referendum and the popular initiative, differ in terms of the

degree of impact they have; the referendum has been found to

be more challenging for the government than the initiative,

which is considerably less successful in votes.

The contributions above make it clear that the relationship

between policy, voters, legislatures, and institutions is highly

complex (Gerber and Hug 2001). Depending on the theoretical

model employed and the empirical specification, these factors

are attributed different importance in explaining direct

democracy’s effect on policy. The assessment of whether direct

democracy has beneficial effects will therefore differ. This can,

for instance, be illustrated by the example of some of the

studies cited in this section, which analyze direct democracy’s

effect on government spending (e.g. Feld and Kirchgaessner

(2001), Matsusaka (1995) cited above). Funk and Gathmann’s

(2006) criticize these studies for omitting voter preferences in

their analysis. As a consequence of this omission the impact of

institutions on policy-making would be overstated. Funk and

Gathmann’s results demonstrate that both voter preferences and

the institutional framework matter for the size and scope of

government (measured in terms of expenditures), but that

conditional on voter preferences, the effect of direct democracy

declines by 40%. Hug and Tsebelis (2002), further provide an

analysis in which this complex relationship between institutions

and voter preferences is investigated into depth at the

theoretical, as well as the empirical level.

How direct democracy affects the political system

Effects on the behavior of the legislature

The literature explicitly dealing with indirect effects of direct

democracy is extensive and well developed for the Swiss case.

A standard work on “the institutional logic” of direct

democracy is Neidhart’s (1970) treatise on the transformation

of the Swiss ‘plebiscitary democracy’ into a ‘negotiation

democracy’. Neidhart demonstrates how democratic institutions

exert strong pressure on political actors to come up with

compromise solutions. The veto power given to the people

through the referendum forces the legislature to take into

account the citizens’ preferences and to adapt their policies

respectively.

The introduction of procedures to consult interest

groups about new legislation, as well as the existence of a grand

coalition government at the federal level, in which the four

major Swiss political parties are represented (since 1959),

illustrate the need for bargaining in a direct democratic system.

The empowering effect that direct democratic instruments can have on

citizens is highlighted in Frey’s (1994) study which portrays, initiatives

and referenda as "effective means by which the voters can regain

control over politicians"; direct participation would serve to keep the

ultimate agenda-setting power with the voters.

Neidhart’s argument has subsequently been further developed

and refined by other scholars (e.g. Immergut 1992).

Indirect effects of direct democracy may take different forms

depending on the specific instrument under consideration. In a

comparison of the Swiss cantons, Vatter (2000) shows that

optional referendums without a quorum of consent correspond

to majoritarian forms of democracy, whereas mandatory

referendums and initiatives with a quorum of consent share

similarities with forms of power-sharing that are typical for

consensus democracies.

Other authors, such as Linder (1999),

point out the contrasting effects of the two key devices of Swiss

direct democracy; the referendum and the initiative. The

referendum has been found to be an instrument that preserves

the status quo (i.e. having a conservative effect), whereas the

initiative has a innovative effect, bringing new issues to the

political agenda. Freitag and Vatter (2006) investigate the

question of whether direct citizen participation in politics act as

a brake or as an accelerator with regard to fiscal expansion in

Swiss cantons. On the basis of their pooled time-series analyses

they can confirm the expected slowing down effect of the fiscal

referendum, but not the postulated accelerating effect of the

initiative.

Employing a comparative research design, a number of

quantitative studies confirm the qualitative research findings

with regard to direct democracy’s indirect effects; that the

simple threat of initiatives may influence how legislators

behave. Evidence in this regard has, for example, been provided

by Gerber’s (1999) study on the differences between different

U.S. states’ abortion policies, where it is shown that interest

groups can indirectly influence policy outcomes by invoking

the threat of an initiative to spur legislators into action. These

kind of indirect effects have been found to be relevant in a

variety of additional policy areas, including the death penalty

(Gerber 1999), tax and spending (Matsusaka 1995, 2000,

Schaltegger and Feld 2001), and minority rights (Gerber and

Hug 1999).

Effects on political organizations

Political parties have been found to adopt different strategies in

response to the challenges in a direct democracy. Smith and

Tolbert (2004) demonstrate that the use of initiatives in the

United States is, amongst others, linked to mobilizing political

parties (see also e.g. Bowler and Donovan 1998, Smith and

Tolbert 2001). They investigated political parties’ strategic use

of direct democracy and found clear evidence that political

organizations use the process not only for instrumental ends,

but also to change and shape the electoral landscape by

mobilizing base supporters, driving wedges into opposing

coalitions, and draining the coffers of political opponents

(Tolbert and Smith 2006). In an empirical study of the 26 Swiss

cantons, Ladner and Brändle (1999) show that direct

democracy in Switzerland

functions hand in hand with more

professional and formalized party organizations. This

interesting finding is in opposition to the widely shared view in

the literature that direct

democracy weakens political parties – a

view, for which de Vreese (2006) has provided empirical

support in a recent study. De Vreese, investigating the

For a detailed discussion of how direct democracy affects the size and

scope of government activity, see Wagschal (1997), Vatter (2000), and

Vatter and Freitag (2007).

He thereby is able to establish, theoretically and empirically, the

connection between direct democracy and Lijphart’s (1999) theory of

the two competing democracy types, i.e. the majoritarian democracy

and the concensus democracy (see also Vatter and Freitag 2007).

Center for Comparative and International Studies, ETH Zurich and University of Zurich Living Reviews in Democracy, 2010 | 6

challenges that political parties face in referendums, concludes

that their control over outcomes and the electorate is

considerably restricted. While political parties are still key

actors in a referendum campaign, a number of factors have

been found to weaken their position: ambiguous cueing,

internal dissidence, electoral volatility and limited impact on

citizens’ prime information sources all reduce the influence of

political parties. Moreover, he shows that smaller parties

campaigning with a clear message and supported by a fairly

homogeneous electoral segment are successful in aligning their

voters with the party, while larger and broader political parties

are less successful.

To some extent this latter point is in line with the finding of

Papadopoulos (1991) who, in his study explicitly focusing on

direct democracy’s effect on small parties in Switzerland,

shows how right wing parties had been strengthened through

the availability of direct democratic procedures. Recent

research in the Swiss context confirms from a more general

perspective the strengthening effect of direct democracy on

political parties (see the studies by Höglinger 2008 and Tresch

2008.

Political parties’ behavior during campaigns – and the strategy

of the political elite more specifically – has been found to play

an important role regarding the outcome ofvotes, as well as

participation rates. The results of Kriesi’s (2005) study suggest

that a campaign’s intensity, which reflects the mobilization

effort by the political elite, is very important in view of the

quality of the citizens’ voting choice. A general finding of

various studies is that consensus within the political elite is

decisive for the outcome of a vote (e.g. Freire and Baum 2003,

Marquis 2006). Consensual strategies by the elite have been

found to allow for a certain control over the effects of direct

democratic instruments (Trechsel 2000). In the case of a

division within the political elite, this control is considerably

diminished.

By controlling the intensity of the campaign, the elites

determine to a great extent the level of participation by the

citizens. Thus, mobilization by the elite during the campaign

preceding the vote increases both the citizens’ capacity to vote

and their motivation to do so (Kriesi 2005). This positive effect

that direct democracy can have on voter turnout (see also

Barankay et al. 2003 above), which is considered to be a

particularly important educative effect, could also be confirmed

for the U.S. context (Donovan and Smith 2004, M. Smith

2001). Research finds that the existence of direct democratic

procedures, and the presence of the initiative in particular,

increases political participation in low-profile mid-term

elections (e.g. M. Smith 2001) as well as in higher-profile

presidential elections (Tolbert and Smith 2005). In line with

Kriesi’s (2005) findings Smith (2001) argues that campaign

efforts – in combination with salient propositions – can increase

the turnout.

Furthermore, citizens living in places with direct democratic

experience have been found to be more likely to contribute to

citizen interest groups (Smith and Tolbert 2004). According to

Boehmke’s (2002) findings, the existence of the initiative

process potentially increases the number of interest groups

active in a state.

In his comparative analysis of the 24 Swiss

Tolbert and Smith (2005), p. 296

For a more detailed overview on the literature on educative effects,

see Tolbert and Smith (2005), Tolbert and Smith (2006), or Smith and

cantons, Freitag (2006) also arrives at the conclusion that

having direct democracy in place promotes a lively

associational life. Freitag highlights the importance of this

finding with regard to the concept of social capital and the

latter’s relevance to the functioning of a democracy: direct

democratic procedures, together with an inclusive government

coalition and a high degree of local autonomy are political

institutions that are beneficial to the creation of social capital.

He sees in these institutions the basis for a feasible ‘top-down’

solution to escape the vicious circle of distrust, disengagement

and weak democracy, from which entities lacking social capital

suffer (see Putnam 1993: 117).

Effects on the general democratic functioning and support

There are studies demonstrating that political efficacy is

enhanced by direct democratic procedures (Bowler and

Donovan 2002, Hero and Tolbert 2004, Mendelsohn and Cutler

2000). Moreover, a large number of scholars confirm that

democratic procedures have beneficial effects on the political

process as a whole. On the basis of the Swiss experience,

Papadopoulos (2001) establishes, for instance, that direct

democratic institutions have an integrative and legitimizing

function. Allowing citizens to directly participate in decision-

making appears to lead to the acceptance of collective decisions

and in doing so contributes to the stabilization and the

legitimization of a democratic polity (see also Papadopoulos

1998).

Related to this legitimization function, Frey and Stutzer (2002)

find that people living in Swiss cantons where the direct

democratic system is more developed are happier and more

satisfied. They argue that this greater satisfaction does not only

result from the higher level of public performance, but that it is

also a direct consequence of the greater legitimacy of public

decisions made in direct democratic procedures. Frey and

Stutzer succeed in empirically separating these two effects, the

effects of direct-democratic institutions on public performance

and their purely procedural effects – and are, thus, able to

confirm their hypotheses. They find that the opportunity for

direct-democratic participation does indeed have a direct effect

on the general life-satisfaction of Swiss citizens - an effect

which is highly robust. The relationship between cantonal direct

democracy and perceived subjective well-being in Switzerland

has been re-evaluated and challenged by different contributions,

such studies by Dorn et al. (2008) and Fischer (2005). Fischer

shows that the results are problematic since they are not

reproducible with other data, and that the empirical analyses

themselves cause crucial problems of inference. Using new data

from the Swiss Household Panel, Dorn et al. find that once

language is controlled for, no robust significant relationship

between the extent of direct democracy and life-satisfaction can

be observed, and that direct democracy does not affect well-

being within language groups in Switzerland.

Furthermore, Vatter (2000) highlights the potential of popular

rights as "effective and sensitive instruments for conflict

regulation" and their potential contribution to the "general

improvement of democratic functioning", which is particularly

relevant for highly developed societies, characterized by

"heterogeneity and polyvalence of political groups and

subcultures" in densely populated urban areas (see also

Trechsel and Kriesi 1996, Vatter 2000: 185-87).

Tolbert (2007).

Center for Comparative and International Studies, ETH Zurich and University of Zurich Living Reviews in Democracy, 2010 | 7

Does direct democracy benefit the many or the few?

In the scope of the discussion on the beneficial or non-

beneficial effect of direct democracy, some scholars focus on

the question of whether direct democracy benefits the many,

meaning citizens, or the few, meaning special interest groups. A

possible way to approach the question, which has been the

focus of several studies, is to evaluate how close the

correspondence is between citizens’ preferences and policy

outcomes in political entities with, and without referendums or

initiatives. Almost all theoretical models conceived to study

direct democratic instruments (including Besley and Coate

2001, Denzau, Mackay and Weaver 1981, Gerber 1996, Hug

2004, Matsusaka and McCarty 2001, Romer and Rosenthal

1979, and Steunenberg 1994) come to the conclusion that if a

particular political entity has a system of direct democracy,

policy outcomes should reflect more closely the preferences of

citizens than in entities without such a system.

The empirical evidence, however, is mixed. Among the scholars

who share the view that direct democracy favors special interest

groups over the general population, we find the Swiss

economist Borner (Borner et al. 1990, Borner and Rentsch

1997), who argues that the referendum as well as the initiative,

rather than being instruments of the people as a whole, mainly

serve organized interests and promote rent-seeking behavior.

According to Borner, through the existence of direct democratic

procedures, small interest groups are be given a veto power and

are in a position to exert direct influence on political processes.

As a consequence, the state’s capacity to act is considerably

restricted or completely blocked. Other scholars that criticize

direct democratic institutions for biasing policies toward the

preferences of interest groups include Broder (2000), Schrag

(1998), and Smith (1998). Broder for instance, not only fears

that direct democracy risks being transformed from a tool of the

regular citizen to an instrument of special interest groups (see

also Gerber’s (1999) “populist paradox”), but argues that by

opening the door to demagogues and influential and wealthy

interest groups and individuals, direct democracy has evolved

to become a threat to America’s representative democratic

system.

Other researchers who challenge the general assumption that

direct democratic processes lead to public policy that better

reflects mass preferences are scholars, such as Camobreco

(1998), Hagen et al. (2001), and Lascher et al. (1996), who

empirically show that direct democratic institutions have no

significant positive influence with regard to the recognition of

citizens’ preferences (Matsusaka 2001: 1).

From a theoretical perspective, however – as has been noted by

Hug and Häfliger (2007) – very narrow assumptions have to be

made in order to obtain models that predict policy outcomes

that are biased toward the will of special interest groups (Hug

2004, Matsusaka and McCarty 2001). In the same study, Hug

and Häfliger make the observation that despite the wealth of

theoretical models which exist on this topic, empirical studies

which test for this specific theoretical implication are rather

scarce. Among them, we find Gerber (1996), Gerber (1999),

Hug (2004), Matsusaka (2004), and Matsusaka (2006). The

authors have two explanations for the scarcity of empirical

analyses in this specific research area. Firstly, researchers have

encountered difficulty in obtaining good information on the

preferences of voters in the policy areas under examination, and

secondly, sophisticated empirical models are needed that allow

for unbiased inferences and a correct assessment of whether

referendums lead to policies more closely reflecting the voter

preferences. Regarding the latter point, it is important to

distinguish cases where policy outcomes can be measured

dichotomously (e.g. presence or absence of a policy), and cases

where policy outcomes are continuous. For dichotomous policy

outcomes, a simple empirical model can be adequate (such as a

correctly specified binary response model or a simple

comparison of voter preferences and outcomes), but this is not

possible when policy outcomes are continuous. This point was

made by Hug (2001) and Matsusaka (2001), who have both

proposed possible solutions to this analytical challenge.

In agreement with the large majority of the theoretical models,

Matsusaka (2004) finds that it is mainly the many, the citizens,

who benefit from the direct democratic process and not the few,

i.e. the special interests. After assembling and analyzing tax and

spending data to determine initiatives’ effects on policies,

Matsusaka compared these policies with the expressed

preferences of citizens derived from previously examined

opinion data.

The question of who benefits from direct democracy presents a

special twist with regard to countries with a dominating

political majority and one or several minorities. Vatter (2000)

presents direct democratic procedures as substitute power-

sharing instruments for minorities that are not sufficiently

integrated. He provides empirical evidence that optional

referendums and initiatives are used more readily by

underrepresented minorities where the political system is less

consensual, and they therefore serve as alternative instruments

of power distribution. In contrast to studies that shine a positive

light on direct democracy’s integrating function, Gamble (1997)

states in her analysis on civil rights initiatives in the United

States for the period between 1959 and 1993, that the political

majority has repeatedly used direct democracy to put the rights

of political minorities to a popular vote, and that anti-civil

rights initiatives "have an extraordinary record of success"

(Gamble 1997: 261). The question of whether direct democracy

is beneficial or detrimental to minorities is also of special

interest in ethnically divided societies. Hajnal et al. (2002)

respond to critics that "argue that direct legislation allows an

electoral majority to undermine the interests and rights of racial

and ethnic minorities". They conclude their analysis of direct

democracy outcomes in California between 1978 and 2000 by

stating that there is "little overall anti-minority bias in the

system of direct democracy" (Hajnal et al. 2002: 154, 174).

Their study shows that critics have overstated the negative

impact of direct democracy by narrowly focusing on one, or a

few minority-targeted initiatives. In the debate on how minority

rights fare in direct democracy votes (see also Gerber and Hug

1999, Haider-Markel 2007), the jury is still out.

We can now turn to the question of what role money plays in

direct democratic votes, since this question can also be linked

to the discussion of who benefits from direct democracy.

What role does money play?

Many scholars have attempted to measure the effect of money

on direct democratic votes. Early contributions in this research

field, like the study written by Magleby (1984), compare

passage rates for small samples of initiatives in which one side

clearly outspent the other, to passage rates where spending was

roughly equal (see also Lee 1978, Lowenstein 1982, Owens and

Center for Comparative and International Studies, ETH Zurich and University of Zurich Living Reviews in Democracy, 2010 | 8

Wade 1986, Shockley 1980, and Zisk 1987). The results

indicate that heavy spending against a proposition tends to lead

to the proposition’s defeat, whereas heavy spending supporting

a proposition has a minimal effect (Lupia and Matsusaka 2004).

This general finding has been confirmed by more recent

studies, which were able to employ more sophisticated

techniques. Gerber (1999) for instance, estimates regressions

for a sample of 125 propositions in eight American states in

order to assess the effect of spending in favor and against a

measure on the measure’s success (it is controlled for the type

of spending and other variables).

In line with the earlier

contributions, her analysis shows that spending against a

proposition has a large and statistically relevant negative effect

on its likelihood to be passed, whereas spending in favor of the

proposition has a small and rather insignificant effect. Gerber

concludes that “the empirical evidence provides further basis

for rejecting the allegation that economic interest groups buy

policy outcomes through the direct legislation process” – a

conclusion that finds further support in a related work by

Bowler and Donovan (1998).

In contrast to these studies stands the work by American

journalist Broder (2000). Claiming that money has a significant

impact both on whether an initiative is passed or fails, Broder

argues that interest groups who spend significantly more will

win. The results of his descriptive study agree with scholarly

research, which has shown that interest group contributions do

have an impact on the outcome of ballots (Ellis 2002, Schrag

1998, Smith 1998).

Broder (2000) holds the view that in the past (the Progressive

era), citizen groups controlled the process and that democracy

was derailed due to the passage of time. Over time, grassroots

campaigns turned into a lucrative political industry, with a lot

of money involved. In this manner, he promotes an idealized

vision of direct democracy as it was in the past. This view has

been challenged by the evidence provided in Allswang’s (2000)

study on the California ballot, in which he evaluates all the

initiatives and referendums from 1912 to 1998. By placing the

direct democratic instruments into a historical context,

Allswang tries to further a better understanding of their

contemporary use. He finds that the U.S. direct legislation

politics in the past display a strong similarity to those of the

present regarding various aspects, including the role that money

plays. Based on historical examples he is able to show that the

money spent by organized economic interest groups played a

crucial role from the beginning.

In a comprehensive review of the contributions to the question

of what role money plays in direct democratic votes in the

American context, Lupia and Matsusaka (2004) conclude that

money matters, but in a nuanced way. They emphasize that the

evidence on spending also indicates that the initiative process

does not necessarily lead to policies that are contrary to the

positions of the majority. In the absence of preexisting public

support, the financial resources of business groups would be

ineffective in changing the status quo. Moreover, the financial

resources of the majority of citizen groups would be too scarce

to bring about a decisive change.

In her analysis, she examines the effects of contributions from

economic groups who she defined as groups that are rich but have a

small membership base, and of citizen groups displaying the opposite

characteristics.

A recent study by Stratmann (2006) voices some general

criticism regarding the literature that examines the importance

of campaign spending in terms of their impact on the success or

defeat of ballot measures. He points out that the methods, as for

instance used by Gerber (1999), do not control for the

endogeneity of interest group campaigning. Groups may spend

strategically, depending on the expected outcome of the ballot

measure. Stratmann addresses this methodological challenge by

suggesting a research design that allows for controlling of voter

preferences and initiative particulars, and is thus able to show

that not only opposing, but also supporting interest groups’

campaigning has a quantitatively important and statistically

significant influence on ballot measure outcomes.

In addressing the question of the role of money in direct

democratic systems, we have so far concentrated on the studies,

written in the context of American politics, which constitute the

bulk of the literature with regard to this specific question. In the

literature on the Swiss direct democratic system, the role of

money, although being an important subject, does not receive

the same level of attention. It is still worth mentioning a

number of valuable contributions that have been made in this

context. Kriesi (2005) for instance, finds that the overall

relationship between the direction of campaign spending and

the outcome of the vote in Switzerland is rather weak. He

explains that this surprising result is partly due to the fact that

initiatives, for which the campaigns in Switzerland are much

more intensive than for referenda, are almost always rejected by

the government and virtually always fail to pass in at the ballot.

When anticipating a close vote, the government’s camp invests

large sums in the campaign against the initiatives, and is in

most cases able to impose itself against its challengers. For the

referenda, it has been found that the overall relationship

between the direction of spending and the outcome of the vote

is closer than for initiatives, but is still relatively weak. The

reason for this is that the minorities challenging the

government’s project by an optional referendum invest in their

cause, no matter whether they anticipate a close vote or not. In

his study, Kriesi has been able however, to discern one situation

in which the direction of investment in a campaign becomes

decisive. In the case of referenda that are highly contested, the

side that is able to mobilize more resources during the course of

the campaign will virtually always impose itself against the

other camp. This result supports in a very specific context the

general conclusion of Hertig (1982), who maintains that money

plays a decisive role in influencing the results of a vote, and

that in theory, it is possible to buy the outcome of a vote in

Switzerland. A note of caution has to be added however on such

general statements on the effect of spending in Switzerland, as

made by Hertig: in both works cited, it is not information on

campaign spending as such that is used, but proxies are

employed.

Conclusion

The literature reviewed in this article included for the most part

books and articles written on the American and Swiss

experience with direct democracy. This reflects the general

research concentration that exists in the field. However, the

introduction and more frequent use of direct democratic

procedures in more recently established democracies such as in

the post-communist countries of Eastern Europe leads to a new

dynamic and offers ground for new studies. The insights gained

from the direct democratic experience in the “older”

Center for Comparative and International Studies, ETH Zurich and University of Zurich Living Reviews in Democracy, 2010 | 9

democracies   can   serve   as   a   useful   basis   for   continuing 
academic work, as well as for policy-making in these countries.
This review also highlights the need to be cautious with regard 
to   generalizing   findings   gained   in   a   specific   context.   By 
studying the literature on the American and Swiss case more in 
detail, it was possible to carve out important differences. The 
study of the role of money in direct democratic votes and the 
question of who direct democratic systems benefit – the many 
or  the   few   –  are  extensively  treated   in  the   literature   on   the 
American  case, whereas  we  cannot  find  the same interest  in 
these questions on the part of the authors studying the Swiss 
direct   democratic   system.   This   can   be   explained   by   the 
differences that exist between the direct democratic systems in 
the   two   countries.   Consequently,   for   a   comprehensive 
understanding   of   the   functioning   and   the   effects   of   direct 
democracy, it does not suffice to narrowly focus on studying the 
direct democratic instruments as such. It is important to open 
the   scope   of   research   and   to   take   into   account   the   bigger 
context   in   which   direct   democratic   procedures   are   placed, 
including the general institutional framework, the strategies of 
political elites, and voter preferences, as well as economic and 
sociological context factors.
The  leading  scholars   on   direct  democracy  whose   books  and 
articles   have   been   reviewed   here   give   an   overall   picture   of 
direct democratic procedures and their consequences, which is 
somewhat positive. This optimistic view can be illustrated by 
the   answers   the   scholars   found   to   the   four   “old”   questions. 
Recent   research   has   demonstrated   that   voters   are   more 
competent and the relationship between money and power is 
less   nefarious   than   has   been   suggested.   Furthermore,   direct 
democracy   has   been   found   to   potentially   enhance   citizens’ 
political  interest  and competence.  Other  evidence  shows that 
the existence and use of direct democratic procedures lead to 
public   policy   that   is   more   responsive   to   voter   preferences. 
Despite   the   important   number   of   works   highlighting   the 
beneficial effects of direct democracy, the empirical evidence is 
nevertheless mixed. The sometimes even contradicting results 
of studies on direct democracy are also a consequence of the 
fact that the relationship between direct democratic institutions, 
policy,   voter   preferences,   and   further   relevant   variables   is 
highly   complex,   and   that   these   factors’  respective   roles   in 
determining policy outcomes is difficult to assess. Depending 
on the approach taken and the emphasis laid on different factors 
and how they are linked to each other, results may considerably 
differ.
Reviewing the literature, we have found a general consensus 
that direct democracy affects policy – directly and indirectly – 
and  furthermore,  has  an  impact  on  the  political  system as   a 
whole.   As   regards  direct  policy  consequences   of   direct 
democracy, scholars have identified potentially positive effects, 
such as better macro-economic performance and better public 
services etc., as well as less beneficial effects such as slower 
economic   growth,   inconsistent   and   incoherent   policies.   In 
contrast,   research   on   direct   democracy’s  indirect  policy 
consequences generally refers to changes in the attitudes and 
behavior of political actors, including the legislature, political 
parties, and citizens. Studies on more general influences on the 
political system, such as a potentially stabilizing and integrating 
effect   of   direct   democratic   procedures,   form   an   additional 
strand within the literature. As nature of the research topic is 
highly   complex,   the   answers   to   the   question   of  how   direct 
democracy   affects   policy   are   often   diverse   and   complex 
themselves. Nevertheless, all of the implications resulting from 
direct democratic institutions prove to be interesting and worth 
looking   into.   With  the   rise   of   the   use   of   direct   democratic 
procedures within states but also cross-nationally, the study of 
direct   democracy   will   continue   to   be   a   dynamic   field   of 
research that is of high relevance and interest.
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